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Abstract
This dissertation deals with two different aspects of environmental policies in a global-
ized world.
First, the impact of exogenous environmental regulations on a domestic polluting sec-
tor´s international competitiveness is investigated. The applied model framework con-
siders the government´s re-election incentives and the interrelation between environmental-
and industrial policies.
Second, the impact of strategic competition for internationally mobile capital on the
level of environmental policies in the competing countries is examined. Also here, a
second policy instrument, a corporate-profit tax, is available. Furthermore, the adverse
welfare effects of a non-cooperative policy choice and different approaches of interna-
tional cooperation to overcome such suboptimal policy outcome are discussed.
The results of both parts of the analysis suggest that frequently expressed public con-
cerns as well as the predictions of many economic analyses may be too pessimistic. In
particular, neither does the imposition of stricter environmental regulations necessarily
weaken the international competitiveness of a domestic polluting sector, nor does com-
petition for foreign investments necessarily lead to an erosion of environmental-policy
levels. Finally, even if countries do not achieve agreement on completely cooperative
policy-making, partial cooperation in one instrument may serve as a politically feasible
means to help them approach the socially optimal welfare level.
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1.1 Motivation
“Wettbewerbsfähigkeit gefährdet. Deutschland hat ein Wettbewerbsproblem (...).
Klimaschutz darf deshalb nicht zu weiteren Wettbewerbsverschlechterungen des
Standortes führen. In praktisch allen Staaten außer Deutschland wird das Thema
Klimawandel auch unter wirtschaftsplitischem Kalkül betrachtet. Dieses muss auch für
Klimapolitik in Deutschland gelten.”
Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie (BDI), 2005.1
“Finally, globalization is creating new challenges in the field of tax policy. Tax
schemes aimed at attracting financial and other geographically mobile activities can
create harmful tax competition between States, carrying risks of distorting trade and
investment and could lead to the erosion of national tax bases. (...) Such harmful tax
competition diminishes global welfare and undermines taxpayer confidence in the
integrity of tax systems.”
Communique issued by the Heads of State of the G7 countries in 1996.2
The public perception of the term “globalization” is rather vague. This might be the
reason why the continuing integration of world markets worries many people and fre-
quently triggers concerns on its presumably adverse impacts. The statements cited
above stand exemplary for numerous similar arguments invoked in the public debate
all over the world.
The first quotation hints at one aspect often associated with globalization: the in-
creasing competition domestic firms face when markets are opened up for international
trade. Not only among industry representatives, but also within the general public, the
following notion predominates: Local governments should support domestic industries
particularly exposed to international competition in order to secure domestic produc-
tion, employment and welfare. In this context, it is not surprising that there is a
widespread opposition against policy measures that apparently worsen domestic firms´
international competitive position. Environmental regulations constitute one example
of particular current relevance. For instance, the number of multilateral environmental
agreements has been rising rapidly in recent years. Once a government has ratified such
agreement, it is committed to the negotiated environmental goals and has to implement
the necessary policy measures. However, whenever politicians announce the intention
to introduce novel environmental restrictions, they trigger intense debates and opposi-
tion.
1Cited from a German industry lobby’s position paper on climate policies. In English: “International
competitiveness in danger. Germany has a competitiveness problem (...). Climate-protection policies
thus must not further weaken the country’s competitive position. Practically all states except for
Germany address the issue of climate change under consideration of economic policy aspects. This has
to be ensured also in Germany.” Source: http : //www.bdi.eu/Klima− und− Umwelt.htm.
2This Communique was issued at the G7 Summit in Lyon, 1996. Cited from OECD (1998).
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The second quotation hints at another aspect associated with globalization: the inter-
national mobility of firms. This so-called “footlooseness” induces governments to engage
in strategic policy-competition in order to attract foreign direct investment (FDI in the
following) to their country and increase domestic welfare. The prevalent public con-
cerns and debates in this respect can be subsumed under the heading “harmful tax
competition”. Those concerns issue from the belief that market integration intensifies
international policy competition and so induces a so-called “Race to the Bottom” (RtB)
with detrimental rather than beneficial social-welfare consequences. In particular, gov-
ernments concerned about deterring FDI may relax environmental- or corporate-tax
policies. Accordingly, FDI competition is believed to harm the environment in addition
to the adverse welfareimpact of suboptimally low tax levels.
Since also many economic analyses find support for both the “international-
competitiveness”- and the “environmental-RtB” concerns, the current dissertation aims
at challenging this pessimistic perception of globalization. The subsequent papers show
that the negative notion on the globalization/environmental-policy relationship may be
owed to the ignorance of different aspects relevant for governmental decision-making.
Most importantly, both approaches followed in this dissertation have in common that
they analyze the interrelation between two policy instruments rather than considering
only one (i.e. environmental policy). The purpose is to approach the theoretical models
to the actually observable policy conditions and by this means derive conclusions more
relevant for “real-world” policy-making. Each of the two approaches focusses on one of
the above-mentioned specific aspects.
The first topic, international competitiveness, is investigated from a unilateral perspec-
tive. The applied model incorporates political-economy aspects of policy-making: As
the ultimate goal of governments is to be re-elected, they have an incentive to maxi-
mize political support from different interest groups when choosing environmental- and
industrial policies. Politicians therefore care for the international competitiveness of
domestic industries. Broadly speaking, the main determinant of policy outcomes in
this approach is the trade-off between different lobby groups’ utility levels.
The second topic, international capital mobility, is investigated in a two-country model
of strategic environmental- and corporate-tax-policy competition for FDI. Here, the
strategic interactions between competing countries constitute the main determinant of
policy-outcomes. The analysis also discusses the welfare implications of globalization in
some detail. In particular, alternative ways of international cooperation with the aim of
overcoming the suboptimal non-cooperative policy regime are introduced: the conclu-
sion of an international agreement on environmental- or on corporate-tax policy.3 How
do such treaties perform in improving on social welfare, if the social optimum (attained
by cooperation in both instruments) is not feasible?
Both papers indeed derive conclusions that are, in many respects, contradicting public
concerns and many economic one-policy analyses on the one hand, and, on the other
3In the following, IEA stands for “International Environmental Agreement” and ITA for “Interna-
tional Tax Agreement”.
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hand, more consistent with empirically observable “real-world” policy patterns. The
results suggest a much more optimistic view on the globalization/environmental-policy
relationship. Two crucial findings of this dissertation can be roughly summarized as fol-
lows: First, stricter environmental regulations do not necessarily weaken, but may even
enhance the domestic polluting industry’s international competitive position. Second,
strategic policy competition for FDI does not necessarily induce an environmental RtB.
Furthermore, continuing market integration (in terms of declining trade costs) does not
come at the cost of laxer environmental-policy levels. On the contrary, the intensity of
FDI competition even declines.
Note, however, that these positive results do not hold in normative terms: Tax competi-
tion for FDI clearly exerts an adverse impact on the competing countries´ social-welfare
levels relative to the optimal policy combination a social planner would implement.
However, both international one-policy agreements constitute a “step into the right di-
rection”– the ITA even more than the IEA– in terms of improving on aggregate social
welfare.
1.2 Outline
The subsequent Parts II and III contain the main analysis of this dissertation.
Part II deals with the “international-competitiveness aspect” of environmental-policy
making in a globalized world. Chapter 1 motivates the research issue, provides an illus-
trative example to demonstrate the practical relevance of the paper’s conclusions, and
reviews the related literature. Chapter 2 introduces the small-open-economy model.
A political-support-function approach is applied to examine the overall impact of ex-
ogenous environmental regulations on the international competitiveness of a domestic
polluting sector. The main contribution of Chapter 3 is to show that restrictive envi-
ronmental policies do not necessarily harm the affected industry, if a government’s re-
election incentives and the availability of an additional policy instrument are taken into
account. In the political equilibrium, the polluting industry is even granted industrial-
policy compensation in excess of its initial environmental-policy loss.
Part III addresses the “capital-mobility aspect” of the globalization/environmental-
policy relationship. A brief introduction to the issue and an overview of the related
literature in Chapter 5 are followed by the positive analysis in Chapter 6: A simple
two-country model of strategic FDI competition is used to investigate the interrelation
between corporate-profit- and emissions taxes. The focus is on the question whether
FDI competition results in a RtB in environmental policies. Furthermore, the effects of
market integration and changes in environmental preferences are examined. The main
result is that countries rely on the profit, rather than the environmental tax as instru-
ment in strategic policy competition. FDI competition does therefore not harm the
environment. Chapter 7 complements the positive results by a normative analysis of
the model. Two alternative means to improve on aggregate social welfare are discussed:
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The countries may either cooperate on corporate-tax, or on environmental policies.
Both one-policy agreements turn out to raise welfare compared to the non-cooperative
policy regime, but do not yield the maximum possible welfare level associated with the
social optimum (i.e. under complete cooperation in both instruments).
Finally, Part IV joins all main chapters. Its purpose is to derive common conclusions
and general implications concerning the research issues and “real-world” observations
introduced in Part I to motivate the analysis carried out in this dissertation.
Part II
The Political Economy of
Environmental Regulations and
Industry Compensation
6
Abstract
This paper uses a political-economy framework to analyze what consequences the ex-
ogenous introduction of a quantitative restriction on total emissions in a small open
economy has on the strength of domestic industrial policy. The question is whether
and to what extent the government, if it takes different lobby groups´ interests into
consideration, has an incentive to compensate the polluting industry for stricter envi-
ronmental regulations by granting higher protection to it.
It turns out that the government will indeed increase subsidization of the industry af-
fected by environmental regulation. This compensation will even be more than complete
if environmental interests are taken into account. Hence, contrary to what might be
expected, the polluting sector realizes a net benefit if stricter environmental regulations
are introduced.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation and Outline
Whenever a government announces its intention to introduce novel environmental-
policy measures, often driven by the aim to fulfil the obligations associated with some
international treaty, it triggers intense public debates. In particular, representatives of
the affected polluting industries articulate their concerns about losing in terms of inter-
national competitiveness, if stricter environmental regulations are imposed on them.1
This concern is supported by many economic analyses like those belonging to the liter-
ature on the “pollution haven hypothesis”.2
On the other hand, governments are, for political reasons like e.g. re-election concerns,
obviously not immune to the interests of important lobby groups like industry. We can
thus expect policy concessions that help the affected groups accept the environmental
restrictions imposed on them.
1In what concerns the term “competitiveness” which is often used in the public debate, there are
diverse views on how to measure this appropriately. At the firm level like in this paper, possible
indicators besides profits/profitability include market share, productivity or a composite measure of
all (see e.g. Triebswetter (2003)). Furthermore, many different measures at a national level exist (for
a discussion see e.g. Mulatu (2004) or OECD (2006)). In the following, the term “competitiveness” is
used as synonym for “profit”.
In what concerns the sectoral-competitiveness impacts of different environmental-policy measures,
OECD (2006) provides some theoretical and empirical case studies e.g. for the steel sector. OECD
(2009) summarizes the (indecisive) key findings of recent theoretical and empirical studies on the
competitiveness effects of environmental policies.
2According to the pollution haven hypothesis (PHH), countries with relatively lax environmental
regulations (in general assumed to be represented by the group of developing countries) gain compara-
tive advantage in the production of “dirty” goods. They therefore attract pollution-intensive industries
and by this means become “havens” for dirty industries that intend to escape the stricter environmental
regulations in the developed world. Copeland/Taylor (2003) provide an extensive survey of theoretical
pollution-haven models. For reviews on the empirical literature on the PHH, see e.g. Rauscher (1995)
or Levinson (2002)).
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This paper examines whether and to what extent a government of a small open econ-
omy tends to compensate domestic industries for unilaterally introduced environmental
regulations by moving to more protectionist industrial-policy patterns. Specifically, it
addresses the impact of an exogenously introduced binding cap on sector-wide emis-
sions on the political choice of a compensating production subsidy to that sector. This
allows to shed light on the question whether environmental regulations really lead to a
loss of competitiveness (measured in terms of profit) in the domestic polluting sector.
In particular, I argue that this may not be the case, if endogenous industrial-policy
reactions are taken into account.3
This issue is relevant for example in connection with the introduction of the European
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS) for CO2 on January 1st, 2005, which is targeted at
achieving the reductions in Greenhouse Gases (GHGs) agreed on in the Kyoto-protocol
in 1997: Aggregated over all EU member countries, GHG emissions have to be reduced
by 8% up to the year 2012, compared to the base year 1990.4,5 For countries that rat-
ified the Kyoto-protocol, the negotiated emissions reductions become binding. Hence,
the introduction of a cap on total emissions can be considered as exogenous.6
Before the EU-ETS was actually introduced, an intense debate on the economic conse-
quences of such a measure went on in the EU member countries. Industry representa-
tives expressed their concerns about the economic costs of such a trading scheme and
feared a loss of international competitiveness compared to countries not participating in
the ETS. For instance, in November 2005, the Federation of German Industries (BDI) in
a position paper claimed that unilateral European climate policy would have only little
3The output-based production subsidy to the polluting sector considered in this paper can equiva-
lently be interpreted as industrial- or trade-policy measure because an open economy is analyzed. In
the following, the term “industrial policy” will be used.
4Klepper/Peterson (2004) and PEW Center (2005) describe the basic mechanisms of the EU-ETS.
For details on the Kyoto-protocol see http : //unfccc.int/essential_background/items/2877.php (lat-
est access in July, 2010).
5Although not only the EU countries alone, but altogether 191 countries (up to July, 2010) have
ratified the protocol, the EU can be seen as the only ratifying region so far which has actually imple-
mented binding policy restrictions in order to achieve the emissions target. At least, the EU-ETS is
singular in the world so far in terms of its economic scale (i.e. the value of traded allowances), like
e.g. PEW Center (2005) , Grubb/Neuhoff (2006) or Demailly/Quirion (2006) argue. Environmental
policy can thus be considered as unilateral in this case. Of course, the EU-ETS is only an illustrative
example; many other environmental regulations applied in any country can be thought of instead.
6Those policies are only exogenous at the moment of their introduction; during the preceding
treaty negotiations, each country exercised influence to achieve an outcome which is most consistent
with its own domestic interests. However, as soon as some environmental objective is set by the overall
number of member countries, each can be assumed to comply with it. This is reasonable despite of a
lacking worldwide monitoring-institution for environmental issues, since, besides the “hard” economic
dimension of policy decisions, countries also consider the “soft” political dimension: Complying with
treaty obligations demonstrates stability and reliability to the international community and so serves
to build up a good reputation. Therefore, in order not to jeopardize current and future opportunities
for international cooperation, countries prefer to countervail the potential negative economic effects
of their environmental-treaty membership by means of alternative policy measures rather than by
non-compliance.
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impact on global warming while seriously harming the competitiveness of European in-
dustries. Not surprisingly, this interest group prefers voluntary industry commitments,
like e.g. pursued by the United States, to legal emission restrictions for the second pe-
riod of the Kyoto-protocol, 2008-12.7 In the UK, as another example, the public debate
on the competitiveness effects of environmental policy preceding the introduction of the
EU-ETS caused a significant delay of the country´s 2005-07 national allocation plan
(NAP) submission to the European Commission (see PEW Center (2005) or Smale et
al. (2006)).8
How may a government react to such political pressures from industrial lobby groups?
This paper refers to industrial policy. In doing so, one has to consider that indus-
trial policies are usually restricted within the international institutional framework. In
the EU, for instance, subsidies are granted in terms of “State Aid”. Though generally
prohibited, the EU rules provide many exceptions concerning e.g. Aid for regional de-
velopment purposes or the so-called “horizontal objectives” including support for small
and medium sized enterprises, employment, R&D etc.9 Hence, governments may well
implement the ETS, while at the same time compensating the affected sectors in terms
of increased output subsidies.10 The next section illustrates a recent example for such
phenomenon.
To analyze the issue, a simple small-open-economy model with sector-specific capital
in two sectors is applied. The import-competing sector produces a polluting good by
using labor, capital and an environmental factor (i.e. emissions), whereas the export
sector produces a clean numeraire good with only labor and capital. The economy
7For a number of position papers on issues related to climate-change mitigation policies and the
EU-ETS see the BDI’s website http : //www.bdi.eu/Klima−und−Umwelt.htm (latest access in July,
2010).
8The above-mentioned debate is also discussed by e.g. Demailly/Quirion (2006) or Grubb/Neuhoff
(2006).
9Although data on subsidy payments have to be interpreted with caution due to incompleteness
and differing definitions/measurement methods depending on their source (for details on those data
issues see WTO (2006)), the latest data (provided by the EU Commission’s “State Aid Scoreboard”
in December 2009) show the following evolution of State Aid patterns in the EU (27) countries:
Total annual Aid remained at rather stable levels of 67-69 billion Euros, or 0.5-0.6 percent of EU-
wide GDP, between 2003 and 2007. Owed to the world-wide economic and financial crisis, State
Aid rose rapidly, up to an amount of 280 billion Euros (2.2 percent of GDP), in 2008. If crisis
measures are excluded, total Aid in 2008 amounted to 67.4 billion Euros or 0.5 percent of GDP.
The industry and services sectors received 78 percent of total Aid in 2008. This corresponds to an
amount of 52.9 billion Euros or 0.42 percent of GDP. Also in these sectors, Aid receipt remained
rather stable since the year 2003. Hence, the Commission’s declared target of substantially reducing
State-Aid levels appears to be hard to meet in aggregate terms. There are, however, large disparities
between different member countries. For details see the EU Commission´s website on State Aid
http : //ec.europa.eu./competition/state_aid/overview/index−en.html (latest access in July, 2010).
10In what concerns a government´s motive for adjusting production subsidies, WTO (2006) points
out that one potential objective is income redistribution. Similarly to the framework in the current
paper, subsidies to declining industries in the course of structural transformation are mentioned as an
example. In addition, different case studies in OECD (2006) illustrate how compensation for losses of
competitiveness is actually granted to polluting sectors in case of restrictive environmental policies.
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consists of households supplying either labor or one of two types of specific capital.
A household´s utility is simply measured in terms of its income. In addition, an en-
vironmental interest group11 derives disutility from environmental damage. I assume
that a binding exogenous cap on total emissions is introduced, lowering productivity
in the polluting sector. As a reaction to this cap, the government adjusts the level of
an output subsidy to the polluting sector. This endogenous industrial-policy reaction
is analyzed in a political-economy framework, in which the government maximizes a
political support function over all interest groups.
The main results of this study are the following: First, governments indeed tend to
compensate industries which are affected by restrictive environmental regulations. Sec-
ond, as it turns out that compensation is more than complete in the presence of an
environmental IG, polluting industries will experience a net gain, rather than a loss,
in profits. The environmental interest´s political weight has a positive impact on the
extent of industry compensation or, put differently, environmental interests work in the
direction of more protectionist trade regimes although they are not directly affected by
industrial policy.12
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: The next sections provide an illustrative
example of how governments might compensate domestic polluting industries for envi-
ronmental regulations, and a review of the related literature. Chapter 2 presents the
basic model by introducing all relevant interest groups and the political framework un-
der which government decisions are taken. Chapter 3 derives the political equilibrium
with respect to the industrial-policy variable first in general and then as a reaction
to exogenous environmental policy. Both direction and magnitude of the policy ad-
justment as well as the latter´s determining factors are discussed. Finally, Chapter 4
concludes.
1.2 Example: Costless Emissions Permits
As mentioned in the introduction, governments can be expected to make certain policy
concessions to interest groups (here: industries) adversely affected by environmental
restrictions. With respect to the introduction of the EU-ETS, an immediate example
for such behavior pattern is the costless allocation of emissions permits through the
member countries´ NAPs. Such free allocation comprises two elements of a subsidy
11In the following, the term “interest group” is also referred to as “IG”.
12Hillman/Ursprung (1994) derive an opposing result, though in a different framework: In their
partial-equilibrium model, two parties engage in political competition. The foreign industry acts as a
lobby group in the domestic country, lobbies pay campaign contributions to the parties, and markets
are subject to imperfect competition. The authors find that, if environmentalists do not care about
the foreign environment (i.e. they are “greens” rather than “super-greens”) and pollution is caused by
production (rather than consumption), assumptions that also hold in this paper, the environmental
IG will favor freer trade over protection. Under general conditions, however, environmentalists favor
protectionist trade policy regimes like in the current paper.
The Political Economy of Environmental Regulations and Industry Compensation 12
(see Johnston (2006)): The first is the value of the allowances themselves. Industries
receive them for free, although they have a positive market price as soon as emissions
are traded. The second element is the ability of producers to pass through, to a cer-
tain extent, the opportunity cost of holding an allowance to the price of their product.
Rogge et al. (2006) term the resulting rents “windfall profits”.13 Whether the cost-
less provision of emissions allowances constitutes a lump-sum or rather a (distortive)
unit-subsidy, depends on the specific allocation method applied: Pure grandfathering
of permits (i.e. a distribution independent of current output/emission behavior) cor-
responds to a lump-sum subsidy whereas an output-based allocation corresponds to a
production subsidy. In reality, most countries follow a strategy “in-between” that con-
tains elements of both allocation methods (for details see Demailly/Quirion (2006)),
so that the current approach, interpreting industrial policy as a production subsidy,
provides an appropriate model framework.
The view that the costless allocation of emissions permits constitutes an implicit sub-
sidy, or, more specifically, in the EU case, an element of State Aid, is commonly held
in the literature. For instance, Grubb/Neuhoff (2006) characterize the phenomenon, in
analogy to this paper, as “compensation for forgone profits due to the environmental
regulation”. Smale et al. (2006) argue in a similar way. Johnston (2006), by taking a
legal perspective to approach the issue, comes to the same conclusion and finds strong
arguments supporting the notion that free allowances involve elements of State Aid.
Even the EU Commission adopts this view, which became obvious in its assessment of
the French NAP for the first trading period 2005-07 (“phase 1”).
In phase 1, the EU Commission allowed an auctioning of up to 5 percent of total
emissions permits. However, only few countries made use of this option (Denmark sold
5, Hungary 2.5, Lithuania 1.5 and Ireland 0.75 percent), while all other EU members did
not auction any permit but allocated the whole amount for free. In the second trading
period 2008-12 (“phase 2”), up to 10 percent of total emissions permits are allowed to
be auctioned. Then again, only some of the member states have chosen this allocation
method. None of these countries, however, completely exhausts its 10-percent share.
Furthermore, there are even countries (Hungary and Ireland) that reduced their share
compared to phase 1 (for an overview table see Appendix A.1).
A look at European NAPs also supports this paper´s finding that domestic polluting
industries are not only compensated in exchange for environmental restrictions but
even granted excess compensation: In the period 2005-07, many European countries
allocated more emission certificates to their industries than those actually needed (which
13Besides this most obvious kind of industry subsidization, many other elements of NAPs may
provide the potential for implicit industry subsidization or compensation. Examples are new-entrant-
or plant-closure rules, the permission to make use of external credits via “Joint Implementation (JI)”-
or “Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)”-rules, the possibility of banking emissions allowances to
future periods or the provision of opt-out rules. For an overview of NAP-features in the first trading
period 2005-07 that might constitute some form of a subsidy see e.g. Betz et al. (2004), for the second
trading period 2008-12 Rogge et al. (2006).
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they could thus sell on the market). The level of this over-allocation (measured as the
share of allocated emissions permits that were not used up in total allocation) ranges
from 5 percent in Germany to 26 percent in Finland.14
The permit prices can give an impression of the monetary value of this subsidization: An
allowance for the emission of one ton of CO2 on the spot market (“EUA Daily Future”)15
has been traded at around 13 Euros in the first months of the year 2010. The number of
costless emissions allowances in a country corresponds to its cap on total CO2 emissions
according to the NAP. Germany, for instance, provided 499 million tonnes of costless
emissions in the period 2005-07. From 2008-12, a total of 456 million tonnes of CO2
emissions are permitted, out of which 40 million allowances are auctioned.16 Hence,
the value of the remaining 416 million costless allowances in phase 2 thus far can be
roughly estimated as 5.41 billion Euros on average.
1.3 Related Literature
The conceptual basis for the current paper goes back to Hillman (1982). He introduced
a political-support-function approach to analyze a government’s incentives– motivated
by self-interest rather than by “social-justice” considerations– for protecting declining
industries (i.e. sectors that suffer from decreasing world-market prices).
Bommer/Schulze (1999) have taken up Hillmans model and applied it to an issue fre-
quently subject to public and economic debate: As market integration is often claimed
to harm the environment, they investigate, which impact trade liberalization has on a
government’s environmental-policy choice. The authors do not consider trade policy
explicitly in their two-sector specific-factors model, but address an exogenous change
in the relative price of the economy´s export good, as e.g. caused by a country´s
joining a free-trade agreement. When trade is liberalized, the resulting increase in the
relative price of a “dirty” export good induces a redistribution of income between the
owners of specific capital in that sector and a clean import-competing one. In order to
sustain maximum political support from all relevant interest groups (besides industry,
the group of workers and environmentalists are considered), the government adjusts
the level of its environmental-policy instrument, a quantitative emissions limit. This
endogenous policy reaction directly affects the export sector´s productivity, since this
industry uses the environment as input in addition to the “traditional” factors. Implied
by the general-equilibrium setting, also the other interest groups´ utilities are affected–
either directly as in case of the environmentalists, or indirectly, via an inter-sectoral
14For data see http : //assets.panda.org/downloads/wwf_can_table.pdf (latest access in July,
2010).
15Among many others, those “European Union Allowances” are a standard product traded at the
European Climate Exchange (ECX). For further details, data and recent developments see http :
//www.ecx.eu/ (latest access in July, 2010).
16See the website of the German Environmental Ministry, BMU at http :
//www.bmu.de/emissionshandel/aktuell/aktuell/1201.php (latest access in July, 2010).
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labor reallocation, as in case of the clean sector and workers. Bommer/Schulze (1999)
find that trade liberalization will make domestic environmental policies more restric-
tive: In order to re-establish the political-support equilibrium after opening up for
free trade, the government redistributes part of the export sector´s gain to the losing
import-competing sector in terms of tighter environmental regulations. Consequently,
contrary to what is often claimed, trade liberalization does not only not harm, but even
benefit the environment.
The current paper is closely related to the latter, but it reverses the question posed:
Whereas in Bommer/Schulze (1999), trade policy is exogenously given via a country’s
membership to an international trade agreement and the government chooses envi-
ronmental policies, the current paper features exogenous environmental restrictions
via a country´s membership to an environmental treaty and the government chooses
trade policy. There are also differences with respect to some less substantial features.
For instance, the polluting sector in the current model is the import-competing one
rather than the export sector. This corresponds to industry characteristics in the EU
(whereas the model in Bommer/Schulze (1999) is more suited to reflect the economic
characteristics of the US): The EU-ETS so far involves firms in the energy-producing
and energy-intensive sectors like the production of metals, the mineral industry and
pulp, paper and board production. Within those sectors, the EU typically is a net
importer.17 Within a political-support-function framework with a government intend-
ing to maximize a weighted aggregate of the individual voter groups´ welfare, however,
this distinction does not alter the results: As long as the compensating subsidy is di-
rectly targeted at the polluting sector subject to environmental restrictions, it does
not matter whether this sector is import-competing or exporting. In both cases, it
will be affected by the regulations in an equivalent way, thus giving the government
an equivalent incentive for more protectionist behavior in terms of increased subsidy
payments.18,19
17As data from EUROSTAT show, the EU-27 countries´ net energy imports have
been continuously increasing since the year 2000. In 2007, they amounted to 988
million tonnes (those are the latest numbers available in July, 2010; see http :
//epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/energy/data/main_tables). According to data from
the European Commission’s website, this amount corresponds to an “import dependency” (de-
fined as net imports in relation to the sum of bunkers and gross consumption) of 53 percent (see
http : //ec.europa.eu/energy/publications/statistics/statistics_en.htm; latest access in July, 2010).
18This is different in Bommer/Schulze (1999), since they analyze the impact of trade liberalization
(represented by a change in the relative price of the export good) on the environmental-policy choice.
In that case, it is of course relevant whether the polluting sector is the importing or exporting one, as
the former loses and the latter benefits from freer trade.
19Similarly, a further difference is owed to the different empirical perspectives: With regard
to the means of lobbying activities, Bommer/Schulze assume that interest groups exert politi-
cal influence by paying campaign contributions to the government (which then itself uses these
contributions to organize campaigns to influence the voter). In Europe, campaign contribution
payments are not a common practice like in the US. Direct lobbying of the government is a
rather complicated process, in which money payments are officially not prevalent (see http :
//www.europarl.eu.int/workingpapers/pana/pdf/w5en_en.pdf (latest access in July, 2010) for de-
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Similarly to Bommer/Schulze (1999), also Bommer (1996) applies a political-support-
function approach to analyze the impact of trade liberalization on environmental poli-
cies. In doing so, he focusses on the example of European integration, known as the
establishment of the “Common Market”. The methodological approach, however, differs
from mine and that of Bommer/Schulze (1999): Rather than investigating a political-
support-maximizing government’s unilateral policy choices, he considers strategic
environmental-policy competition between two countries with imperfectly competitive
markets (specifically, one domestic and one foreign firm supply the domestic market).
Governments aim at providing most favorable policy conditions to their domestic pro-
ducers in terms of international competitiveness (i.e. profits). The results of both
approaches coincide, but rely on different mechanisms. Also Bommer (1996) finds
that trade integration, under certain conditions,20 facilitates the introduction of more
stringent environmental standards. In his model, however, this conclusion is due to a
convergence of the two countries’ non-cooperative environmental-policy levels induced
by declining tariffs. As a consequence, policy harmonization to a more stringent level,
and thus the overcoming of a Prisoners’ Dilemma situation in the initial equilibrium,
becomes feasible. Accordingly, also his paper confutes the claim that trade liberaliza-
tion is “bad for the environment”.
Yet another political-support-function approach to analyze an environmental-policy
issue is Rauscher (1997). His research question, however, differs from the previous pa-
pers’: Which bias from socially optimal environmental-policy levels does an industry-
and an environmental lobby group’s influence cause? Rather than modeling trade pol-
icy explicitly, the author considers environmental policy as an implicit substitute. The
model is very general in that it allows for many possible variations: For instance, pollu-
tion may be caused by production and consumption of a good, there are different policy
instruments available, and the environmental lobby can exhibit different characteristics.
Rauscher (1997) finds that, depending on the specific case under consideration and on
parameter values, the preferences of both lobbies may coincide. That is, strict environ-
mental regulations may be consistent with the domestic industry’s profit-maximizing
interest– a result which is consistent with the previous papers´ findings.
Besides those theoretical papers, there are also empirical approaches to the issues the
current paper deals with. Specifically, they attempt to find explanations for the weak
existing empirical evidence of the hypothesis that environmental regulations affect trade
patterns (also known as the pollution haven hypothesis; see above). Those papers sus-
pect that the imposition of stricter environmental regulations on a polluting sector is
accompanied by compensating policy adjustments in other areas, so that the overall ef-
fect on a country´s production- and trade patterns is canceled out or at least weakened.
As an example, Eliste/Fredriksson (2002) use agricultural-sector data to analyze whether
tails). This paper thus measures political influence in terms of an IG’s ability to influence voting
decisions of the voters directly. This difference, however, is not crucial for the results, because neither
paper models the lobbying process explicitly.
20That is, the country hosting the import-competing industry must be characterized by more ex-
pressed environmental preferences than the country hosting the exporting industry.
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the imposition of stricter pollution taxes leads to increased government transfers in
terms of a higher output subsidy to the affected sector. Their empirical results are based
on a theoretical political-economy model applying the “Protection-for-Sale” approach by
Grossman/Helpman (1994).21 Environmentalists lobby for a low, and farmers for a large
subsidy to the polluting agricultural sector. As all individuals are assumed to be tax
payers (thus having to finance the subsidy) as well as recipients of pollution-tax revenue,
there are respective additional negative and positive pressures on environmental-policy
levels. Whether in the political equilibrium agricultural output is subsidized or taxed,
depends on the weights of the lobby groups and social welfare in the governmental
objective function. The direction of an endogenous output-subsidy adjustment to an
exogenous increase in the pollution tax, however, is unambiguously positive: Transfers
to the polluting agricultural sector will indeed increase if stricter environmental regu-
lations are imposed. Furthermore, Eliste/Fredriksson (2002) show that trade patterns
are not affected at all. That is, the rise in the agricultural-output volume induced by
the compensating production subsidy exactly offsets its initial pollution-tax-induced
decline. The theoretical predictions of the model are supported by the authors´ empir-
ical results.22
In their solely empirical analysis, also Ederington/Minier (2003) suspect the govern-
ments´ compensation motives to explain the weak evidence of the pollution haven hy-
pothesis. The underlying mechanism, however, differs from Eliste/Fredriksson (2002):
Rather than using production policies as means of compensation for a sector adversely
affected by exogenous environmental restrictions, their model predicts the government
to apply endogenous environmental policy as second-best trade policy to compensate
domestic import-competing sectors adversely affected by free trade (interpreted as ex-
ogenous trade policy).23 They argue that the neglect of such environmental-policy
endogeneity in existing empirical tests leads to an under-estimation of the PHH effects.
As their hypothesis is indeed supported by the empirical results,24 the authors conclude
21Differently from the current paper, Grossman/Helpman (1994) use a partial-equilibrium model.
The government´s objective function is a weighted aggregate of social welfare and the sum of campaign
contributions paid by different lobby groups. The authors provide an endogenous derivation of the
weights attributed to different lobby groups in a political support function. Hence, both approaches
are closely related.
22The empirical model uses cross-country data from 62 countries for the year 1990. Both envi-
ronmental stringency and the producer subsidy are measured by indices aggregating diverse policy
indicators. The authors note, however, that the results have to be interpreted with caution, since not
all transfers to the agricultural sector necessarily constitute a means of compensation for the adverse
impacts of stricter environmental regulations.
23In particular, the use of trade policies is restricted because countries belong to a free trade area.
There is no specific political-economy model underlying this analysis like in Eliste/Fredriksson (2002).
Aspects of political economy are only incorporated implicitly in a political-economy-variable vector
determining environmental stringency and the hypothesis that higher levels of imports are correlated
with less stringent regulations (see below).
24The analysis also differs from Eliste/Fredriksson (2002) with respect to the empirical methodology
and data. Ederington/Minier (2003) use time-series data from US-manufacturing industries for the
period 1978 to 1992 to estimate the effect of environmental regulations (the stringency of which is
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that, in order to prevent compensating environmental-policy reactions to international
trade agreements and their adverse impact on global welfare, free-trade negotiations
should be extended to cooperation on environmental issues.25
How do the conclusions of these empirical analyses relate to the current paper´s find-
ings? In what concerns the specific policy instruments, only Eliste/Fredriksson (2002)
correspond to the current paper in considering compensation for exogenous environ-
mental restrictions in terms of endogenous production policy. The argument of Ed-
erington/Minier (2003), treating environmental policy as endogenous and trade policy
as exogenous, is more in line with Bommer/Schulze (1999). Nevertheless, both papers
find empirical evidence for the general hypothesis that governments, considering po-
litical support from different interest groups, compensate industries adversely affected
by the exogenous introduction of some policy measures connected with the country´s
membership to an international agreement. Their general empirical findings are thus
in line with the current paper´s theoretical predictions. However, besides this qualita-
tive result, the quantitative extent of industry compensation is not determined in the
empirical analyses. Hence, the current paper contributes to the existing literature in
providing insights into the net competitiveness-effects of exogenously introduced envi-
ronmental regulations on the affected sector. The results derived are not restricted to
the case of environmental policy; it is straightforward to transmit them to various other
policy areas.
With respect to the general research issue, a number of additional papers relate to the
current one in that they also deal with the analysis of the trade/environment relation-
ship under consideration of political-economy aspects. Those papers ask, which impacts
the presence of different lobby groups has on the determination of environmental (and
trade) policies in open economies. Unlike Rauscher (1997), who addresses an analogous
question within a political-support-function model framework (see above), this litera-
ture strand applies the “Protection-for-Sale” approach by Grossman/Helpman (1994).
Depending on the specific model features, e.g. with respect to the type of the available
policy-instruments,26 of pollution externalities27 or of the relevant lobbies,28 it turns
measured by the ratio of pollution abatement costs to total costs) on trade flows (i.e. net imports).
In addition, the impact of political-economy effects (measured by a vector of political economy vari-
ables) on environmental regulations is estimated. The authors expect environmental regulations to
be the more lenient, the larger a sector´s net-import volume is. In a simultaneous estimation, Eder-
ington/Minier (2003) find their hypotheses supported: If the endogeneity of environmental stringency
is accounted for in the estimations, the correlation between environmental policies and trade flows is
much larger than otherwise.
25As the authors note, this argument for international cooperation on domestic policies in addition
to international (trade-)policies can be classified as “second-best argument”.
26First of all, this distinction concerns the broad instrument category, i.e. whether trade-,
environmental- or both policies are endogenous. Within those categories, one can distinguish between
distortive instruments like taxes and non-distortive ones like quantitative emissions limits.
27Pollution can be generated by production, consumption or both. A further distinction is made
between local and transboundary pollution.
28Some papers only consider industry lobbies, some only environmentalists, others both. Aidt (1998)
The Political Economy of Environmental Regulations and Industry Compensation 18
out that neither the presence of environmental lobbies unambiguously implies stricter
environmental policies, nor that of industry lobbies weaker policies. Another common
conclusion is that lobby influence induces socially suboptimal policy decisions: In the
political equilibrium, the government chooses an environmental-policy level that devi-
ates from the welfare-maximizing one.
A first subgroup within this literature applies a small-open-economy framework.
Fredriksson (1997), in a model with two sectors and free trade, detects a positive or
negative influence on the equilibrium emissions-tax rate exerted by environmentalists
or industrialists respectively. The relative weights of the lobby groups in social welfare
and the governmental objective function, however, have ambiguous effects on equilib-
rium policies.29
Aidt (1998), in a similar model with n sectors only partly organized as interest groups,
supports the inefficiency-outcome with respect to the level of environmental policy: As
a result of lobbying activities, the emissions tax is lower than the socially optimal one
for organized, and higher for unorganized sectors. In what concerns the type of instru-
ment, however, the political equilibrium yields an efficient decision: The government
chooses the instrument directly targeted at the source of pollution, i.e. an input-tax on
the use of raw materials rather than a tax on output.
Schleich (1999) further extends the model to investigate the consequences of lobby
influence on environmental quality (which is determined by the government´s policy
choice). Differently from the previous papers, he adds trade policy to the set of a
government´s available instruments. In consistence with the related papers, he finds
that in the political equilibrium, the government chooses the efficient policy instrument,
but at an inefficient level. An industrial lobby’s influence on environmental quality is
ambiguous.30 Furthermore, the author compares different policy regimes: In order to
address a domestic pollution externality, a government may either dispose of both do-
mestic (production- and consumption-) and trade policies, or only of one policy type.
This allows for the key conclusion that (inefficient) trade policies alone may even yield
better environmental quality than (efficient) domestic policies alone.31
Building on Fredriksson (1997) and Aidt (1998), only Fredriksson (1999) explicitly ex-
amines the effects of trade liberalization on pollution taxes and -levels. He considers
further differentiates between “functionally specialized” lobbies (like e.g. environmentalists or indus-
trialists) and “multiple-goal” lobbies. As already mentioned, Hillman/Ursprung (1994) distinguish
“greens” from “super-greens”.
29This is due to the corresponding changes in environmental-tax revenue, which is redistributed to
all citizens and thus affects the groups´ utilities indirectly.
30Specifically, the result depends on the shape of the environmental-damage function: Increasing-
or constant marginal damage implies inefficiently low environmental-quality levels, whereas decreasing
marginal damage may induce higher-than-optimal levels. An environmental IG´s influence is not
considered in this paper.
31The explanation is given by the higher “political cost” of trade policies as compared to production
policies due to an additional distortion of the consumer price. Hence, a government interested in
political support (i.e. contribution payments) will raise the producer price (and thus output and
pollution) by less, if only trade policy is available.
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the impact of an exogenous reduction in import tariffs on an environmental- and an in-
dustry lobby groups´ incentives for influencing the government´s pollution-tax choice.
In particular, as declining tariffs imply a contraction of the domestic import-competing
industry´s output and pollution, the effects of pollution-tax changes become less impor-
tant in the course of trade liberalization. This in turn reduces the political polarization
between the two lobbies (measured by the difference in the intensity of their lobbying
efforts). The overall environmental impact of tariff reductions depends on the relative
magnitude of the changes in the different interest groups´ lobbying efforts. If this change
is sufficiently more expressed for the environmental, than for the industry group, declin-
ing tariffs may induce lower pollution taxes and thus higher environmental damage.32
Fredriksson (1999) concludes that trade liberalization can no longer be considered as
unambiguously welfare-enhancing, if endogenous environmental-policy adjustments are
considered.
A second subgroup within the political-economy literature on the environment/trade re-
lationship addresses analogous research questions in a large-open-economy framework.
Differently from most small-country analyses (except for Schleich (1999)), those models
endogenize trade policies and compare the outcomes of different policy regimes. In
addition to the previously mentioned policy impacts, large-country governments have
to consider the terms-of-trade effects of their decisions.
Schleich/Orden (2000), for instance, investigate the impact of industry lobbies on a
country’s production-tax- and/or trade-policy choice. Their paper extends the small-
country analysis in Schleich (1999), and allows for transboundary pollution and coop-
eration between different countries:33 Can such cooperative policy choice improve on
environmental quality compared to the non-cooperative regime? The efficiency-results
for restricted policy availability are consistent with the small-country case: Due to a
non-cooperative government’s political-support considerations, less efficient trade poli-
cies alone may lead to higher environmental quality than efficient domestic policies
alone. Inter-governmental cooperation has an ambiguous effect: Environmental quality
may be lower in a cooperative, than in a non-cooperative policy regime.34
Conconi (2000) in a similar two-country model modifies the research question and ex-
amines, whether there is something to be gained from international cooperation on
environmental policies despite of a green lobby´s presence (industry lobbies are not
32This outcome arises if the pollution-tax decline is so strong that the total-pollution impact of the
induced increase in pollution per unit of output outweighs the respective impact of the contraction in
the volume of output.
33Political cooperation here implies the maximization of two governments´ joint surplus, i.e. a
weighted sum of both countries’ domestic objective functions.
34In particular, there are four cooperation-effects: First, cooperating governments abstain from
using policies to influence their terms-of-trade (environmental effect indeterminate). Second, trans-
boundary pollution externalities are accounted for (positive effect on environmental quality). Third,
negative externalities from support for a domestic lobby on foreign lobbies are considered (positive
effect on environmental quality due to lower output price). Finally, industry protection is available at
lower welfarecosts (negative effect on environmental quality due to higher output price). The overall
environmental impact of cooperation depends on the relative magnitude of these four effects.
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considered). Differently from Schleich/Orden (2000), political cooperation here incor-
porates only trade policy (in terms of a free trade area like the WTO). Conconi (2000)
finds that the reasonability of environmental-policy cooperation depends on whether
countries already cooperate in trade policies: A green lobby´s political pressure can
serve as better substitute for an international environmental agreement, if the involved
countries set their trade policies non-cooperatively. This finding is owed to the large-
country setting: Domestic pollution taxes improve the foreign country’s terms-of-trade
and so induce an expansion of foreign output and pollution. If the countries belong
to a free trade area, they cannot counteract those leakage-effects by appropriate trade-
policy adjustments. Hence, the environmental lobby´s interest in high domestic pol-
lution taxes (and thus its contribution payments to the government) are weakened:
Rather than biasing environmental policies upwards, in the cooperative policy regime,
the green lobby causes the pollution-tax rate and environmental quality to be lower
than in the non-cooperative regime. They may even fall short of their efficient (Pigou-
vian) levels.35 Conconi (2003) further extends her model by introducing an additional
industry lobby, allowing for cooperation between domestic and foreign green lobbies
and for asymmetric countries. However, neither of these extensions changes her basic
conclusion with respect to an environmental IG´s policy impact.
To give a very broad summary of this political-economy literature´s general conclu-
sions on the trade/environment relationship, one can divide them into two groups:
Whereas the political-support-function approaches detect positive environmental im-
pacts of trade liberalization, the group of “protection-for-sale” approaches finds that
trade integration may have adverse environmental effects. Especially the latter group´s
conclusions, however, rely heavily on the specific underlying assumptions and parameter
values.
In what concerns the position of the current paper within the political-economy liter-
ature reviewed above, one can state the following: There is a broad literature on the
trade/environment relationship that addresses the effects of an exogenous trade liber-
alization or an exogenously given trade regime (mostly free trade) on environmental-
policy making and/or pollution. This is motivated by the empirical observation of
numerous free trade agreements in the last decades. However, in recent years, also in-
ternational environmental agreements have become an issue of considerable relevance.
Nevertheless, approaches dealing with the exogenous introduction of environmental
policies (reflecting a country´s membership to an international environmental agree-
ment) and the respective impacts on policy-making in other areas including trade pol-
icy, are quite rare. Hence, the current paper provides one step to fill this gap and
account for recent “real-world” developments.
35This is the case for pollution spillovers and leakage effects sufficiently large: For such parameter
values, stricter domestic environmental policies increase environmental degradation, and are thus op-
posed by the green lobby. Such outcome contradicts the findings of the related literature building on
small-country models (see above).
Chapter 2
The model
2.1 Production
In a small open economy with perfectly competitive goods- and factor markets, there
are two sectors, I and II, both applying a constant-returns-to-scale technology.
The import-competing “dirty” sector produces a good xI , a substitute to the foreign
good ximp, by using sector-specific capital KI , mobile labor LI and an environmental
factor E.1 Specifically, use of the environment (i.e. pollution) makes production more
efficient (subscripts denote partial derivatives):
xI = g(E)F (K
I
, LI) with g(0) = 1, gE > 0, gEE < 0 and F IL > 0, F
I
LL < 0.
(2.1)
Producers in sector I receive a subsidy s per unit of output. As a consequence, producer-
and consumer prices do not coincide:2 While consumers pay the world market price pw,
producers receive the domestic price pp = pw + s.
Sector I maximizes the return to its specific factor as follows:
max
L,E
ΠI = ppxI − wLI = ppg(E)F (KI , LI)− wLI
s.t. LI + LII = L
KI = KI
E ≤ EI , (2.2)
1Supply of specific capital is fixed as well as total labor supply: LI + LII = L. Thus, an increase
in labor employed in one sector must be accompanied by a respective decrease in the other sector:
dLI = −dLII . Initially, use of the environmental factor E is also restricted by environmental policy
to a level of E0.
2Let p denote the relative price of good I, i.e. the price of good I in terms of the numeraire good II.
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where w is the wage rate. This profit maximization yields, first, the common result that
labor is paid its value marginal product: w = ppg(E)F IL. Second, the environmental
factor is employed to the maximum possible extent: E = E0.
The “clean” sector produces the numeraire good xII by using sector-specific capital KII
and mobile labor LII :
xII = F (K
II
, LII) with F IIL > 0, F
II
LL < 0. (2.3)
The return to the specific factor in sector II is given by:
ΠII = xII − wLII = F (KII , LII)− wLII . (2.4)
Here, profit maximization yields w = F IIL , so that the wage rate is determined by:
w = ppg(E)F IL = F
II
L , (2.5)
and equal across sectors due to labor mobility. Profits in the two sectors thus are:3
ΠI = ppg(E)[F (K
I
, LI)− F ILLI ], (2.6)
ΠII = F (K
II
, LII)− F IIL LII . (2.7)
2.2 Workers
A worker’s individual utility is determined by the level of income.4 Each worker supplies
one unit of labor and there is no unemployment. Thus, labor income is w. The subsidy
to the polluting sector is financed via a lump-sum tax on workers: Each of them bears
an equal share of the total transfer S = sxI . A worker’s total individual income is thus
given by:
I = w − sx
I
L
. (2.8)
3In the following, the terms “profit” and “return to the specific factor” will be used as synonyms.
4One might annotate that also environmental damage should impact on a worker´s utility, since
each consumer will exhibit some preference for a clean environment. In the political-support-function
approach applied here, however, a government maximizes political support over different interest groups
that represent their members´ common interests with respect to a certain issue. Workers are organized
as a labor union which usually focuses on issues directly related to labor, mainly on income. The
workers´ environmental concerns are incorporated in the environmental lobby´s utility (alternatively
interpreted as “general environmental interest”; see below): The stronger environmental awareness in
a country is, the higher will the political weight of the environmental lobby be. However, including
environmental damage into a worker´s utility function would not alter the qualitative findings and
influence the quantitative results in the same way a higher political weight of the environmental IG
would do (see Section 3.2).
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2.3 The Environment
Environmental damage positively depends on total domestic emissions E and is repre-
sented by the convex damage function
D(E) with DE > 0 and DEE > 0. (2.9)
This function abstracts from transboundary pollution, as it neglects the adverse effects
domestic (foreign) emissions have on the foreign (domestic) environment.5
2.4 The government
In representative democracies like e.g. the EU countries, governments are elected by
voters. Re-election can be seen as an incumbent government´s main goal. The sup-
port a government receives from different interest groups influences the probability of
being re-elected. Political support can be interpreted as the lobbies´ implicit or ex-
plicit (re-)election recommendations to voters.6 For instance, a common appearance
at public events organized by the governing party or the lobby group may constitute
5In the model framework applied in this paper, no other assumption on environmental damage
is sensible. Consider the case of global environmental problems in which it does not matter where
emissions are produced for world-wide damage to arise. The domestic damage function would then be
determined by world-wide emissions Ew: D = D(Ew) with Ew = Ed+EROW (d stands for “domestic”
and ROW for “Rest of the World”). The effects of domestic environmental restrictions would only
differ from those analyzed in this paper (see Chapter 3) if the induced external effects and thus the
potential strategic reactions of the foreign country (ROW) are taken into account:
∂D
∂Ed
=
∂D
∂Ew
∂Ew
∂Ed
=
∂D
∂Ew
(
1 +
∂EROW
∂Ed
)
6= ∂D
∂Ew
if
∂EROW
∂Ed
6= 0.
Depending on sign and magnitude of the term ∂E
ROW
∂Ed
, positive environmental effects of domestic pol-
icy (i.e. a decrease in emissions) may be strengthened, weakened, leveled out or even reversed.
However, strategic interdependencies between different countries (and the corresponding leakage ef-
fects) are not in the scope of this model which focuses on the unilateral introduction of envi-
ronmental restrictions, implicitly assuming policies in ROW to be given and fixed. Alternatively,
without explicitly modeling the foreign policy-choice, one could simply assume some leakage ef-
fect. This, however, would not add further insights to the analysis as it could equivalently be ex-
pressed by modifying the damage function D. Consider, for instance, the economically plausible case
−1 < ∂EROW
∂Ed
< 0⇒ ∂D
∂Ed
< ∂D∂Ew , i.e. the foreign reaction weakens the positive effects of domestic en-
vironmental policy. In terms of the current model, such scenario is equivalent to a change in marginal
environmental damage. The implications of varying levels of marginal environmental damage for the
results are discussed in Chapter 3.
6Note that, besides lobby recommendations, there are many more factors determining whether
a voter elects a government or not. Among them are e.g. the potential alternatives (other par-
ties/coalitions), a voter´s personal satisfaction with current policy-making or his general party prefer-
ences/sympathies. However, an interest groups´ political support is a substantial determining factor
for a government´s re-election.
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an implicit recommendation to vote for the government (example: labor unions invite
the president/chancellor). More explicit recommendations might take the form of po-
sition papers published by an interest group or positive public statements concerning a
government position on some policy (example: an industry representative supports the
government´s tax policies in a newspaper article).
Accordingly, the government´s aim is to maximize political support over different inter-
est groups; its objective function G is a weighted aggregate of those groups´ utilities.
The relevant instruments are industrial- and environmental policies in terms of a pro-
duction subsidy to the polluting sector and a quantitative cap on that sector’s total
emissions. When determining the level of those policies, the government has to con-
sider tradeoffs between the opposing interests of the different lobbies: A policy measure
which is beneficial for one of them and thus raises its political support may be harmful
for another and decrease that group´s support in turn.
Relevant interest groups in this model include workers, or labor (L), organized in a
labor union. The function G incorporates their interests in terms of total income I
according to eq. (2.8): The higher this income (and thus utility), the more do labor
representatives support the government.
In addition, sectors I and II (that is, the owners of the respective specific factors) are
organized as lobbies. As their goal is profit maximization, those groups´ interests are
represented by ΠI and ΠII (see eqs. (2.6) and (2.7)) in G. Their political support
depends positively on the respective profits.
Finally, there is an environmental lobby, a group that only cares about domestic envi-
ronmental quality.7 Its goal is to minimize environmental damage caused by industry-I
emissions. The support function incorporates the environmentalists´ interest in terms
of environmental damage: A rise in D decreases the environmental lobby group´s po-
litical support (increases its political opposition, respectively).8
A general political support function considering all the above-mentioned groups is given
by: G = G(I,ΠI ,ΠII , D). This function is twice continuously differentiable. Political
support increases with rising utility at a diminishing rate whereas political opposition
increases with rising disutility at an increasing rate. That is, the political support func-
tion is concave in all its arguments (−)Vi, where (−)Vi represents the level of (dis)utility
of any group i, as illustrated in Figure 2.1:
7This assumption implies that environmentalists do not care about foreign, or global pollution.
Hence, “greens” rather than “supergreens” are considered here (according to the distinction made by
Hillman/Ursprung (1994)).
8The term D in the support function may also be interpreted as general environmental awareness
of the population.
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iV
G
0>iVG
0<iViVG
0<− iVG
0<−− iViVG
political
opposition
political
support
Figure 2.1: Properties of the Political Support Function
Within G, the government attaches different weights to the groups´ utilities. Those
depend on the lobbies´ ability to influence the government itself on the one hand and,
on the other hand, voter decisions (or “public opinion”). Since the government´s ul-
timate goal is its own re-election, the former type of a lobby´s political influence is
following from the latter, which is thus decisive for the political weight. How powerful
an interest group is in this respect depends on several factors, like its financial means or
its presence in the media for example, but also on more subtle factors like the lobby´s
reputation and general public preferences. For instance, in countries characterized by
high environmental awareness, the environmental IG can be expected to have a strong
influence on public opinion; this should translate into a high political weight in the
support function.
Chapter 3
The Political Equilibrium
As explained in Section 2.4, the government maximizes a political support function G
over all interest groups. The first-order condition for the optimal choice of the subsidy
to the polluting sector I is given by:
Gs = GIIs +GΠIΠ
I
s +GΠIIΠ
II
s +GD Ds︸︷︷︸
=0
!
= 0. (3.1)
Equation (3.1) implies that there is a unique subsidy s∗ which equates marginal political
support from the policy winners to marginal political opposition from the policy losers.
The environmental IG does not directly influence the government´s choice since its
utility does not depend on s (see Lemma 3.1 below).
Due to the small-country model framework and the focus on policy instruments not dis-
torting consumer prices, the impacts of policy changes on the different interest groups´
utilities (except for the environmental IG) can be measured solely by changes in their
income.
The industrial-policy instrument is a subsidy s per unit of output to the polluting sector
I, financed by a lump-sum tax on workers. Lemma 3.1 summarizes the impacts of this
policy measure on the different IGs´ utilities:
Lemma 3.1 When, for a given environmental-policy level, the production subsidy to
the polluting sector is raised, the return to its specific factor rises (ΠIs > 0), the return
to the clean sector´s specific factor declines (ΠIIs < 0), and the total income of a worker
also declines (Is < 0). The environmental IG´s utility is not affected (Ds = 0).
Proof: See Appendix A.2. 2
Lemma 3.1 implies that the subsidized sector I raises output as the producer price
of its good increases. This improves its own profits but detracts labor from sector II
and induces a profit decline there. Although workers, due to the increased marginal
product of labor, benefit from an increase in the wage rate, this positive income effect
is outweighed by the higher subsidy payments to sector I they have to finance. Overall,
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the workers´ total income declines. The environmentalists´ utility is solely determined
by the domestic emissions level E which is not affected by industrial policy.
In order to analyze a government´s incentive to compensate an industry for more re-
strictive environmental policies, this paper assumes that, departing from an initial
emissions-allowance level E0, a lower binding cap on total emissions in industry I, E,
is introduced.1 This policy is exogenously determined. Lemma 3.2 summarizes the
impacts environmental policy has on the different IGs´ utilities:
Lemma 3.2 When, for a given industrial-policy level, environmental restrictions are
strengthened, the return to the specific factor in the polluting sector declines (ΠIE > 0),
the return to the clean sector´s specific factor rises (ΠIIE < 0), and the total income of
a worker rises (IE < 0). The environmental IG´s utility is also raised (DE > 0).
Proof: See Appendix A.3. 2
The intuition behind Lemma 3.2 is similar to that behind Lemma 3.1: A stricter emis-
sions cap decreases labor productivity (and thus wages) in the polluting sector. Con-
sequently, labor moves from there to the clean sector. Output and profits decline in
sector I and rise in sector II. For workers, the negative wage effect is outweighed by the
lower subsidy payments as output in the subsidized sector declines. Environmentalists
obviously benefit from improved environmental quality.
3.1 The Direction of the Industrial-Policy Adjustment
As discussed above, the introduction of E leads to losses in utility (and thus political
support) for some groups and to respective gains for others.
The question to be answered now is how industrial policy has to be adjusted in order
to keep total political support at its maximum level. Formally, sign and magnitude of
ds
dE
have to be determined. Total differentiation of eq. (3.1) yields:
Gssds+GsEdE = 0
⇒ ds
dE
= −GsE
Gss
. (3.2)
The interpretation of eq. (3.2) is the following: How does the subsidy s have to be
adjusted after a decrease in total emissions (dE) in order to offset the induced change
1Though it is not arguable that, in the presence of externalities, output-based emissions-control
instruments like taxes are more efficient to correct a producer’s suboptimal choice than emissions
limits, quantitative restrictions are more often used in practice. Buchanan/Tullock (1975) e.g. provide
an early theoretical political-economy explanation for this phenomenon. Many papers dealing with
environmental-policy issues follow these findings and address standards rather than taxes (see the
examples mentioned in the literature review, like e.g. Bommer/Schulze (1999)). Recent anecdotal
evidence includes the Kyoto protocol (see Section 1.1) or the US Clean Air Act (last amendment in
1990; see http : //www.epa.gov/lawsregs/laws/caa.html (latest access in July, 2010) for detailed
information).
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in marginal political support (GsE) by a countervailing change (Gss) so that marginal
political support (Gs) remains at the optimal (zero-) level? Proposition 3.1 states the
result:
Proposition 3.1: If the government aims at sustaining a maximum level of total
political support, the relationship between the policy variables E and s is negative, i.e.
stricter environmental regulations induce increased protection for the domestic polluting
industry. This result holds for non-convex utility functions.2
Proof: The denominator of eq. (3.2), the term Gss, must be negative in order to meet
the second-order condition for s∗ to yield a maximum of political support. Specifically,
this term is given by:3
Gss = GII(Is)
2 +GIIss +GΠIΠI (Π
I
s)
2 +GΠIΠ
I
ss +GΠIIΠII (Π
II
s )
2 +GΠIIΠ
II
ss . (3.3)
As pointed out above, marginal political support is positive but diminishing, implying
the first, third and fifth element of eq. (3.3) to be negative. Non-convexity of the
utility functions thus constitutes a sufficient (though not necessary) condition for the
remaining summands, and thus the whole term, to be negative.
The numerator of eq. (3.2) is given by:
GsE = GIIIsIE +GIIsE +GΠIΠIΠ
I
sΠ
I
E +GΠIΠ
I
sE +GΠIIΠIIΠ
II
s Π
II
E +GΠIIΠ
II
sE. (3.4)
With respect to the sign of this expression, no unambiguous statements valid for all
functional forms are possible. However, economic-plausibility considerations suggest
GsE to be negative as well as Gss, because the term consists of analogous elements
and Gss must be negative for s∗ to meet the second-order condition for maximum
political support. If the above-mentioned sufficient conditions for this are fulfilled, it
is economically plausible that also the respective conditions for GsE < 0 are met, since
the policy variables s and E impact on profits and income in the same direction.4 2
Proposition 3.1 implies that the government indeed has an incentive to compensate the
industry subject to stricter environmental policies in terms of increased subsidization
of its production (this, due to the open-economy framework, is equivalent to increased
protection). Hence, part of the gain from environmental restrictions accrued by the
clean sector, workers and the environmental IG is redistributed to the loser from envi-
ronmental policy, the polluting sector.
2The term “utility” here generalizes the respective groups´ incomes/profits.
3Following Bommer/Schulze (1999), so-called envy effects are neglected: GViVj = 0 ∀ i 6= j,
i.e. marginal utility of one group is not affected by changes in another group’s utility level.
4Calculations in Appendix A.4 use the specific example of a Cobb-Douglas production function to
show that both Gss < 0 and GsE < 0 are reasonable assumptions in a standard analytical framework.
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3.2 Magnitude and Determining Factors of the Policy
Adjustment
What remains to be discussed is the quantitative extent of the effect stricter environmen-
tal regulations have on industrial policy. The question is whether the interdependencies
between environmental- and industrial policies induce overall losses or benefits for the
different interest groups compared to the initial situation. For this purpose, I intro-
duce the concept of “completeness”. This is interpreted in terms of the initial income
distribution: Compensation of the environmental-policy loser is complete if the associ-
ated change in industrial policy retains the initial income distribution among industry
I, industry II and workers. In that case, the increase in s is termed “proportional” to
the initial decrease in E. Most interesting for the general issue under consideration
in this paper is the net impact of the policy mix on the polluting sector´s profits (i.e.
competitiveness). Proposition 3.2 states the rather unexpected result:
Proposition 3.2: Compensation of sector I for losses caused by environmental policy
is more than complete if the environmental interest (group) is attached some political
weight. In other words, the increase in the polluting sector´s utility due to more generous
subsidy payments is larger than that sector´s initial loss due to the lower emissions
allowance. Hence, the polluting sector benefits from stricter environmental regulations.
Proof: See Appendix A.5. 2
Proposition 3.2 implies that the polluting sector is granted excess compensation for the
introduction of stricter environmental policies. Figure 3.1 illustrates this finding:
The iso-distribution curve shows all combinations of policies s and E that induce the
same distribution of income among industries I and II and workers. This curve is con-
vex, since the underlying utility functions are concave (i.e. characterized by diminishing
marginal utility and rising marginal disutility).5 The iso-support locus depicts all com-
binations of s and E that induce the same level of overall political support. This curve
incorporates the environmental IG’s support level: Since the subsidy does not influence
the environmentalists´ utility, a vertical line through the emissions level represents an
indifference curve of this lobby. A graphical combination of the iso-distribution- and
the environmental indifference curve yields an iso-support curve somewhere in-between,
i.e. steeper than the iso-distribution locus.
If the environmental group had no influence at all, the iso-distribution- and iso-support
curves would coincide, and compensation for the introduction of E would be complete
(i.e. the government would raise s to a level that retained the initial income distribu-
tion). However, in the presence of an environmental interest, in order to keep political
support constant after the decrease in E, s has to be raised by more (i.e. from s0
to s′1) than required to simply reverse the initial income re-distribution (i.e. from s0
to s1). The figure also illustrates that industry I is better off in the presence of an
5For details on the slope of the iso-distribution curve see Appendix A.6.
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Figure 3.1: Iso-Support- versus Iso-Distribution Curves
environmental IG than it would be without it, while industry II and workers are worse
off.
What is the intuition behind these results? In addition to its impacts on income dis-
tribution and in contrast to industrial policy, environmental policy (respectively the
associated environmental improvement) has a value in itself. As a consequence, a given
level of overall political support can be attained by lower support from IGs other than
the environmental one if a country improves on its environmental performance. That is,
the initial income-redistribution caused by E does not have to be reversed completely
by an adjustment in s. Hence, the new political equilibrium yields a net reduction in
aggregate political support from industries I and II and workers: Declines in support
from the industrial-policy losers (industry II and workers) outweigh the rise in support
from the polluting industry I.6 This net decline is compensated by increased support
from the environmental IG. The result implies that the government has an interest in
protecting the polluting industry from international competition. Only in the presence
6Due to the properties of the political-support function, such a net reduction is obtained if subsi-
dization of sector I is increased more than proportionally. See Appendix A.5 for further discussion.
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of an environmental IG, however, it is possible to do so without losing overall political
support.7
So far, the analysis has shown that compensation will be more than complete. What
remains to be discussed are the factors that determine the extent of this excess com-
pensation. The following Proposition summarizes the results:
Proposition 3.3: The extent of the polluting industry´s excess compensation is pos-
itively related to the level of marginal environmental damage DE (or, equivalently, to
the absolute pollution level) and the political weight of the environmental interest. The
political weight of the clean industry and workers (i.e. the losers from protection) has a
negative influence on the extent of compensation. The impact of the polluting industry´s
own political weight is indeterminate.
Proof: See Appendix A.7. 2
The first part of Proposition 3.3 implies that, since a high level of marginal environmen-
tal damage is associated with severe pollution, the political propensity to compensate
an industry for environmental restrictions is the higher, the “dirtier” this industry is.
Furthermore, environmental awareness (reflected by the environmental IG’s weight) has
a positive impact on industrial policy favoring the polluting sector, although environ-
mental damage is not affected by this policy.
In Figure 3.1, the extent of excess compensation, or, respectively, the extent to which
industry I is better off in the new equilibrium, corresponds to the difference in the abso-
lute values of the iso-support- and iso-distribution curves’ slopes in the initial situation
(E0, s0):∣∣∣∣ s0 − s′1E0 − E
∣∣∣∣ ≈ ∣∣∣∣ dsdE
∣∣∣∣
G,E0︸ ︷︷ ︸
slope of iso-support curve at E0
>
∣∣∣∣ dsdE
∣∣∣∣
dist.,E0
≈
∣∣∣∣ s0 − s1E0 − E
∣∣∣∣︸ ︷︷ ︸
slope of iso-distribution curve at E0
. (3.5)
The more those slopes deviate from one another, the more will sector I be over-
compensated. The slope-differential in turn is determined by the change in the en-
vironmental IG’s political support induced by environmental restrictions:
ds
dE
∣∣∣∣
G︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
=
ds
dE
∣∣∣∣
dist.︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+
dG
dD
dD
dE︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
<
ds
dE
∣∣∣∣
dist.︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
. (3.6)
7Also other papers belonging to the political-economy literature like e.g. Ederington/Minier (2003)
find that governments support domestic industries exposed to international competition (i.e. the
import-competing sector). The empirical observation that trade protection is positively related to
the degree of import-penetration (see the theory of endogenous protection, e.g. in Trefler (1993)) is
inter alia explained by risk-sharing motives of support-maximizing governments: Supporting import-
competing industries passes through part of their potential losses to society (in this paper consisting
of the relevant interest groups).
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The intuition behind the first part of Proposition 3.3 is that when facing severe pol-
lution, the environmental IG´s utility and political support react rather sensitively to
environmental policy. The introduction of E thus increases their political support by
relatively much. As a consequence, the government´s potential to accept decreases in
support from other groups is also relatively large.
The second result concerning the clean industry and workers is immediately apparent
as these groups benefit from environmental, and lose from industrial policy: If the gov-
ernment attaches a higher political weight to them, its propensity to compensate the
polluting industry declines.
Part three of Proposition 3.3 implies that the polluting industry’s own political weight
may have an adverse impact on the extent of compensation. Such outcome arises if the
environmental-policy impact on profits is relatively weak compared to the respective
industrial-policy impact. Consequently, if industry I was aware of this interrelation,
it should not demonstrate too much political influence to the government in order to
avoid being attached a political weight that implies this industry being worse off in the
new political equilibrium.
Expressed graphically, the iso-support curve is flatter for larger political weights of in-
dustry II and/or workers, whereas the respective impact of industry I is indeterminate.
The iso-distribution locus is independent of the political weights. Hence, the degree
to which the different groups are worse/better off in the presence of an environmental
interest than without it varies with the political weights.
Chapter 4
Conclusions
This paper has, in a small-open-economy framework, examined the impacts of exoge-
nous environmental regulations on a political-support-maximizing government’s choice
of industrial policy and the consequences for the international competitiveness of a pol-
luting sector.
It turned out that the government has an incentive to compensate the polluting indus-
try for the introduction of restrictive environmental policies by granting higher output
subsidies. In other words, as a reaction to the imposition of exogenous environmental
restrictions, the country becomes more protectionist.
In contrast to what might be expected and to what is often claimed by industry rep-
resentatives in the public debate, the polluting sector even realizes a net gain in in-
ternational competitiveness, as compensation is more than complete. This outcome is
owed to an environmental interest group whose political support is positively affected
by stricter environmental regulations, whereas independent of industrial policy. As a
consequence, its utility-gain from the initial decrease in the emissions allowance is not
touched by the following increase in the subsidy. The government can therefore retain
a maximum level of overall political support even if support from the other interest
groups declines. The corresponding new political equilibrium is attained by increas-
ing the polluting industry´s output subsidization and thus profits (competitiveness) by
more than its initial loss induced by the environmental restriction (and by more than
in case the environmental IG did not exist).
What do these findings imply for the public debate on the economic consequences of
the Kyoto-protocol or the EU-ETS? The analysis revealed that industry concerns about
losses in competitiveness are, if a government’s political incentives and the availability of
different policy instruments are considered, unjustified. In contrast to public claims, the
polluting sector can even expect to be better-off after the implementation of exogenous
environmental restrictions. This outcome yields two general conclusions: First, interest
groups adversely affected by some policy measure should be aware that compensation
for potential income losses may be granted in terms of a different policy instrument,
if the instrument directly under discussion is restricted exogenously. Second, lobbies
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should consider that the government’s decision problem includes all relevant groups’
interests, and that it aims at maximizing their lobbies’ overall political support. The
government’s trading-off of the different groups’ gains and losses even creates the chance
for single IGs of being granted excess compensation for potential initial losses. To
summarize, this paper’s findings suggest that industry expectations concerning adverse
(environmental-)policy impacts tend to be too pessimistic.
This paper’s findings suggest the following policy implications: The frequent public
debates preceding the implementation of various presumable harmful policy measures
could be diluted by much, if the affected interest groups were made aware of the gov-
ernment’s political-support considerations and incentives to compensate “policy losers”
indirectly, i.e. in terms of other policy instruments. Those features of policy-making
should be communicated clearly to industry representatives in order to weaken or even
avoid their opposition. As a consequence, not only the implementation of policy mea-
sures a country is committed to due to its membership to an international treaty could
be facilitated by much. These implications are not limited to the environmental-policy
case, but carry over to any instrument that, considered from an isolated viewpoint,
harms some interest group (the reference to international competitiveness constitutes
only one example) at the same time as benefitting other groups.
Building on the analysis carried out in this paper, some propositions for future research
arise. First, especially as the model is tailored to the example of the European Union, a
large-country model could be applied: Do the terms-of-trade effects of environmental-
and/or industrial policies change the results? Note that in a large-country setting, also
consumer prices are affected by domestic policy measures. An appropriate model setup
should therefore explicitly incorporates consumer preferences.
Second, the model could allow for international capital mobility: What does an explicit
location decision of firms imply for a government’s incentives and policy choice? To
answer that question, a framework of policy interactions between different countries
competing for capital/FDI makes sense. Similarly, this paper´s assumption of unilat-
erally introduced environmental restrictions ignores that other countries might react
to domestic policies or, in other words, that countries interact strategically. A model
of strategic international policy competition in environmental- and industrial policies
(though without considering political-economy aspects) is examined in Part III of this
dissertation.
Part III
FDI Competition in Emissions- and
Corporate Taxes
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Chapter 5
Introduction
5.1 Motivation and Outline
The notion that the continuing integration of international goods- and capital markets
(often referred to as “globalization”) might lead to an intensification of international
policy-competition between countries is widespread in the public debate as well as
among economists. In particular, governments concerned about deterring FDI may be
tempted to reduce corporate taxes or environmental policies. There is also a growing
public fear that this “Race to the Bottom” may cause adverse welfare effects.
The analysis in this chapter attempts to shed light on the issue from a positive as well
as from a normative perspective. Chapter 6 focuses on the question whether the public
concerns are theoretically justified. Specifically, the paper investigates whether FDI
competition really induces an environmental RtB, if the interactions between differ-
ent policy instruments (that is, between environmental- and corporate-tax policies) are
taken into account. The analysis also considers the impact of trade liberalization and
changes in environmental conditions on the results.
Building on the positive findings, Chapter 7 addresses the welfare effects of FDI com-
petition and introduces alternative ways of international policy-cooperation that aim
at improving on aggregate welfare of the region. In particular, an International Tax
Agreement is compared to an International Environmental Agreement: Which performs
better in overcoming the adverse welfare effects of FDI competition?
5.2 Related Literature
The subsequent chapters primarily relate to two literature strands: The applied model
combines elements from the literature on international tax-competition for mobile cap-
ital/FDI and the literature on environmental-policy competition.
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The tax-competition literature can be divided into two groups, with the first one taking
a mainly public-finance/continuous-investment perspective on the issue. Capital flows
are analyzed in a perfect-competition framework with many countries. Governments
aim at raising tax revenue in order to provide some public good that creates utility for
domestic consumers. A basic model goes back to Zodrow/Mieszkowski (1986). Liter-
ature surveys are provided e.g. by Wilson (1999) or Haufler (2001) on a theoretical-
and by Devereux/Griffith (2002) on an empirical basis. Due to the specific assump-
tions, however, public-finance approaches are more suited to analyze inter-jurisdictional
competition for portfolio, rather than for discrete investment (FDI).1
The tax-competition literature also comprises approaches that incorporate environmen-
tal issues. These “integrated approaches” introduce environmental-policy competition
into the “traditional” tax-competition models: Governments aim at maximizing a repre-
sentative agent´s utility, which is not only determined by consumption and the provision
level of some public good, but additionally by environmental quality. To do so, they
simultaneously choose a capital tax and some environmental-policy instrument.2
Rauscher (2001) provides a comprehensive theoretical overview of the different re-
lated model categories, their properties and respective conclusions. One basic model
was introduced by Oates/Schwab (1988). Building on this and on the basic tax-
competition model by Zodrow/Mieszkowski (1986), further approaches were devel-
oped, e.g. by Bayindir-Upmann (1995), Kim/Wilson (1997), Chao/Yu (1997) or Bjor-
vatn/Schjelderup (2002).
Concerning the research question, those “integrated approaches” correspond to the cur-
rent paper: Both intend to find out whether competition for capital/FDI induces a
RtB in environmental policy, and whether the governments´ multiple-policy choice is
efficient.3 Most of these “integrated approaches”, however, do not model the strategic
interactions between the competing countries explicitly.
Implied by those studies´ perfect-competition setting, their general finding is that non-
cooperative policy choices are efficient. If, however, distortions on one or more other
markets arise, also environmental-policy levels will be inefficient, as the environmen-
tal instrument then serves as a correction device. Oates/Schwab (1988) quite generally
consider the case of inefficient capital taxes and attribute this distortion and the implied
RtB in environmental policies to “some exogenous reason”. In a more specific manner,
Kim/Wilson (1997) predict an environmental RtB to result from distortions on the la-
bor market.4 Analogously, in Bjorvatn/Schjelderup (2002), an inefficiently low level of
1This argument is also put forward in related papers like e.g. Fumagalli (2003).
2Most approaches assume lump-sum environmental-policy instruments like a quantitative emissions-
limit or -ratio. Kim/Wilson (1997) even incorporate a third policy instrument, a tax on labor, in their
model.
3The benchmark policy-level to detect a RtB and to define an efficient policy-choice, however, differs
from that applied in the environmental-policy-competition literature and the current approach (see
below): The marginal (rather than discrete) analysis of capital flows implies the Pigouvian tax level (i.e.
the level of environmental policy inducing production patterns that equalize marginal environmental
damage and marginal abatement cost) to serve as appropriate concept.
4The distortion is due to the existence of positive inter-jurisdictional labor-market externalities not
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environmental quality is caused by the governments´ neglect of positive international
spillovers of this public good’s provision. Bayindir-Upmann (1995) find that both an
environmental RtB or a RtT (“Race to the Top”) may coincide with inefficient levels of
some public good’s provision. The results of Chao/Yu (1997) differ from those of the
other studies: Due to a government that aims at maximizing an objective function that
includes, besides consumer utility, also revenue generated for its own spending (i.e. a
Niskanen government), environmental-policy levels may differ from the Pigouvian ones
even in the absence of further distortions. Only if private utility and government spend-
ing are attributed equal weight, environmental policy will be efficient. Indirectly, this
finding implies that an environmental RtB is triggered by a government putting more
weight on its own spending than on consumer utility (and vice versa).
More relevant for the current analysis is the second group within the tax-competition
literature: It concentrates on the analysis of international FDI competition through
tax-/subsidy incentives in a two-country-, imperfect-competition setting.5 Those pa-
pers contain both positive and normative elements in their analyses. In general, they
address the consequences of strategic tax-policy choices on the FDI decision of a foreign
investor and on welfare.
Haaland/Wooton (1999) use a general-equilibrium model with symmetric countries to
examine the effects of subsidy competition for FDI on MNE (Multinational Enter-
prise) location patterns and on domestic welfare in the two countries. Most common
within the FDI-competition literature, however, are partial-equilibrium models with
two asymmetric countries. Asymmetry occurs with respect to different aspects, most
often country size. Haufler/Wooton (1999) constitutes one example. In addition to
tax policy, the “losing” country´s government in their model may also apply a tariff on
imports from the neighboring FDI host. Barros/Cabral (2000) extend the pattern of
asymmetry by assuming that there is unemployment in the smaller country. Fumagalli
(2003) introduces asymmetry with respect to the potential host countries´ technological
advancement and the possibility of inter-firm technology spillovers. Differently from the
before-mentioned papers, the assumption of technology differences here involves the ex-
istence of one domestic firm in each of the competing countries. Bjorvatn/Eckel (2006)
finally combine elements of the latter two papers: In their model, countries also differ
with respect to size and technological advancement. In addition, unemployment may
occur in each of the countries, whereas a domestic firm is only present in the larger
considered by domestic governments: Stricter environmental standards in one jurisdiction indirectly
raise wages, and so benefit consumers, in the neighboring jurisdiction.
5Recently, Davies/Eckel (2010) have combined both types of tax-competition approaches: They
incorporate the governments’ objective to provide a public good into an imperfect-competition model
by assuming that firms are heterogenous with respect to their labor requirement to cover fixed costs.
As a consequence, even the high-tax/low-cost location attracts some firms, generates tax revenue and
is thus able to provide the public good. Strategic policy competition between the two countries induces
a RtB in capital taxes, inefficiently low levels of public-good provision, and an overabundance of firms.
Hence, aggregate regional welfare falls short of its socially optimal level (i.e. the level attained by
harmonized tax rates set in a way that equalizes the marginal value of income between the public and
the private sector).
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one. Haufler/Wooton (2003) extend the typical model framework by introducing an
additional country. In their model, two symmetric countries, forming a region, and a
third outside-country compete for FDI from the ROW. Asymmetry is thus restricted to
a possible size-differential between countries within, as compared to outside the region.
Though the specific models applied in the tax-competition literature differ in many
details, their main conclusions can be summarized as follows: The positive analyses of
non-cooperative policy patterns reveal that countries indeed engage in (downward) tax
competition for FDI. Ferrett/Wooton (2009) even show that this result is independent
of the international distribution of firm ownership.6 In normative terms, it turns out
that a non-cooperative policy regime is not necessarily detrimental for welfare. On the
contrary, FDI competition may induce a more efficient location choice of the MNE,
leading to an increase in aggregate regional welfare.
The explanation for such positive welfare effects clearly lies in the assumption of asym-
metric countries: Without FDI competition, the foreign firm would prefer the larger
market as location. This choice, however, is inefficient from a regional-welfare per-
spective, as the smaller country (depending on the specific model features e.g. due
to unemployment or technological backwardness) gains more from attracting the in-
vestment. Hence, because in a non-cooperative scenario, the country with the highest
willingness to pay (WTP in the following) for the FDI will win the competition, a relo-
cation of the MNE to the smaller country, and thus more efficient allocation patterns,
may result.
Note, that welfare-related results are not unambiguous. Depending on the specific
model features, also negative relocation effects may arise. Potential sources are e.g.
an increasing competitive pressure on domestic firms, and/or employment losses in the
“losing” country that outweigh the corresponding gains in the “winning” country, if size
asymmetry is sufficiently large.
It is unambiguous, however, that FDI competition solely implies a waste of regional re-
sources, and thus a decrease in aggregate regional welfare, if the competing countries are
identical like in Haaland/Wooton (1999), Haufler/Wooton (1999) and Haufler/Wooton
(2003).7 Hence, this lack of potential efficiency gains from FDI competition also char-
acterizes the model applied in the current analysis. Chapter 7 will establish the result
that the region as a whole loses from FDI competition in aggregate-welfare terms. The
focus of the analysis is then on showing up different possibilities to overcome such
6The results obtained by Ferrett/Wooton (2005) constitute an exception in this respect. Their
divergent finding is, however, driven by a different model framework in which countries compete for
two rather than one foreign firm. The authors find no evidence for a RtB in lump-sum corporate taxes.
For small levels of asymmetry in country size, the competitive equilibrium is even characterized by full
profit extraction, i.e. by maximum levels of taxation.
7Due to the extended model framework in Haufler/Wooton (2003), the regional-welfare loss is
not solely attributable to a RtB in corporate taxes inducing a waste of resources. The competitive
equilibrium in their model may also be characterized by too high tax levels: FDI competition then
results in a RtT in corporate taxes. In such scenario, the countries within the region could improve
on their aggregate welfare by cooperatively lowering taxes and so attract additional investment that
would otherwise accrue to the extra-regional third country.
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adversarial situation.
The literature on environmental-policy competition for FDI can be seen as an applica-
tion of the strategic-tax-competition literature to environmental policy. In a similar
manner as the general tax-competition literature, it addresses governments´ strategic
environmental-policy choices and the consequences for FDI and welfare in a two-country,
imperfect-competition model framework.8 Specifically, this literature strand focuses on
the question whether FDI competition induces a RtB in environmental policy and is
hence detrimental for environmental quality. The normative aspects of the issue are of-
ten addressed indirectly by investigating, whether internationally coordinated (central-
ized), or rather unilaterally chosen (decentralized) environmental policies yield higher
levels of aggregate regional welfare.9
In order to provide a suitable framework for the analysis of environmental-policy com-
petition, the general tax-competition models are extended by a pollution externality
associated with the domestic and/or foreign firms’ production process. As this implies
an additional negative welfare impact of FDI, the politicians´ decision problem becomes
more complex than without the environmental component. Hence, differently from the
general tax-competition literature and owing to the higher complexity of its models,
the environmental-policy-competition literature relies on symmetric-country models.
Surveys on the environmental-RtB literature are e.g. provided by Wilson (1996) and
Oates (2001). One prominent and often cited paper on the issue is Markusen et al.
(1995). They introduce a model that was subsequently modified in many ways– either
by simplifying its structure or by extending it with additional features. The authors as-
sume local pollution, absence of domestic firms, intra-regional transport- and plant-level
fixed costs. A foreign MNE, considering the potential host-countries´ environmental
policies, chooses between three options: build two plants in the region (i.e. one in
each country), build one plant, or none (i.e. serve the region by exports). The com-
peting countries´ optimal pollution- (i.e. production-) tax choice depends on the cost
parameters (and thus the consumer surplus (CS) generated by the foreign firm) and
on domestic environmental damage associated with the investment. Markusen et al.
(1995) find that FDI competition may cause an environmental RtB as well as a RtT.
That is, when facing the international mobility of foreign investments, countries de-
or increase their environmental-policy efforts as compared to the non-strategic levels.
Even the often cited “NIMBY” (Not In My Backyard) outcome may arise: For very
high pollution and fixed costs, environmental taxes are increased to a level that induces
the MNE to completely cease production in the region (i.e. choose the export option).
Concerning the normative aspect, it turns out that FDI competition is detrimental for
aggregate regional welfare in any case.10
8Rauscher (1995), by applying a n-country model framework, constitutes an exception in what
concerns the number of countries.
9See e.g. Hoel (1997) or Oates (2001).
10The authors derive their results with the help of simulations for certain constellations of param-
eter values. For the RtB-scenario, the welfare loss is driven by an overall decline in the sum of net
environmental-tax revenue and CS as the MNE increases production (and thus pollution) and switches
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Rauscher (1995) extends the Markusen-et-al. model in some respects. Most impor-
tantly, he allows for transboundary pollution in a region consisting of n potential FDI
host countries. On the other hand, he simplifies the foreign firm’s investment decision
by ignoring intra-regional trade costs. Hence, a multiple-plant strategy is excluded.
Hoel (1997) is also closely related to the Markusen-et-al. model and similar to Rauscher
(1995).11 Unlike Markusen et al., Hoel ignores trade costs. On the other hand, the pa-
per introduces some additional features to the basic model: Besides the “standard” case
of symmetric countries and one foreign investor, it also investigates versions with asym-
metric countries and many foreign firms. In the asymmetric scenario, the potential host
countries differ with respect to environmental damage.
Ulph/Valentini (2001) base their model on Hoel (1997). Differently from most other
papers within this literature strand, here the environmental-policy instrument is not an
emission/output tax, but a quantitative emission limit. Hence, the governments gener-
ate no environmental-tax revenue adding to social welfare. Furthermore, there are two
foreign firms deciding about their investment within the region. Hence, the resulting
market structure is oligopolistic rather than monopolistic. The main distinguishing
feature of the paper, however, is its consideration of two alternative move structures
in the FDI-competition game: In the “standard” model versions (termed as “location
games”), countries move first by choosing environmental policies, which determine the
foreign firms’ investment decision in the second stage. Alternatively, Ulph/Valentini
(2001) analyze a so-called “market-share game” in which firms decide on their location
before the governments set environmental policies. The latter is to represent a situation
in which firms are less mobile (“footloose”) than under the standard assumptions.
Similarly as Ulph/Valentini (2001), also de Santis/Stähler (2009) modify the basic
Markusen-et-al. model with respect to the order of moves. In their version of a market-
share game, there are also two firms. Differently from the Ulph/Valentini model, those
firms are domestic– one settled in each country within the region. In the first stage
of the game, the firms decide about becoming a multinational, i.e. whether to invest
in the neighboring country or not. In the second stage, governments determine their
output-tax level.
Though differing in a number of specific assumptions, the environmental-policy-
competition literature yields quite uniform conclusions. All papers agree on the finding
that environmental-policy competition for FDI induces countries to deviate from their
optimal no-competition policy choice.12 Whether strategic policy-levels undercut or ex-
from a one- to a two-plant strategy, which involves additional fixed costs. For the RtT-/NIMBY sce-
nario, the welfare loss is due to a parameter constellation (i.e. environmental damage and fixed costs
high, but not too high) that makes the region as a whole better-off with one plant rather than none,
although each individual country has an incentive to prevent investment in its domestic market.
11See also Hoel (1994) for a former version of his paper.
12Which no-competition policy level serves as reference point to investigate the consequences of FDI
competition, depends on how the authors define the term RtB/RtT. There is one group of papers
considering environmental-policy levels that maximize aggregate regional welfare as a benchmark.
Those rather normatively oriented approaches thus detect a RtB/RtT if strategic environmental-policy
levels fall short of, or exceed the socially efficient ones. Examples include Rauscher (1995), Hoel
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ceed their no-competition counterparts, i.e. whether a RtB or a RtT in environmental
policy occurs, however, depends on parameter values (most relevant in this respect is
of course the extent of environmental damage).13
Those papers that also provide a normative analysis, by analogy with Markusen et
al. (1995), consistently detect detrimental aggregate-regional-welfare effects of FDI
competition– no matter, whether this results in an environmental RtB or in a RtT.
This coincidence is mainly driven by the common application of identical-country mod-
els within this literature. Like stated above, such framework prevents potential ef-
ficiency gains from the relocation of firms to arise– be it through up- or downward
tax-adjustments. On the contrary, the induced waste of regional resources leads to a
decline in aggregate welfare.14
Differently from most of the above-cited literature, the current approach excludes a RtT-
scenario “per se” by assuming environmental-tax rates to take on non-prohibitive levels
in equilibrium.15 The motivation for doing so is inspired by “real-world” observations:
This paper intends to focus on situations with FDI competition actually occurring, i.e.
with countries actually attempting to attract an investment (for details see Chapter
6). As a consequence, the one-policy scenario always yields an outcome with strategic
environmental-policy levels falling short of their optimal non-strategic levels. If, how-
ever, a second policy instrument, a tax on foreign profit, is introduced, results change:
In spite of the “non-prohibitiveness assumption”, no environmental RtB occurs when
countries compete for FDI. Hence, considering interactions between different policy
(1997), or Ulph/Valentini (2001). Another group follows a rather positive approach by considering the
countries´ unilateral non-strategic policy choices as a benchmark. Hence, down-/upward-deviations
of environmental-policy levels from these unilaterally efficient ones are interpreted as a RtB/RtT.
Examples include Ulph (1994), Markusen et al. (1995), or de Santis/Stähler (2009).
13These findings have recently been supported by a number of empirical analyses on strategic
environmental-policy interactions between neighboring countries. In particular, those papers examine,
whether and how one country’s policy choice (represented by some environmental-stringency index
like e.g. that developed by Levinson (1999)) reacts to its neighbors´ policies. For instance, Fredriks-
son/Millimet (2002), Levinson (2002) and Fredriksson et al. (2004) estimate the respective reaction
functions of US states between 1977 and 1994. As the slopes of these reaction functions take on sig-
nificantly positive values, the authors find the common theoretical hypothesis empirically validated:
States interact strategically when choosing environmental policy. The results, however, do not ascer-
tain to which direction the strategic policy levels deviate from their (efficient) non-strategic values, i.e.
whether policy competition induces an environmental RtB or a RtT.
In directly addressing policy interactions, these studies distinguish themselves from another related
group of empirical papers that estimate the effect of decentralized environmental-policy-making with
data on emissions and pollution-abatement expenditures. List/Gerking (2000) and Millimet (2003) for
instance find evidence for an environmental RtT in the US states in the 1980s and 1990s.
14Levinson (2002) in his literature survey lists six theoretical conditions under which decentral-
ized environmental-policy making (resp. intra-regional FDI competition) would lead to efficient (i.e.
aggregate-regional-welfare maximizing) outcomes. All of these conditions to be fulfilled simultane-
ously, however, is implausible and not consistent with “real-world” observations. Indeed, none of the
introduced papers takes the respective assumptions.
15A similar assumption is e.g. taken in Davies/Ellis (2007), who label it “assumption of beneficial
FDI”.
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instruments yields results that distinguish the current paper from its environmental-
tax-competition-literature relatives.
By a similar motivation, Davies/Ellis (2007) attempt to explain the empirical evidence
of persistently strict performance requirements (PRs) going along with downward FDI-
competition in capital taxes. They rely on a rather simple two-policy model structure.
Environmental policy in their paper constitutes one out of several possible interpreta-
tions of a PR– implying that, differently from the current analysis, this instrument is
non-distortive as well as the capital tax. Hence, a country´s domestic welfare is strictly
increasing in the level of both instruments. As the foreign firms´ (of which there are
two) profit is assumed to contribute to the host country´s domestic welfare as well, a
government has to consider two tradeoffs less than in the current model: the ambiguous
welfareimpact of changes in the distortive environmental-policy instrument on the one
hand, and the profit-shifting property of changes in the capital tax on the other hand.
Hence, the competing countries´ decision problem is much less complex than in the
current model. An additional simplification of Davies/Ellis (2007) is that they derive
their basic results without considering intra-regional spillovers.
In spite of these (and further) differences, the paper’s positive conclusions correspond
to the current one’s: Even when competing for FDI with a neighboring country, gov-
ernments apply PRs to correct for domestic inefficiencies of the firms´ choices.16 Only
the capital tax is subject to a RtB which proceeds until the complete FDI surplus is
channeled to the firms. The normative result, however, differs from this paper´s finding:
In the competitive equilibrium, aggregate welfare in the region amounts to the socially
optimal level.17 Hence, there are no aggregate-welfare gains to be realized when coun-
tries decide to cooperate in policy-making.
To sum up, the contribution of the current paper is to integrate the approaches on
strategic corporate-tax- and environmental-policy competition for FDI into one model
in order to consider the interdependencies between both policy instruments. The aim
is to provide a theoretical framework yielding results more in line with actually ob-
served policy patterns than many single-instrument approaches.18 With respect to the
16Differently from the current paper, Davies/Ellis (2007) assume the individual firms’ neglect of
inter-firm spillovers (like e.g. R&D-spillovers) to be the source of those domestic inefficiencies.
17This is clearly due to the authors´ above-mentioned assumption of foreign profit contributing to
domestic welfare, and to the neglect of intra-regional spillovers. If the latter assumption is relaxed,
Davies/Ellis (2007) find results more in line with the current paper´s conclusions.
18Devereux et al. (2008) and Egger/Raff (2009) also investigate strategic policy-competition in two
instruments; the former paper from a portfolio investment-, the latter from a discrete-FDI perspective.
Both approaches focus on an empirical investigation of the competing governments´ two-dimensional
reaction functions. They do not, however, relate to environmental issues like pollution externalities and
the consequences for policy-making, but to alternative instruments of capital taxation. Devereux et
al. (2008) find strong evidence for their hypothesis that countries compete in both instruments: They
predict a RtB in statutory tax rates (with the aim of shifting foreign profit to the domestic country)
as well as in effective marginal tax rates (with the aim of attracting capital). Similarly, Egger/Raff
(2009) find the empirical observation of two-dimensional policy competition in corporate-tax rates and
appreciation allowances confirmed. Both approaches provide purely positive analyses. They neither
assess the welfare implications of strategic policy competition, nor the potential benefits from regional
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research question, an additional contribution of the current paper is to provide insights
on issues that go beyond those analyzed in the existing literature. Specifically, the
analysis of the effects that changes in the environmental conditions and market inte-
gration (respectively trade liberalization) have on the optimal policy choice and thus
on the environmental-policy level may contribute to the ongoing debate on the effects
of globalization.
cooperation in one or both policy areas.
Amerighi/de Feo (2009) provide a complementary normative analysis of strategic two-dimensional
policy competition. They apply an imperfect-competition model framework like Egger/Raff (2009),
and allow the foreign MNE to shift profit between jurisdictions (e.g. by using appropriate transfer-
pricing methods) like Devereux et al. (2008). Amerighi/de Feo (2009) find that FDI competition in
corporate-tax rates (expressed in a tax system discriminating between domestic and foreign firms) and
lump-sum subsidies may raise aggregate regional welfare under certain conditions (the basic mechanism
behind this result is driven by the asymmetric-country assumption and corresponds to that introduced
above in connection with the general tax-competition literature).
Also the empirical analysis by Fredriksson et al. (2004) addresses multi-dimensional policy competition:
The authors estimate intra- and inter-policy reaction functions for even three instruments including
environmental policy (measured by Levinson’s (1999) index; see above). Corresponding to the results
of the above-mentioned papers, they find strong evidence for both types of strategic interactions. For
instance, increases in one US state’s governmental-spending level or decreases in its tax level induce
decreases in a neighboring state’s environmental-policy stringency.
Chapter 6
Positive Analysis: Will There Be an
Environmental Race to the Bottom?
Abstract
This paper uses a simple two-country model to analyze, how countries will set output-
based emissions taxes and corporate taxes to compete for FDI. Will this competition
result in a “Race to the Bottom” in environmental taxes, in corporate taxes, or both?
The paper also investigates the effects of changes in environmental conditions and
market integration on equilibrium policies.
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6.1 Introduction
The widespread public concern that competition for FDI may trigger a RtB in en-
vironmental policies is supported by the environmental-policy competition literature.
Within this literature strand, there is broad consensus on the finding that FDI compe-
tition induces countries to deviate from their optimal no-competition policy levels.
This paper investigates whether this RtB-result is sustainable, if it is considered that
governments have more than one policy instrument at their disposal. Specifically, I
analyze the interrelation between emissions- and corporate-tax policies in a framework
where countries compete for internationally mobile capital in form of FDI: How does a
country´s optimal policy combination look like? Will emissions and profit be taxed at
a positive rate or will they rather be subsidized? How does the policy choice depend
on the intensity of FDI competition? Will FDI competition result in a RtB in environ-
mental policy?1
Building on the results, the paper also investigates, how exogenous changes in
environmental- and market conditions affect equilibrium policies. Specifically, the im-
pacts of changes in the domestic and international environmental conditions and of
market integration (i.e. declining trade costs) are examined: How is the intensity of
FDI competition and thus, indirectly, the optimal environmental-policy choice affected?
Do any adverse or beneficial impacts on the environment arise?
The issues to be analyzed in the current paper are of considerable practical relevance.
On the one hand, there is plenty of recent anecdotal evidence for an intensification of
international tax-competition. On the other hand, a public debate on environmental-
1The model framework implicitly assumes that corporate-tax- and environmental policies are de-
cisive determinants for a MNE´s location choice. It should be mentioned here that this view is not
uncontroversial:
In what concerns the impact of capital taxation, some authors argue that other factors like e.g. the eco-
nomic fundamentals, a country’s political, jurisdictional and financial stability or market size are more
relevant (see e.g. Oman (2000); Devereux/Griffith (2002), Gordon/Hines (2002) and OECD (2007b)
provide reviews of empirical studies on the impact of taxes on capital location). However, potential
FDI host countries, especially if located within the same region like assumed in this paper (think of
the EU as an example), become increasingly similar with respect to those factors. Hence, tax-level
differentials gain importance as a distinguishing factor in FDI competition (a similar argument is e.g.
made by Bjorvatn/Eckel (2006)).
In what concerns the locational relevance of environmental regulations, the arguments are basically
the same. Theoretical analyses that directly address the issue (see e.g. Markusen et al. (1993),
Motta/Thisse (1994), or Ulph (1994)) in general find a negative impact of environmental-policy strin-
gency on investment decisions. However, other factors like country size, trade costs etc. may weaken
or even reverse the results. Dijkstra et al. (2006), for example, derive conditions under which environ-
mental regulations constitute an incentive for, rather than an obstacle to FDI. Rauscher (1995) argues
that the issue is more an empirical one, investigated by the literature on the pollution haven hypothesis
(see Chapter 1.1 for a definition and some exemplary references). Though this literature does not yield
uniform conclusions, there is sufficient theoretical and empirical evidence justifying the assumption
that strict environmental regulations constitute an obstacle to FDI– irrespective of potential other
determining factors.
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policy erosion, presumably caused by this increased competition and by market integra-
tion, goes on in many industrialized countries. This debate, however, does not match
with the actually observable policy-patterns in the competing countries, which hint at
persistently high, rather than declining environmental-policy efforts.2
The development of investment incentives, offered by different country groups, over
time has been investigated e.g. by Oman (2000) and UNCTAD (1996). For the period
between the 1980s and 1990s, they find evidence for an increasing use, both in range
and in the number of countries, of financial and fiscal incentives. Most often, corporate-
tax-rate reductions are applied. Charlton (2003) extensively surveys recent world-wide
examples of incentive-bidding cases.3
Recent OECD data (see OECD (2007a)) show that this downward trend in corporate-
tax rates is still continuing: The average statutory corporate-income-tax rate in the 30
member countries declined from an average of 33.6% in 2000 to 28.4% in 2006. Reduc-
2With respect to the environment, recent anecdotal evidence for continuously intense, rather
than declining policy levels is mainly provided by examples related to the issue of climate change.
In mid-2007, the G8 countries on their yearly summit agreed to continue negotiating on a “post-
Kyoto”-agreement on GHG emissions. Although the process has not been terminated yet, at the
UN climate change conference in Copenhagen in December, 2009, the participating countries at least
achieved agreement on the “Copenhagen Accord”. This document refers to climate change as “one
of the greatest challenges of our time” and highlights the urgency of taking collective action to com-
bat this phenomenon by cutting world-wide GHG emissions drastically. In the “Copenhagen Ac-
cord”, countries for the first time commit to the aim of preventing increases in global temperature of
more than two degrees Celsius (for details see http : //unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830txt.php
and http : //unfcc.int/files/meetings/cop_15/application/pdf/cop15_cph_auv.pdf ; latest access in
July, 2010).
A related example are recent climate policies in the EU and in Germany: In 2007, the EU-member
countries decided to “unilaterally” reduce union-wide CO2 emissions by 20 percent compared to 1990-
levels up to 2020. Germany, conditional on the implementation of the above-mentioned EU-agreement,
goes even farther and considers CO2-reductions of 40 percent until 2020. In order to achieve this goal,
a vast number of single policy instruments were implemented in 2008 (termed “integrated energy- and
climate programme”). This German example is particularly interesting since within the same year, a
corporate-tax reform and significant environmental-policy efforts were implemented.
3Recent anecdotal evidence of the intensity of FDI competition is provided by Germany´s effort
to lead the US-American microchip-producer AMD to build a new plant at its established location in
Dresden rather than in the State of New York in the US. Both regions were fiercely competing for the
investment by offering considerable financial incentives. Finally, in the end of the year 2006, the US
outbid the German government by providing an incentive of 650 million US-dollars to AMD. In 2007,
AMD announced its plans to expand existing production facilities once again. Like before, the firm
faced the choice between its locations in the US and in Germany. In the light of this new chance to
attract the investment to Germany, the EU-Commission allowed the German government to provide
financial incentives of another 262 million Euros. Regardless of those subsidies, however, AMD suffered
substantial profit-losses during the current world-wide economic crisis, and was forced to outsource its
microchip production-facilities. For that purpose, AMD founded a joint venture (“Globalfoundries”)
together with an investor from Abu Dhabi in March, 2009. Their intention to expand production
capacities in Dresden, however, is claimed to be untouched by this transaction.
A similar example is the investment of the British technology producer “plastic logic” in 2008. Also
this company faced the choice between locations in Dresden, Singapur and the State of New York.
Among other locational advantages, incentive payments were decisive for finally choosing Dresden.
FDI Competition in Emissions- and Corporate Taxes: Positive Analysis 48
tions occurred in 25 OECD countries while the remaining five kept their rates constant
in that period. The variation across countries slightly increased.4 Figure 6.1 illustrates
this downward trend for the period between 1996 and 2009.5,6
Figure 6.1: Average Top Corporate Tax Rate in 30 OECD Countries
In the context of these empirical observations, the aim of this paper is to theoretically
reconcile the pessimistic environmental “predictions” of public debates and economic
analyses and the more optimistic characteristics of actual policy-patterns. For that
purpose, the interrelations between different policy instruments are considered rather
4The standard deviation rose from 6.58 to 6.85.
5The diagram is taken from the website
http : //www.cato.org/research/fiscal_policy/facts/tax_charts.html (latest access in July, 2010).
6One has to be aware, however, that besides tax rates, there are many more (tax-related) factors
determining a firm´s investment decision (above all, the relevant tax-base). As argued in OECD
(2007a), the relevant determinant for a MNE´s discrete investment decision is the average effective
tax rate (AETR), which measures the extent to which corporate profit is reduced by taxation. The
AETR considers both tax-rate- and tax-base features. In 19 OECD countries for which the respective
data is available, the AETR decreased from an average of 34.2% in 1982 to 24.4% in 2005. This
implies that reductions in the capital-income tax rate had a stronger impact than the broadening of
the tax base which simultaneously occurred during that period in many OECD countries. Hence, the
latter observation does not conflict with the notion of interpreting the observed tax-rate reductions as
indicator for an increase in tax competition.
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than limiting the analysis to one single (environmental) instrument. This approach
seems to be much more consistent with the actual policy-making conditions govern-
ments face.
Similarly, it is also current “real-world” developments that motivate investigating the
impacts of market integration and changes in environmental preferences: On the one
hand, a vast number of international and regional free-trade agreements are negotiated
and concluded each year.7 On the other hand, people´s preferences for a clean environ-
ment appear to follow an upward trend– particularly in the industrialized, but recently
as well in many newly industrializing countries. This rise in environmental awareness
is reflected e.g. in those countries´ increasing willingness to join the international ne-
gotiations on climate-change policies.8
To analyze the issue, a simple two-country model is applied: In a sequential three-stage
game, identical neighboring countries engage in strategic environmental- and corporate-
tax-policy competition for FDI from a third country. The foreign firm’s production
process causes transboundary pollution. The available instruments to attract the in-
vestment are a (distortive) emissions tax and a (non-distortive/lump-sum) corporate
tax on gross profit, chosen simultaneously and non-cooperatively in stage 1 of the game.
The foreign investor makes his location choice in stage 2 by comparing the net-profit
options in the two countries. In stage 3, the MNE chooses its profit-maximizing output
levels.
The analysis yields the following main results: When competing for the investment of a
foreign MNE, countries use corporate-profit- rather than environmental taxes as strate-
gic policy instrument. In the non-cooperative policy equilibrium, the corporate-tax rate
is smaller than its optimal value when there is no FDI competition (i.e. in a hypothet-
ical benchmark scenario in which the MNE’s location is fixed). The environmental-tax
rate is kept constant at the optimal no-competition level. Hence, there is no RtB in
environmental policy and no adverse impact of FDI competition on the environment.
Trade liberalization induces a decrease in the intensity of FDI competition via the profit
tax, whereas environmental-policy levels, again, are unaffected.
This result is not restricted to the environmental-/corporate-profit-tax policy frame-
work, and does not hinge on the simple structure of the underlying model. Rather,
the results allow for a general conclusion: In their competition for FDI, countries set
the distortive policy instrument in a way that induces the MNE to choose a produc-
tion volume (emissions, respectively) that maximize the countries´ individual welfare.
In particular, this strategy maximizes their net surplus from the FDI, and thus the
available means to compete for the investment in terms of offering the most favorable
conditions with respect to the second, non-distortive policy-instrument to the MNE.
Hence, FDI competition induces a RtB in the lump-sum policy instrument, whereas
the optimal choice of the distortive instrument is unaffected.
7For an overview see e.g. http : //www.worldtradelaw.net/fta/ftadatabase/ftas.asp?table1 = s : 4;
(latest access in July, 2010).
8See e.g. the webpage http : www.umweltbewusstsein.de (latest access in July, 2010) for some
studies on the evolution of environmental awareness in Germany in recent years.
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The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: The next section introduces the model
and explains the basic rationales behind governmental decision-making, which will con-
stitute the basis for the subsequent analysis. As a preliminary step, Section 6.3 in-
vestigates strategic policy competition for FDI in only one instrument, the emissions
tax. Section 6.4 then contains the main policy analysis considering the interrelations
between environmental- and corporate-profit-tax policy. In both scenarios, conclusions
build on a comparison of non-strategic (no-competition) policy equilibria to their strate-
gic counterparts. Finally, Section 6.5 concludes.
6.2 The model
The research questions in this paper are analyzed within a simple two-country model
framework. Identical neighboring countries constitute a region in which an investor
from a third country has already decided to set up a plant. The investor has monopoly
power in its market: One country becomes host for the foreign-owned monopolist, the
other is served by exports from its neighbor. Due to the countries´ symmetry, the
MNE´s decision of where to invest is solely determined by the countries´ (tax-)policies.
The host country (in the following referred to as “country i”) applies two policy instru-
ments in order to address the distortions associated with the foreign firm´s investment
in its domestic market:9 A source-based corporate tax si[−∞, 1] per unit of foreign
(gross-)profit Πi generated in the host country, and an emissions tax τi per unit of
output produced in the host country for the domestic market (qi) or for exports to
the neighboring country (qj; in the following, the importing country is referred to as
“country j”). This implies that the policy bundle includes one distortive- and one non-
distortive instrument in what concerns the MNE´s output choice: si is thus equivalent
to a lump-sum tax on profit. Both policy instruments only become effective, if country
i actually hosts the FDI. Otherwise, domestic production and MNE profit are equal to
zero.
The model takes the form of a sequential three-stage game. First, both countries in the
region choose their profit- and emissions-tax rates simultaneously and non-cooperatively
with the aim of attracting the foreign firm. Based on these policy conditions, in the
second stage, the MNE decides where to locate. In the last stage of the game, the
foreign firm chooses its output for domestic consumption and export.
6.2.1 Consumption
Consumption in country i is derived from a representative household’s preferences.
This household derives utility from the consumption of two goods, q and z, with z
being the numeraire, and disutility from environmental damage D, which is considered
9For details on these distortions see Section 6.2.5.
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as exogenous. The utility function of a consumer in country i is quadratic:
Ui = qi − 1
2
q2i + zi −Di. (6.1)
The budget constraint is given by:
I =
Ti + Si
Ni
+Mi = piqi + zi. (6.2)
Ti = τi(qi+qj) is environmental-tax revenue, Si = siΠi is profit-tax revenue (respectively
subsidy payment if si < 0), Ni denotes the number of households, Mi is an exogenous
income-component, pi is the domestic price for good q, and I is total income. Hence,
total income consists of redistributed environmental- and profit-tax revenues and an
exogenous component.
Utility maximization s.t. the budget constraint yields inverse demand
pi = 1− qi. (6.3)
6.2.2 Production
In both potential host countries, identical production technologies are available to the
MNE. Capital is the only factor of production; its total supply equals population size,
since each household owns one unit of capital. In the numeraire sector, one unit of
capital generates one unit of output, so that the capital price can be normalized to
one. Production in the other sector is characterized by constant and identical marginal
cost c, with 0 < c < 1. Intra-regional transport costs are t per unit of output, with
0 < t < 1.10 The foreign firm can price-discriminate between the regional markets.
With the investment located in country i, the MNE´s gross profit Πi consists of a
domestic- and an export component:
Πi = qi(pi − c− τi) + qj(pj − c− τi − t)
⇒ Πi = qi(1− qi − c− τi) + qj(1− qj − c− τi − t). (6.4)
Profit maximization with respect to qi respectively qj yields:
qi =
1− c− τi
2
, qj =
1− c− τi − t
2
. (6.5)
10Plant-level fixed costs are omitted here, although their absence would usually imply that the
MNE, in order to avoid transport costs, preferred locating in both, rather than in only one market.
The “one-plant” decision is based on the implicit assumption that plant-level fixed costs are sufficiently
high relative to intra-regional trade costs to prevent a double-plant strategy of the MNE. This is done
for reasons of simplicity: Adding fixed costs would neither change the MNE´s location decision nor
its output decision. All relevant qualitative results with respect to the research questions would be
unaffected.
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Both c and t are assumed to be sufficiently small and, throughout the whole paper,
parameter values are assumed to take on values such that the emissions-tax rate τ will
be non-prohibitive at its optimal level. In particular, this implies the environmental-
damage parameter δ being sufficiently small. These assumptions ensure positive output
for both domestic and foreign consumption, i.e. 1− c− τi > 1− c− τi − t > 0.11
Due to linear demand and constant marginal costs, foreign monopoly profit is:
Πi = q
2
i + q
2
j
=
(1− c− τi)2
4
+
(1− c− τi − t)2
4
. (6.6)
The net-of-tax profit (“net profit” in the following) of the MNE is thus given by:
(1− si)Πi = (1− si)
(
(1− c− τi)2
4
+
(1− c− τi − t)2
4
)
. (6.7)
6.2.3 The Environment
One unit of output produces one unit of emission, so that total emissions in the host
country, Ei, are equal to the MNE´s total production-volume: Ei = qi + qj = Qi.
Environmental damage in the FDI host country i is a function of domestic emissions:
Di = Di(Ei(Qi)) = δEi = δQi with 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, (6.8)
where δ represents constant marginal environmental damage.
The model allows for pollution spillovers between the neighboring countries. Environ-
mental damage in the importing country is given by the damage function:
Dj = Dj(Ei(Qi)) = µEi = µQi with 0 ≤ µ ≤ δ (6.9)
and thus solely determined by emissions in the FDI host country. Parameter values
µ = 0 and µ = δ characterize the “extreme” scenarios of purely local and global pollution
respectively.
11Similar assumptions are e.g. taken in Davies/Ellis (2007). Parameter values inducing prohibitive
emissions-tax rates would yield the so-called “NIMBY”-case (see Markusen et al. (1995)) with pollution
being so severe that countries prefer importing from abroad to production in their own country. This
scenario is excluded by assumption in this paper, since it does not make sense to analyze the effects
of FDI competition in a setting where countries actually do not wish to attract an investor.
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6.2.4 Social Welfare
Social welfare consists of consumer surplus CS, environmental-tax revenue T , envi-
ronmental damage D and profit-tax revenue (possibly negative in case of a subsidy):
W = CS + T −D + S.
Specifically, consumer surplus in the host, respectively the importing country is given
by:
CSi =
1
2
q2i =
(1− c− τi)2
8
, CSj =
1
2
q2j =
(1− c− τi − t)2
8
. (6.10)
Environmental-tax revenue in the host, respectively the importing country equals:
Ti = τiQi = τi(1− c− τi − t
2
), Tj = 0. (6.11)
Analogously, environmental damage in country i respectively j is given by:
Di = δQi = δ(1− c− τi − t
2
), Dj = µQi = µ(1− c− τi − t
2
). (6.12)
In the following, environmental-tax revenue and environmental damage will be aggre-
gated as “net revenue”:
net revi = (τi − δ)(1− c− τi − t
2
), net revj = −µ(1− c− τi − t
2
). (6.13)
Finally, extracted MNE-profit in country i yields a profit-tax revenue equal to:
Si = siΠi = si
(
(1− c− τi)2
4
+
(1− c− τi − t)2
4
)
. (6.14)
6.2.5 Governmental Decision-Making
The host country´ s government applies two policy instruments to address three do-
mestic distortions associated with the MNE´s presence:
Firstly, the profit tax serves to redirect foreign profit generated on the domestic market,
which would otherwise go abroad, to the domestic country.
Secondly, the welfare-maximizing choice of the emissions-tax rate is determined by a
tradeoff between two further domestic distortions of the MNE´s output choice to be
corrected for: The market distortion due to the monopolistic market structure and the
pollution distortion due to the environmental externality not considered by the firm.
The pollution distortion implies a positive tax on output as, from an environmental
point of view, too much is produced. The market distortion, on the contrary, implies
an incentive for a negative output tax, as, compared to the socially optimal output
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level, the monopolist produces too little and sells at too high a price which leads to
sub-optimally low CS.12
Whether the optimal emissions tax is positive or negative, depends on which of the
two output distortions dominates. In particular, a positive tax will result, if marginal
environmental damage is sufficiently high.
When choosing the optimal policy combination, governments have to consider the
MNE´s participation constraint. That is, the MNE´s profit option net of corporate-tax
payments on the domestic market must at least ensure that the firm is indifferent be-
tween producing in the market or leaving it.
In a scenario without FDI competition the participation constraint is equivalent to a
zero-profit condition. In a competitive scenario13 with an internationally mobile firm
the participation constraint implies that net profit attainable on the domestic market
must at least equal the MNE´s outside-profit option, i.e. the net profit it could generate
when moving to the neighboring country.
6.3 Preliminary Step: A Single-Policy Framework
Before analyzing FDI competition in two policy instruments, it is useful to first establish
the respective results in a one-policy setting, where countries only use the environmental
tax as strategic policy variable (i.e. where the corporate-tax rate is set to zero).
Will, in the model framework introduced in Section 6.2, such single-policy competition
induce an environmental RtB and thus correspond with the predictions of the related
literature mentioned above?
Comparing the resulting policy patterns to those arising in a multiple-policy scenario
(where in addition to environmental- also corporate-tax policy is at the governments´
disposal) will show: Conclusions with respect to the environmental-policy consequences
of FDI competition may change drastically, if it is considered that governments usually
apply more than one policy instrument in their efforts to attract foreign investments.
The analyses of both the single- and the multiple-policy cases in this, and the following
section respectively, comprise two steps: First, a “no-competition” benchmark scenario
without strategic FDI competition, i.e. with a fixed location of the MNE, is inves-
tigated. The results then serve as a reference point for the main analysis insofar as
the non-strategic equilibrium policies will be compared to their strategic counterparts.
This allows drawing conclusions with respect to the impact of FDI competition on
12Even in the absence of any pollution distortion, the subsidy rate on output, however, would not
suffice to induce the MNE produce at a level where price equals marginal cost: The positive externality
on the neighboring country that results from part of the MNE´s output being exported there is not
considered by the host-country’s government.
13Throughout the paper, the term “competitive” does not refer to the market structure, which is
always a monopolistic one, but rather to the pattern of inter-governmental FDI competition.
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environmental-policy levels, and hence answers the question of whether an environmen-
tal RtB occurs.
6.3.1 The “No-Competition” Benchmark-Scenario
Without having to compete for the investment, country i, hosting the foreign firm,
will choose welfare-maximizing policies subject to the MNE´s participation constraint
as stated in Section 6.2.5. In the scenario considered in this one-policy benchmark
analysis, the host country´s welfare consists of CS and net environmental-tax revenue:
W FDIi =
(1− c− τi)2
8︸ ︷︷ ︸
CSi
+(τi − δ)(1− c− τi − t
2
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
net revi
. (6.15)
The MNE´s participation is ensured if it attains a gross-profit of at least zero:
Πi =
(1− c− τi)2
4
+
(1− c− τi − t)2
4
≥ 0. (6.16)
Hence, the maximum emissions-tax rate a country can charge amounts to τmaxi = 1−c.14
Differentiating eq. (6.15) with respect to τi yields the optimal non-competitive emissions-
tax rate which is unambiguously positive:
τ ∗i =
3
7
(1− c− 2
3
t) +
4
7
δ > 0. (6.17)
The level of the output tax in this benchmark scenario is determined by three partly
counteracting incentives the government faces: As mentioned in Section 6.2.5, the pol-
lution distortion on the domestic market implies a positive, and the market distortion a
negative tax rate. In addition, in this one-policy framework, the complete MNE profit
goes abroad and thus no profit-tax revenue accrues to the domestic country. This evokes
an additional profit-shifting motive of the host government wishing to appropriate at
least part of the foreign profit in terms of positive output-tax revenue. Taken together,
the incentives for a positive tax rate outweigh those for a negative rate in this scenario.15
The participation constraint is not binding in equilibrium, implying that positive profit
remains for the foreign firm.16
14Note that the terms in brackets in eq. (6.16), by definition, cannot become negative since this
would correspond to negative output volumes. A tax rate of τi = τmaxi = 1 − c yields zero exports
(qj = 0), just the same as a tax rate of τi = 1 − c − t. Hence, in order to ensure Qi(τmaxi ) ≥ 0, the
maximum emissions-tax rate amounts to a value of τmaxi = 1 − c, implying both output components
to be zero (qi = qj = 0).
15τ∗i > 0 immediately follows from the assumption of parameter values such that both the firm´
s domestic- and exported output volumes are non-negative (in particular: 1 − c − t > 0). Formally:
τ∗i > 0⇔ δ > − 34 (1− c− 23 t). This condition is unambiguously fulfilled.
16It is obvious that τ∗i < τmaxi = 1− c holds under the non-prohibitiveness assumption with respect
to τi.
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6.3.2 The Non-Cooperative Equilibrium with FDI Competition
This section considers that the foreign firm is internationally mobile and thus bases its
location decision on a comparison of gross-profit options in the two countries. In order
to induce the MNE to invest/stay in the domestic market, country i must thus ensure
Πi(τi) ≥ Πj(τj).
Differently from the no-competition case, a country´s optimal emissions-tax rate is now
determined in a non-cooperative policy competition and thus chosen as reaction to the
other country´s policy. If the resulting strategic tax rate τNi (τNj ) falls short of its non-
strategic value τ ∗i , it can be concluded that FDI competition leads to an environmental
RtB.
Intuitively, if there is a positive net surplus from FDI compared to importing in a situa-
tion with a fixed MNE location, introducing FDI competition will induce both countries
to lower their tax rates in order to attract the investment. Hence, in environmental-
policy competition for FDI, emissions-tax rates are strategic complements. Country i´s
best-reply function is stated below:
τi(τj) =
{
τj −  for τj > τmini
τj for τj = τmini .
(6.18)
This FDI competition game can be interpreted as a special kind of Bertrand competi-
tion: Countries will undercut each other´s tax rates by an infinitesimally small amount
 until their maximum WTP for the FDI (i.e. the minimum necessary tax rate τmini
to attain a net surplus from FDI of at least zero) is reached. In the resulting policy
equilibrium, welfare in the FDI host country equals welfare in the importing coun-
try: W FDIi = W
Imp
j , since the complete surplus from FDI is “competed away”, and thus
transferred to the foreign firm (in terms of larger gross profit). The importing country´s
welfare is solely determined by (positive) CS- and (negative) pollution spillovers from
the FDI host country. Proposition 6.1 summarizes the characteristics of the resulting
single-policy equilibrium:
Proposition 6.1: When countries compete for FDI by strategically setting emissions-
tax rates, the MNE´s output is taxed/subsidized at a rate of τNi = δ − µ − t4
>
< 0.
For parameter values that induce non-prohibitive emissions-tax rates (i.e. for τ ∗i <
1 − c − t ⇔ δ < 1 − c − 5
4
t), this tax rate falls short of its non-strategic counterpart:
τNi < τ
∗
i . Hence, FDI competition induces an environmental RtB.
Proof: The equilibrium emissions-tax rate is calculated by setting welfare of the host
country equal to welfare in the importing country (which is equivalent to setting the
net FDI surplus equal to zero). The importing country´s welfare is given by:
W impj =
(1− c− τi − t)2
8︸ ︷︷ ︸
CSj
−µ(1− c− τi − t
2
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
net revj
. (6.19)
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Hence:
W FDIi −W impj != 0
⇒ (1− c− τi)
2 − (1− c− τi − t)2
8︸ ︷︷ ︸
surplus in CS
+(τi − δ + µ)(1− c− τi − t
2
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
surplus/loss in net rev
= 0. (6.20)
Solving for τ yields:
τNi = δ − µ−
t
4
>
< 0. (6.21)
Given the assumption of non-prohibitive optimal tax rates, the strategic emissions-
tax rate given by eq. (6.21) is smaller than its non-strategic counterpart given by
eq. (6.17): τNi < τ ∗i . This follows from the FDI host country´s welfare in the non-
competitive benchmark equilibrium exceeding the respective welfare in the importing
country: W FDIi (τ ∗i ) > W
imp
j (τ
∗
i ). This condition is fulfilled unambiguously under the
assumption of non-prohibitive values of τ ∗i :
Eq. (6.20) shows that a sufficient though not necessary condition for W FDIi (τ ∗i ) >
W impj (τ
∗
i ) (implying the LHS of eq. (6.20) to exceed zero) is τi − δ + µ > 0, since the
surplus in CS (the first term on the LHS) is always positive as well as MNE output
given by the term (1− c− τi− t2). After plugging in τ ∗i and re-arranging, the condition
becomes: τ ∗i −δ+µ > 0⇔ 37(1−c−δ− 2t3 +µ) > 0. This in turn holds for non-prohibitive
emissions-tax rates: τ ∗i < 1− c− t⇔ 1− c− δ − 5t4 > 0⇒ 1− c− δ − 2t3 + µ > 0. 2
Eq. (6.21) shows that the equilibrium emissions-tax rate lies within a range of
(− t
4
, δ − t
4
), depending on the extent of pollution spillovers. For the extreme case
of global pollution, output is subsidized rather than taxed: τNi (µ = δ) = − t4 < 0. For
the other extreme of purely local pollution, the strategic output-tax is at its maximum
value: τNi (µ = 0) = δ − t4
>
< 0. Hence, FDI competition is the more intense, the larger
environmental spillovers are. This result is intuitive, since the relative attractiveness
of hosting the FDI compared to importing rises, if pollution spillovers increase: While
(positive) CS in the importing country is not affected, (negative) environmental-tax
revenue (corresponding to environmental damage) becomes larger.
The conclusion of the preceding preliminary analysis therefore is: If countries compete
for FDI only in terms of environmental policy, they face incentives to lower emissions-
tax rates below their non-strategic levels in order to attract the foreign firm. Hence, FDI
competition induces an environmental RtB. This is the more pronounced, the larger
transboundary pollution spillovers are.
These preliminary results motivate the research question, which is investigated in the
following main sections: (How) does this prediction change, if an additional policy
instrument (corporate profit taxation) is introduced?
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6.4 Policy Analysis with Two Instruments
The following sections constitute this paper’s main contribution. They derive the coun-
tries´ optimal strategic policy patterns in case they have two instruments, (distortive)
environmental- and (lump-sum) profit taxes, at their disposal. Like above, the non-
strategic policy choices serve as reference point for the characterization of the compet-
itive policy equilibrium.
6.4.1 The “No-Competition” Benchmark-Scenario
Without having to compete for the investment, the country hosting the foreign firm
will choose welfare-maximizing policies subject to the MNE´s participation constraint
as stated in Section 6.2.5. The participation constraint is now given by:
(1− si)Πi ≥ k, k = 0, (6.22)
where k is a parameter interpretable as the MNE´s outside-profit option.
In the resulting “no-competition” policy equilibrium, the foreign MNE is taxed at the
maximum feasible rate of s∗i = 1, which is just sufficient to ensure the MNE´s par-
ticipation in the domestic market (i.e. that leaves the MNE indifferent towards the
investment).
The intuition is straightforward: If there is no competition for FDI, all that has to be
ensured to keep the firm in the domestic country is zero net profit (i.e. eq. (6.22) to
hold with equality, which in turn implies that the participation constraint is binding).
Hence, the profit-tax rate can be set equal to one and the complete foreign profit is
shifted to the domestic country. This profit adds to welfare as if the foreign firm was a
domestic one.
Domestic welfare is thus given by:
WFDIi =
(1− c− τi)2
8︸ ︷︷ ︸
CSi
+(τi − δ)(1− c− τi − t2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
net revi
+ si︸︷︷︸
=1
(
(1− c− τi)2
4
+
(1− c− τi − t)2
4
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Πi
.
(6.23)
Maximizing eq. (6.23) with respect to τi yields an optimal non-strategic emissions-tax
rate of:
τ ∗i = −
1
3
(1− c) + 4
3
δ
>
< 0. (6.24)
Proposition 6.2 states a crucial result concerning the interrelation between environmental-
and profit-tax policies:
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Proposition 6.2: If the participation constraint is binding, a country´s optimal level
of environmental policy is independent of its corporate-tax policy.
Proof: Proposition 6.2 is straightforward to prove for any value of k ≥ 0:17 As k
represents some fixed value, it can be used to eliminate s in the welfare function as
follows: Re-arranging eq. (6.22) in its binding form yields:
(1− si)Πi = k ⇒ siΠi = Πi − k, k ≥ 0. (6.25)
Using eq. (6.25), the host country´s welfare function becomes
W FDIi =
(1− c− τi)2
8
+(τi−δ)(1−c−τi− t
2
)+
(1− c− τi)2
4
+
(1− c− τi − t)2
4
− k︸ ︷︷ ︸
siΠi
.
(6.26)
Obviously, maximizing eq. (6.26) with respect to the emissions-tax rate yields the same
value for τ ∗i as in the case of si = 1. 2
Eq. (6.25) illustrates the intuition behind the participation constraint: In order to en-
sure the MNE´s participation in the domestic market, the share of foreign gross profit
the host country can appropriate must not exceed the difference between the MNE´s
domestic and outside profit options.
We can conclude that, as long as the participation constraint is binding, the optimal
environmental policy will be constant at a level of τ ∗i , no matter how high the profit-
tax rate is. Changes in k force a country to adjust its profit-tax rate in order to keep
the participation constraint binding, but this adjustment will not affect its optimal
environmental-policy choice.
In general terms, the respective conclusion is that in case of a binding participation
constraint, FDI competition is carried out in terms of the non-distortive policy instru-
ment. The distortive instrument is meanwhile kept constant at its welfare-maximizing
“no-competition” level.
6.4.2 The Non-Cooperative Equilibrium with FDI Competition
Suppose now, the foreign firm is internationally mobile and thus bases its location
decision on a net-profit comparison between its potential host countries. In order to
17In particular, the result with respect to the independence of environmental taxes does not hinge
on this specific benchmark scenario, but holds in general, for any outside-profit option of the MNE.
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induce the MNE to invest/stay in the domestic market, country i must ensure the
following generalized participation constraint to hold:
(1− si)Πi ≥ (1− sj)Πj. (6.27)
Hence, from country i´s point of view, intensified FDI competition, expressed by coun-
try j either lowering its profit, or its emissions-tax rate, is equivalent to a rise in k, the
exogenous outside-profit option of the foreign firm. How will country i react, i.e. how
will the policy equilibrium change, when competition for FDI intensifies?
The next subsection will establish the interrelation between the two policy instruments
in the non-cooperative scenario and specify the main characteristics of the policy equi-
librium. The following subsection then completes the equilibrium analysis by some
comparative statics.
The interrelation between environmental- and corporate-tax policies and
the main characteristics of equilibrium policies
In analogy to the single-policy scenario investigated in Section 6.3, tax competition
for FDI can be interpreted as a special kind of Bertrand competition: Two symmetric
countries undercut each others´ profit-tax rates until they reach their maximum WTP
for the FDI. As a consequence, the participation constraint is binding in both countries.
In such an equilibrium, welfare in the FDI host- equals welfare in the importing country:
W FDIi = W
Imp
j , since the complete surplus from FDI is “competed away”, generating
larger net profit for the MNE.
As shown in the benchmark analysis, environmental policy is independent of k if the
participation constraint is binding. In case FDI competition intensifies (that is, the
MNE´s outside profit k rises), governments use (non-distortive) corporate- rather than
(distortive) emissions taxes in order to maintain the MNE´s market-participation. This
result yields the following Proposition:
Proposition 6.3: For parameter values that induce non-prohibitive emissions-tax rates
(i.e. for τ ∗i < 1 − c − t ⇔ δ < 1 − c − 34t), a government will adjust its profit-tax rate
downwards to a level of sNi (τ ∗i ) < 1 when facing intensified international competition
for FDI, expressed by declining profit- or environmental-tax rates in the neighboring
country. The environmental tax remains at its optimal no-competition level. Conse-
quently, there are no adverse environmental effects when countries are enhancing their
competition for FDI. Since si is a strategic complement to both sj and τj, the best-reply
function of country i is the following:
si(sj, τj) =
{
si | (1− si)Πi(τ ∗i ) = (1− sj)Πj(τj)
}
. (6.28)
Depending on the size of the environmental-spillover parameter, both a tax and a sub-
sidy on profits may arise as equilibrium policy: sNi
≥
< 0 for µ ≤> µ˜ = 1
3
(1− c− δ − 3t
4
).
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Proof: See Appendix B.1. 2
Proposition 6.3 implies that governments do not apply environmental policy as an
instrument in strategic FDI competition, if they have an additional policy instrument
(corporate taxes) at their disposal. Hence, the “Environmental-RtB result” of single-
instrument analyses is not be confirmed here. Furthermore, not only is environmental
policy unaffected by FDI competition, but so is the absolute pollution level, too.
So far, the current paper has followed a rather technical approach to explain the re-
sults: The key mechanism driving the outcome is the finding that environmental policy,
under the condition of a binding participation constraint in the policy equilibrium, is
unaffected by changes in the intensity of FDI competition.
What is the rationale for governments exclusively relying on corporate-tax policy, when
trying to attract a foreign firm?18 In the Nash equilibrium, the countries in the re-
gion use the distortive tax instrument to induce the MNE produce an output volume
corresponding to the socially optimal one: The emissions tax serves to correct for the
market- and the pollution distortions in the domestic country. In other words, the wel-
fare surplus the host country can generate if it succeeds in attracting the investment,
is maximal, if it sets the emissions-tax rate equal to τ ∗i . A maximum domestic-welfare
level in turn implies that the country´s means available for FDI competition are max-
imized: The more surplus a country generates by an optimal output tax, the more
favorable investment conditions can it offer to the MNE in terms of the non-distortive
instrument. Hence, choosing τ ∗i creates the largest possible chance of success in the
countries’ competition for FDI. Offering investment incentives in terms of a low profit-
tax burden constitutes the “least-cost” alternative of competing for FDI, since it does
not involve any further welfare-reducing biases of the MNE’s output choice.
The Nash equilibrium characterized by Proposition 6.3 is unique. Specifically, there
does not exist any environmental-policy choice in equilibrium that does not maximize
the competing countries’ individual welfare: Given the neighboring country´s strategic
policy-choice, any value for τi with τi 6= τ ∗i would imply a suboptimal individual-welfare
level, and cause a defeat in the FDI competition game, respectively a complete loss of
the FDI surplus.
Comparative Statics
How do the countries´ corporate-policy choices and, thus, the intensity of intra-regional
FDI competition depend on the prevailing environmental conditions in the region?
The first aspect to consider is the domestic perspective as characterized by the
environmental-damage parameter δ. Changes in δ can either be interpreted as changes
in the level of environmental damage associated with the production process, or as
changes in environmental preferences.
18The basic principle behind the following argument is inspired by Davies/Ellis (2007).
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The following Proposition states the results concerning changes in domestic environ-
mental conditions:
Proposition 6.4: For parameter values that induce non-prohibitive emissions-tax rates
τ ∗i , the relationship between the optimal profit-tax rate in the non-cooperative policy
equilibrium and marginal environmental damage in the FDI host country is negative:
∂sNi
∂δ
< 0.
In the absence of any environmental externality (and thus pollution spillovers, i.e. for
δ = µ = 0), foreign profit is taxed at a positive rate of sNi (τ ∗i , δ = µ = 0)(0, 1).19
Proof: See Appendix B.2. 2
The first part of Proposition 6.4 implies that rising environmental damage associated
with the MNE´s production, or, equivalently, an increase in environmental preferences
in the region, intensify FDI competition via the profit tax. Considered from country
i´s welfare perspective, this finding is surprising at first sight, as one would rather ex-
pect hosting FDI to become relatively less attractive, and thus the WTP for FDI to
decrease (resp. smini = sNi to increase), if domestic pollution is (perceived as) more se-
vere. Remember, however, that the host country already counters this increase in (the
perception of) environmental degradation by adjusting its emissions-tax rate upwards.
Since this increase in τ ∗i is even larger than proportional to the change in environmen-
tal damage/-preferences (∂τ
∗
i
∂δ
= 4
3
), there is indeed scope for an intensification of FDI
competition via the profit-tax rate, i.e. for s to decline to a level below its initial equi-
librium value.20
Note, however, that the environment will not suffer from FDI competition becoming
more fierce. As the analysis in Section 6.4.2 has shown, the neighboring countries solely
rely on the non-distortive policy instrument (the profit tax), when competing for the
investment; a RtB in (distortive) environmental taxes does not occur.
The second part of Proposition 6.4 implies that, also in the absence of pollution, coun-
tries have an incentive to compete for the foreign investment by strategically choosing
their profit-tax rates. The optimal tax rate is positive, even though the host coun-
try does not suffer from environmental damage caused by the MNE´s production, but
rather realizes a positive surplus in CS compared to the importing country. This sur-
plus, however, is not sufficient to completely compensate for the output subsidy the
19In such no-pollution scenario, the policy instrument τi is of course not interpreted as environ-
mental tax. It rather represents an ordinary output-tax serving to correct for the domestic market
distortion (see Section 6.2.5). In equilibrium, this tax constitutes a subsidy, since from a social-welfare
perspective, the foreign monopolist produces too little: τ∗i (δ = 0) = − 13 (1− c) < 0.
20When explaining the change in the countries´ WTP for FDI in terms of the aggregate welfareeffects
of changes in δ, one has to consider a number of direct and indirect channels through which the
optimal profit-tax rate is determined. Specifically, those include the host country´s relative CS- and
net environmental-tax revenue surpluses (see eq. (B.1) in Appendix B.1). Whereas the former declines
if pollution aggravates (∂4CS∂δ = − 13 t < 0) and thus causes an upward pressure on sNi , the latter
may rise with pollution (∂4netrev∂δ
>
< 0) and thus possibly decrease sNi . Both effects are endogenously
determined by the upward adjustment of the equilibrium emissions-tax rate τ∗i .
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host country needs to pay the MNE in order to correct for the domestic market distor-
tion. Hence, additional profit-tax revenue is required to make the FDI-option attractive
for a country. Such a positive profit-tax rate also illustrates the host country´s profit-
shifting motive, which gains relative weight in political decisions-making if pollution
externalities are absent.
Next, consider the effect of cross-country environmental spillovers on corporate-tax pol-
icy (representing the international aspect of environmental conditions). The following
Proposition states the results concerning changes in the extent of pollution spillovers:
Proposition 6.5: For parameter values that induce non-prohibitive emissions-tax rates
τ ∗i , the relationship between the optimal profit-tax rate in the non-cooperative policy
equilibrium and environmental spillovers from the FDI host- to its neighboring country
is negative: ∂s
N
i
∂µ
< 0.
In the absence of any intra-regional pollution spillovers (i.e. for purely local pollution:
0 = µ ≤ δ), foreign profit is taxed at a positive rate of sNi (τ ∗i , 0 = µ ≤ δ)(0, 1).
Proof: See Appendix B.3. 2
The first part of Proposition 6.5 implies that FDI competition is the more intense (i.e.
the lump-sum-policy conditions offered to the MNE are the more favorable), the more
pronounced transboundary pollution is. As already mentioned in Section 6.3.2, this
finding is intuitive: FDI is the more attractive, the larger is the net surplus a country
can generate from hosting the FDI compared to importing. The total net surplus
consists of a (unambiguously positive) surplus in CS (∆CS > 0) and a surplus/loss
in environmental-tax revenue net of environmental damage (∆net rev >< 0). While the
former is not affected by pollution spillovers, the latter positively depends on their level:
In contrast to the host country, the importing neighbor only suffers from environmental
damage without generating any tax revenue. Therefore, the difference in net-revenue
levels between the competing countries rises with µ. They will thus increase their
efforts to attract the foreign investor by offering more favorable profit-taxes, the larger
pollution spillovers are. However, the intensity of FDI competition does not exert any
adverse impact on the environment, since environmental-policy levels are unaffected.
The second part of Proposition 6.5, in analogy to Proposition 6.4, implies that countries
have an incentive to compete for the foreign investment, even if the surplus from net
environmental-tax revenue is comparatively small under purely local pollution. Con-
sequently, the additional CS a country can generate from hosting the MNE must be
relatively large. However, FDI competition is not so fierce that negative profit-tax rates
(i.e. subsidies on foreign profit) result as equilibrium policy. This finding is intuitive,
as already in the no-pollution scenario (in which the relative attractiveness of FDI is
even larger), positive profit-taxes are necessary to compensate the host country for the
output subsidy it pays to the MNE (see above).
Another interesting aspect of the external conditions countries face when making their
policy decisions concerns the size of trade barriers, when markets are more and more
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integrating. The question is, how governments will react to declining intra-regional
trade costs: Does this liberalization process induce FDI competition to become more,
or rather less intense?
Unfortunately, general comparative-static results turn out to be quite hard to derive.
Outcomes are ambiguous and depend on parameter values.
Nevertheless, clear-cut results for the special cases of “complete market integration” (i.e.
for trade costs close to zero) and “autarky” (i.e. for trade costs close to prohibitive), as
stated in Proposition 6.6, are possible to derive:
Proposition 6.6: For parameter values that induce non-prohibitive emissions-tax rates
τ ∗i and regional markets being close to complete integration (i.e. free trade), the rela-
tionship between trade costs and the optimal profit-tax rate is negative: ∂s
N
i
∂t
|t=0< 0.
The same holds for markets close to autarky: ∂s
N
i
∂t
|t=1−c< 0.
A negative equilibrium tax rate sNi < 0 (i.e. a subsidy on foreign profit) is more likely
to arise in an autarky, than in a free-trade scenario.
Proof: See Appendix B.4. 2
These findings are intuitive: If trade costs fall, the surplus in CS the host country can
generate compared to the importing country declines. Hence, FDI becomes relatively
less attractive and country i´s minimum necessary profit-tax rate yielding a net FDI
surplus of zero increases.21
In the “extreme” scenario of free trade without any intra-regional trade costs, the FDI
host country cannot attain any surplus in CS compared to the importing country
(∆CS = 0). The only potential surplus comes from net environmental-tax revenue
(∆netrev >< 0). Hence, “free trade” is the scenario, in which FDI is c.p. the least
attractive. As a consequence, the competing countries´ incentives to offer favorable
investment-conditions to the MNE are the least pronounced here; the equilibrium profit-
tax rate will c.p. take on its maximum level.
Analogously, the other “extreme” scenario of prohibitively high intra-regional trade costs
(autarky) ensures the FDI host country the largest attainable surplus from avoided trade
costs: ∆CS is maximal. Hence, the autarky scenario represents conditions, under which
hosting the FDI is c.p. the most attractive. The competing countries will thus offer the
most favorable investment conditions in terms of low profit-tax rates to the MNE; the
21It should be mentioned that there are two additional channels through which changes in t influence
the optimal profit-tax rate: The MNE´s output and profit rise if t declines. Firstly, rising output
increases the absolute value of the host country´ s relative surplus/loss in net environmental-tax
revenue. Whether this effect constitutes an incentive for more or less intense FDI competition, depends
on whether initially, the relative surplus was positive or negative. Secondly, a larger profit raises the
host country´s profit-tax base and thus the relative attractiveness of hosting the FDI, if sNi > 0
initially. If in the initial situation, profits were subsidized (sNi < 0), this effect works in the opposite
direction. These two additional channels, however, are of relatively minor importance. For the special
cases considered in Proposition 6.6, they can at most weaken the CS-effect quantitatively, but not
change its direction.
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probability that even a subsidy results as equilibrium policy is the most pronounced.
In summary, these findings yield the conclusion that FDI competition is the less fierce,
the more integrated markets are.
What do these results imply with respect to the common fear that “globalization is bad
for the environment”? First, trade liberalization does not, as often claimed, lead to
intensified international FDI competition. On the contrary: When trade costs decline,
intra-regional trade more and more constitutes a substitute for the competing countries´
efforts to attract the FDI themselves. Second, environmental-policy levels are not
affected by the liberalization process, because countries only use the corporate-profit
tax as policy instrument in FDI competition.22
6.5 Conclusions
This paper has examined the impact of strategic FDI competition on a country´s opti-
mal emissions-/corporate-tax policy combination in a framework explicitly considering
the interdependencies between the two policy instruments. In the context of current
public debates, the aim was to investigate whether FDI competition causes a RtB in
environmental policies, as predicted by many one-policy approaches. Furthermore, also
motivated by current “real-world” developments, the paper has discussed the impacts
of changes in domestic and international environmental conditions and of economic
integration on equilibrium policies.
It turned out that FDI competition does not induce an environmental RtB. Rather,
environmental-policy levels are completely unaffected by FDI competition, since coun-
tries solely apply corporate-tax policies to attract the foreign investment. In the re-
sulting non-cooperative policy equilibrium, profit-tax rates are smaller than their non-
strategic value, whereas emissions-tax rates amount to their optimal non-strategic level.
This implies that welfare-maximizing governments have no incentive to “misuse” envi-
ronmental policy as a means to attract FDI, if they have an alternative, more directly
targeted, policy instrument at hand.
This result is perfectly consistent with recent anecdotal evidence on corporate-tax- and
environmental policies mentioned in the introduction: There are lots of examples for in-
tense FDI-competition going hand in hand with strict environmental legislation. Hence,
as compared to public concerns and the results of a large number of analyses within
the (environmental-)tax-competition literature, the conclusions of this paper are rather
optimistic.
The conclusions with respect to the effects of FDI competition are neither limited to
22This does not exclude, however, adverse direct environmental impacts of market integration, as
declining trade costs clearly raise the firm´s total output and thus total environmental damage: The
MNE is induced to raise its output volume as exports become more profitable (∂qj∂t = − 12 < 0). As a
consequence, the absolute pollution level in the region, identical to the foreign firm´s total production,
rises: ∂Ei(Qi)∂t =
∂Qi
∂t =
∂qj
∂t < 0 (see Section 6.2.3).
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this paper´s specific application to environmental- and corporate-profit-tax policies,
nor to the applied model framework. On the contrary, the results yield rather general
conclusions.
In particular, generalizations with respect to the model framework are conceivable e.g.
in terms of the foreign firm´s decision variable: This could, besides the volume of output
as in this paper, represent any other firm choice relevant for the determination of do-
mestic welfare. Examples include R&D- or pollution-abatement expenditures. Implied
by alternative decision variables, also the externalities underlying the MNE’s subopti-
mal choice (with respect to social welfare) and the nature of intra-regional spillovers
could be of different kinds– either positive or negative.
Generalizations with respect to the policy framework implicitly follow from the as-
sumptions on the externalities characterizing the regional markets. These determine
the distortive policy instrument suitable to correct for suboptimal firm decisions by
directing the MNE´s choice to a socially optimal outcome. For the above-mentioned
example of R&D- or pollution-abatement expenditures as choice variables, which cer-
tainly create positive externalities and spillovers, a conceivable policy instrument could
be a subsidy per dollar spent.
By the same line of argument as for the distortive, generalizations with respect to the
non-distortive policy-instrument are straightforward: Think of any lump-sum transfer
to the foreign investor suitable to attract the MNE. It is irrelevant, so to say, how this
transfer is termed. Quite common in the “real world” are e.g. “incentive packages”
offered to a foreign firm in case it locates a plant in the domestic country. The RtB in
profit taxes induced by FDI competition as in this paper would then correspond to a
RtT in incentive payments.
To sum up, this paper´s main conclusion with respect to the interrelation between
environmental- and corporate-profit-tax policies in intra-regional FDI-competition car-
ries over to a broad range of policy- and model frameworks. The results do not hinge
on the specific, simple model structure applied here, since the basic and intuitive mech-
anism driving those results is a general one:
Suppose, governments have two policy instruments, one distortive and one
non-distortive, at their disposal, and domestic markets exhibit suboptimal welfare lev-
els due to some external effects associated with a foreign firm´s investment. It is
straightforward that the FDI host applies the distortive instrument to correct for those
distortions and by this means generate a maximum level of domestic welfare. At the
same time, the government maximizes its means available to offer to the foreign firm
in terms of most investment-friendly conditions with respect to the non-distortive in-
strument. As a consequence, it achieves the given target of maximizing the MNE´s
domestic net-profit option in order to attract the FDI at the least possible cost. This
cost may be interpreted in terms of the (potential) welfare loss associated with a policy
intervention: Whereas policy competition via the distortive instrument would bias the
MNE´s (forcedly domestic-welfare maximizing) decision in addition to raising its net-
profit option, competition via the lump-sum instrument directly targets at net profit
without inducing further distortions and welfare losses.
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The comparative-statics results with respect to the environmental conditions yield
mixed conclusions in connection with the above-mentioned “real-world” observations
and public concerns: The anecdotal evidence with respect to recent environmental-
policy patterns in many countries may be interpreted as an indicator for an increasing
environmental awareness. According to this paper´s findings, this induces an intensi-
fication of FDI competition, just as expected by the public and many economists. As
this competition, however, is carried out in terms of corporate-tax, rather than envi-
ronmental policy, adverse environmental(-policy) impacts are not to be expected. On
the contrary: The domestic emissions-tax rate will, independently of FDI competition,
be raised.23
The comparative-statics results with respect to trade costs suggest that the currently
ongoing market integration leads to a weakening of the countries´ efforts to attract FDI.
Hence, the public concern about “harmful” tax competition induced by globalization
lacks theoretical support. Most relevant with respect to this paper´s motivation is the
finding that the environmental-policy impact of market integration is equal to zero.
This comparative-static result is already stated in a rather general way. Following
the preceding line of argument in more detail reveals, why also the conclusions with
respect to the effects of regional integration on FDI competition are independent of
the specific model framework applied: Transport costs are not relevant for the host
country´s welfare-maximizing level of the distortive policy-instrument. They only af-
fect equilibrium policies via the net surplus from FDI, which in turn determines the
intensity of FDI competition in the non-distortive instrument, whichever form that has.
Accordingly, results carry over to a much broader range of model settings.
Which potential extensions of the analysis in this paper appear sensible? In what
concerns the theoretical model framework, for instance, introducing asymmetry with
respect to environmental preferences in the competing countries might yield further
interesting insights. Suppose, for example, the environmental-damage parameter in
country A, and thus also its optimal emissions-tax rate, exceeds the respective values
in country B. Then, in order to win the FDI-competition game, A has to offer a lower
profit-tax rate than B. According to the arguments in this paper, the minimum rate
that is reasonable is sminA , leading to a zero net surplus from FDI. Country B´s best
reply would be a profit-tax rate yielding a net MNE profit exceeding the profit option
in A by an infinitesimally small (and thus negligible) amount. The MNE locates in
B. The generalized participation constraint, however, is binding in equilibrium. The
basic conclusion of no environmental RtB occurring is thus unaffected. The equilibrium
characteristic of identical welfare levels in the host- and the importing country under
completely non-cooperative policy choices, however, need not hold for the asymmetric-
23In contrast to transport costs, arguments concerning a more general interpretation of this
environmental-variable comparative-statics results are not very useful, since already the existence of a
pollution externality constitutes a rather specific assumption, driven by the underlying environmental-
policy model framework. This is different with respect to transport costs, which should plausibly
be part of any model specification on the issue of FDI competition– independently of the additional
alternative model features.
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country case. The less environmentally aware country B has to ensure the MNE´s
locational indifference, but this no longer requires to set sNB = sminB . For all profit-tax
rates exceeding their minimum necessary value (sNB > sminB ), a positive net FDI surplus
for the host country remains.
Chapter 7
Normative Analysis: What are the
Welfare Effects and How Can They be
Tackled?
Abstract
This paper analyzes the welfare effects of international FDI competition in an emissions-
and a corporate-profit tax. As a starting point, the competing countries´ aggregate wel-
fare in the non-cooperative policy equilibrium is compared to the maximum attainable
level corresponding to the social optimum. The analysis then focusses on the question
of how countries can improve their aggregate welfare, if the social optimum, requiring
cooperation in both policy areas, is not feasible. The paper examines two alterna-
tive patterns of partial policy cooperation: an International Tax Agreement and an
International Environmental Agreement.
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7.1 Introduction
The preceding chapter has shown that FDI competition in environmental- and corporate-
tax policies does neither induce an environmental RtB nor excessive pollution. This
rather optimistic result does not immediately imply, however, that globalization does
not have any adverse welfare impacts. In particular, it is highly questionable, whether
the two-dimensional non-cooperative policy equilibrium is compatible with the aim of
maximizing regional welfare. The subsequent normative analysis of the model there-
fore addresses the welfare effects of policy competition. In the light of the empiri-
cally observable attempts different groups of countries and regions undertake to over-
come such “harmful policy competition” by negotiating international agreements on e.g.
environmental- or tax-related issues, the paper also assesses alternative approaches to
improve social welfare.
For that purpose, the analysis first establishes the (rather obvious) result that aggre-
gate regional welfare in the Nash equilibrium falls short of its maximal attainable level
in the social optimum. One reason is that a non-cooperative policy choice implies a
country´s complete surplus from hosting the FDI (as compared to importing) being
channeled to the foreign firm by means of a low profit tax. Second, although there is
no FDI competition in environmental policy, the non-cooperative emissions-tax rate is
not optimal from an aggregate regional perspective, since it does not consider intra-
regional pollution- and consumer-surplus spillovers. The social optimum corresponds
to a situation, in which intra-regional policy-cooperation is “complete” in the sense that
both policy instruments are set to maximize aggregate regional welfare.
Subsequently, the paper investigates the welfare effects of “partial” policy cooperation,
i.e. cooperation in only one of the two available instruments: How does an International
Tax Agreement perform as compared to an International Environmental Agreement?
This approach takes account of the fact that complete cooperation in the “real world”
may often be infeasible, due to e.g. political or administrative obstacles. The focus of
the analysis is to examine, whether such partial-cooperation options constitute appro-
priate means to attain welfare improvements relative to a completely non-cooperative
situation, and so at least help approach the socially optimal welfare level. It turns
out that both kinds of agreement are suitable to do so. The gains from cooperation
on the lump-sum corporate-tax policy instrument (ITA), however, exceed those from
cooperation on the distortive environmental-tax policy instrument (IEA).
Recently, there have been numerous attempts of different country groups to cooperate
on environmental, as well as on corporate-tax policies. With respect to the environment,
the “IEA database”, for instance, provides a list of IEAs worldwide, showing that since
the year 2000, the large number of 151 IEAs has been concluded.1 Current worldwide
attempts of countries to find international solutions to the issue of global warming and
climate change, as manifested in the negotiations on a follow-up of the Kyoto-protocol
1See “International Environmental Agreements Database Project (Version 2010.2)” at http :
//iea.uoregon.edu/; access July, 2010.
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(see Chapter 6), constitute the most prominent example.
With respect to corporate taxation, policy cooperation with two closely related aims
has recently prevailed: A first example is the EU’s “Common Consolidated Corporate
Tax Base” (CCCTB) policy, introduced in 2001. This policy implies EU-wide har-
monization of corporate-tax bases, and is pursued by a working group, meeting on a
quarterly basis, most recently in April, 2008. The EU Commission presumes that such
coordination of national tax systems has positive effects on regional (EU-wide) tax ef-
ficiency and thus, indirectly, on aggregate welfare.2
Second, international agreements with the aim of addressing “harmful tax competition”
provide anecdotal evidence for cooperation efforts in corporate-tax policy. One promi-
nent example is the “Code of Conduct for business taxation”, set out by ECOFIN in
1997: EU-member countries commit to rolling back existing and refraining from intro-
ducing new tax measures, which have significant impact on business location and are
classified as “harmful” according to a set of criteria.3 In 1998, also the OECD founded
the “Forum on Harmful Tax Practices”, encompassing similar aims and measures as the
Code of Conduct.4
Examples of agreements on international cooperation in both policy areas, however, are
hardly observable: As achieving agreement on the determination of one policy instru-
ment has already proven to be sufficiently difficult, it can be considered as politically
infeasible to cooperate on multiple issues at the same time. Furthermore, if cooperation
in more than one instrument should really be achieved, we can expect competition in
still other instruments to be adjusted in turn. Hence, simultaneous cooperation in all
available policy instruments (two in this paper´s model framework) can plausibly be
considered as infeasible.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: The next section characterizes equilib-
rium policy patterns in the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium (i.e. under no cooperation
at all) and the social optimum (i.e. under complete cooperation) and compares the as-
sociated welfare levels. For reasons mentioned above (and elaborated below), the social
optimum serves as a reference point for the normative welfare analysis rather than
as “realistic” policy scenario. Section 7.3 investigates partial-cooperation scenarios in
corporate- and environmental taxes and the associated welfare differentials to the Nash-
and the socially optimal outcomes. The focus is on the question of whether welfareim-
provements can be realized, and on the alternative agreements´ relative performance
in aggregate-welfare terms. Section 7.4 concludes.
2For an overview of basic features and current progress of the CCCTB see
http : //ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/company_tax/common_tax_base/index_en.htm
(latest access in July, 2010).
3For an overview of the main features see http : //ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/company
_tax/harmful_tax_practices/index_en.htm (latest access in July, 2010).
4For further information see OECD (1998) and
http : //www.oecd.org/topic/0, 2686, en_2649_33745_1_1_1_1_37427, 00.html (latest access in
July, 2010).
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7.2 Nash Equilibrium and Social Optimum:
No versus Complete Cooperation
7.2.1 The Non-Cooperative Nash Equilibrium
In the non-cooperative policy regime, the countries in the region compete for FDI in
both policy instruments. Lemma 7.1 replicates the resulting equilibrium policy patterns
derived in the positive analysis in Chapter 6:
Lemma 7.1: In the simultaneous non-cooperative policy equilibrium, environmental-
tax rates equal their no-competition values τNi = τ ∗i = −13(1 − c) + 43δ. For parameter
values that induce non-prohibitive emissions-tax rates, competition for FDI is exerted
via downward adjustments of profit-tax rates to a level of sNi (τNi ) < 1. This tax level
yields a zero net surplus from FDI in the host country.5
Policy patterns as described in Lemma 7.1 imply that the competing countries are
offering their maximum WTP for the FDI in terms of charging the foreign firm with
only the minimum necessary profit-tax rate to just ensure themselves a net FDI surplus
of zero. Consequently, the complete surplus is redirected to the foreign country, leaving
both with identical welfare levels corresponding to the importing country´s welfare:
W FDI,Ni = W
imp,N
j .
7.2.2 The Cooperative Social Optimum
The maximum feasible welfare level associated with the social optimum serves as a
reference point for an assessment of aggregate regional welfare attainable in the Nash
equilibrium. A socially optimal policy regime here is interpreted from the regional per-
spective: Both the environmental- and the corporate-tax policy-instrument are chosen
such that regional welfare Wreg, i.e. the sum of welfare levels in the FDI host- and the
importing country, is maximized:
Wreg = W
FDI
i +W
imp
j →
max!
s, τ . (7.1)
Hence, the social optimum corresponds to a scenario without any competition for FDI,
as countries i and j cooperate in both policy areas.
5Remember that the net FDI surplus is defined as the welfare differential between the FDI host- and
the importing country. In general, it consists of three elements: First, differently from the importing
country, the FDI host can realize an (unambiguously positive) surplus in CS due to avoided transport
costs. Second, the host country realizes a surplus from net environmental-tax revenue. Whether this
is positive or negative, depends on the extent of environmental damage. The third element of net FDI
surplus is profit-tax revenue, which is, of course, only generated in the host country and can also take
on positive or negative values.
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Lemma 7.2 characterizes the associated policy equilibrium:
Lemma 7.2: In the social optimum, the cooperative policy choice yields a corporate-
profit-tax rate of sopti = 1 and a corresponding emissions-tax rate of
τ opti (s
opt
i ) = −(1 − c) + t2 + 2(δ + µ), with τ opti (sopti ) > τNi for environmental spillovers
sufficiently large, i.e. for µ > µ˜ = 1
3
(1− c− δ − 3
4
t).6
Proof:
• The optimal cooperative profit-tax rate being equal to unity immediately follows
from arguments introduced in Chapter 6, and builds on the assumption that the
foreign MNE has already decided to invest in the region. Hence, all the countries
have to ensure in order to fulfill the MNE´s participation constraint, is a foreign
net-profit of zero. This allows them to charge the maximum tax-rate of si = 1.
Formally: (1− si)Πi != 0⇒ sopti = 1.
• The emissions-tax rate is to maximize aggregate regional welfare, which is given
by:
Wreg = CSi + net revi + s
opt
i Πi︸ ︷︷ ︸
WFDIi
+CSj + net revj︸ ︷︷ ︸
W impj
=
(1− c− τi)2
8︸ ︷︷ ︸
CSi
+(τi − δ)(1− c− τi − t2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
net revi
+ sopti︸︷︷︸
=1
(
(1− c− τi)2
4
+
(1− c− τi − t)2
4
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Πi
+
(1− c− τi − t)2
8︸ ︷︷ ︸
CSj
−µ(1− c− τi − t2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
net revj
. (7.2)
Maximization with respect to τi yields:
τ opti = −(1− c) +
t
2
+ 2(δ + µ). (7.3)
The threshold value µ˜, which implies this socially optimal emissions-tax rate to
6Note that this condition on the environmental-spillover parameter corresponds to the threshold
value µ˜ identified in Proposition 6.3 in Chapter 6. It yields negative profit-tax rate values in the
competitive equilibrium: µ > µ˜⇔ sNi < 0. Subsidies on foreign profit as equilibrium policy indicate a
scenario with relatively fierce FDI competition.
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exceed its non-cooperative counterpart, obviously follows from:
τ opti > τ
N
i
⇒ −(1− c) + t
2
+ 2(δ + µ) > −1
3
(1− c) + 4
3
δ
⇒ µ > 1
3
(1− c− δ − 3
4
t). (7.4)
2
The subsequent analysis assumes that the above-mentioned condition on the
environmental-spillover parameter ensuring τ opti > τNi is fulfilled. This assumption
makes sense, since without transboundary pollution being sufficiently severe, there
would be no need to internationally cooperate on environmental-policy making. In
order to improve on aggregate welfare, the countries would then have to reduce, rather
than intensify their environmental-policy efforts– a situation which is not consistent
with “real-life” observations.
A maximum corporate-tax rate as identified in Lemma 7.2 implies that the countries
can retain the complete foreign profit generated within the region for themselves. A
look at the socially optimal emissions-tax rate reveals that it reflects, differently from
its unilaterally chosen counterpart in the Nash equilibrium, environmental damage in
both countries, as well as intra-regional transport costs. This implies that all external-
ities from the host- to the importing country are internalized: On the one hand, the
environmental spillover −µ(1− c− τi− t2) constitutes a negative externality, implying a
downward bias in the host country’s non-cooperative emissions-tax rate. On the other
hand, the CS-spillover (1−c−τi−t)
2
8
, constituting a positive externality, implies an upward
vias in the non-cooperative emissions-tax rate. In general, whether the socially optimal
tax rate exceeds (as assumed in this paper), or falls short of the non-cooperative one,
depends on which of those externalities dominates.
7.2.3 Welfare Comparison
As shown above, in the social optimum, the FDI host country is able to appropriate the
complete foreign profit by setting the corporate-tax rate equal to one. Differently from
the competitive scenario, the host country realizes the net FDI surplus, as this need not
serve as investment incentive for the foreign MNE in the course of intra-regional FDI
competition. As a consequence, the host country´s exceeds the importing country´s
welfare level. Proposition 7.1 summarizes, how aggregate regional-welfare levels in the
two policy-regimes differ.
Proposition 7.1: For parameter values that induce non-prohibitive optimal emissions-
tax rates (i.e. for τ opti < 1 − c − t ⇔ δ + µ < 1 − c − 34t), aggregate regional welfare
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in the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium falls short of the welfare level attainable under
socially optimal policies: WNreg < W optreg .
Proof: See Appendix C.1. 2
Proposition 7.1 implies that intra-regional FDI competition is detrimental for aggregate
welfare in the region. There is a RtB7 in both policy instruments, if governments aim at
attracting the foreign firm to their own country, rather than acting cooperatively and
considering that the MNE has already decided to invest in the region and thus does not
require any further incentives. In the Nash equilibrium, potential welfare gains from
cooperation are not realized: If the countries jointly decided to tax foreign profit at the
maximum possible rate of sopti = 1, rather than each offering a subsidy of sNi < 0 to the
MNE, they could save the “incentive payments” and so improve on aggregate welfare.
Although this paper does not interpret the social optimum as a “realistic” policy sce-
nario, but rather uses it as a benchmark for welfare comparisons, some additional
welfare-related insights, stated in Corollary 7.1a, can be gained:
Corollary 7.1a: On aggregate, the region gains from complete policy cooperation as
compared to a scenario with no cooperation at all. This result carries over to the in-
dividual perspective of the host- and the importing country. Both achieve higher wel-
fare levels in the social optimum than in the Nash equilibrium: W FDI,opti > W
FDI,N
i ∧
W imp,optj > W
imp,N
j .
Proof: See Appendix C.2. 2
The FDI host country is better-off in the social optimum, because it realizes the com-
plete net surplus from FDI rather than channeling it to the foreign firm in terms of
low corporate taxes. The importing country is better-off, because it gains from the
internalization of external effects (here expressed in a higher level of the emissions-tax
rate).
Furthermore, the welfare relations stated in Corollary 7.1a allow for an insight going
beyond the topics analyzed in this chapter: Although both individual countries gain
from complete cooperation, such policy pattern is not feasible without additional pol-
icy provisions. Because in the social optimum the FDI host country realizes a higher
welfare level than its importing neighbor, there is always an incentive to engage in FDI
competition– resulting in the Nash-equilibrium outcome. That is, countries face a typ-
ical Prisoners’ Dilemma situation. An appropriate scheme of side-payments might help
to overcome this dilemma. Such a scheme would have to ensure that in equilibrium,
both countries achieved the same level of individual welfare– no matter whether they
7Differently from the positive analysis, the term “RtB” here is interpreted in a normative sense:
The reference point for the emissions-tax rate is given by its socially optimal level τopti rather than by
its “no-competition” level (corresponding to τNi ). The reference values of the profit-tax rate coincide,
since the socially optimal- and the “no-competition” values are both equal to one.
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end up as host- or importing country. The “winner” of the FDI competition must thus
pay half of its surplus to the “loser”:
W imp,opt,νj = W
imp,opt
j +ν
!
= W FDI,opti −ν = W FDI,opt,νi ⇒ ν =
1
2
(W FDI,opti −W imp,optj ),
where ν represents the side-payments from i to j.8
7.3 Alternative Approaches of Partial Cooperation
7.3.1 An International Tax Agreement
An ITA constitutes one potential regime of partial intra-regional cooperation. Such
agreement encompasses the direct and complete elimination of FDI competition in
corporate taxes (i.e. in the lump-sum policy instrument), whereas environmental taxes
(the distortive policy instrument) are still chosen non-cooperatively. This paper assumes
that, by concluding an ITA, the countries commit to a common profit-tax rate that
maximizes their aggregate welfare, and thus corresponds to the socially optimal rate:
sITAj = s
ITA
i = s
opt
i = 1 > s
N
i .9
The ITA Policy Equilibrium
Lemma 7.3 states the main characteristics of the ITA policy equilibrium:
Lemma 7.3: Suppose, the countries in the region conclude an ITA by choosing the
socially optimal profit-tax rate as common policy level: sITAi = s
opt
i = 1. As this tax
rate corresponds to its non-strategic value, FDI competition is completely eliminated.
8It should be annotated that the practical relevance of such (hypothetical) side-payment schemes
is highly questionable due to a variety of obstacles of e.g. administrative-, calculatory-, or political
nature.
9Although such policy choice constitutes the most ambitious pattern of cooperation in an ITA,
this assumption is motivated by the fact that the conclusion of an ITA and the implied common
corporate-tax rate constitute entirely political decisions (which are exogenous to the model): Which
policy level the ITA member countries achieve agreement on, appears, at least from an economic
perspective, rather arbitrary. There is thus no reason not to suppose that those countries choose
the socially optimal tax rate as their cooperative one. On the contrary: As those countries aim at
maximizing aggregate welfare, the social optimum plausibly constitutes a reference scenario for their
cooperative policy choices. Hence, in order to keep things simple and comprehensive, the subsequent
analysis builds on an ITA profit-tax rate corresponding to its social optimum. The qualitative results,
however, do not hinge on this assumption, as long as the relation sITAi > sNi is sustained. For ITA
profit-tax rates above the non-cooperative value but below one (i.e. for sNi < sITAi < 1), though not
completely eliminated, FDI competition is still directly weakened by the agreement. Positive welfare
effects from this “competition effect” (see below) still arise, although their extent clearly falls short of
that attainable by means of a socially optimal tax rate.
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In the resulting ITA policy equilibrium, the emissions-tax rate corresponds to that in
the “no-cooperation” Nash equilibrium: τ ITAi = τNi = −13(1− c) + 43δ.
Proof: See Appendix C.3. 2
Lemma 7.3 directly implies that the introduction of an ITA has neither an effect on
environmental-policy levels, nor on environmental quality in the member countries.
This result may appear surprising at first sight: As members of an ITA, the countries
in the region are withdrawn the opportunity to engage in corporate-tax competition
for FDI. One might thus expect them to apply the second available policy instrument,
the distortive one, instead, and so trigger a RtB in environmental policy. The intuition
for this not happening is, however, straightforward: If the region cooperatively sets
corporate-tax rates equal to one, the MNE´s net-profit option in both countries is zero–
no matter, which environmental-tax levels it faces. The ITA regime thus corresponds
to the no-competition benchmark scenario introduced in Chapter 6. Hence, why should
the countries continue competing for the FDI, if the MNE is indifferent with respect to
its location within the region anyway? An agreement on the lump-sum corporate-tax
instrument therefore enables the FDI host country to set its distortive environmental-
tax instrument in a way that induces the MNE to produce an output volume consistent
with maximum domestic welfare.
Welfare Effects
How does aggregate regional welfare in an ITA regime compare to welfare attainable in
case of no cooperation? In other words: Does such tax agreement constitute a “step in
the right direction” in what concerns the aim of mitigating the adverse welfare effects of
international policy competition? Proposition 7.2 provides the answer to this question:
Proposition 7.2: Aggregate regional welfare in the ITA equilibrium is larger than
welfare in the Nash equilibrium with no cooperation, but falls short of the maximum
attainable level in the social optimum: WNreg < W ITAreg < W optreg .
Proof: See Appendix C.4. 2
Proposition 7.2 affirms the question posed above: Partial corporate-tax-policy coopera-
tion indeed constitutes an appropriate means to enable the region to approach (though
not entirely attain) its socially optimal welfare level.
On the one hand, an ITA regime with common profit-tax rates of one completely elim-
inates FDI competition (since this is solely exerted in terms of the tax instrument).
This competition effect ensures that, in contrast to the completely non-cooperative pol-
icy scenario, the net FDI surplus can be appropriated by the host country and thus
remains within the region. Aggregate regional welfare in the ITA therefore exceeds its
respective level in the Nash equilibrium.
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On the other hand, aggregate regional welfare in the ITA regime fails to attain the
complete-cooperation level: Environmental taxes are not socially optimal, because
countries continue to target their individual welfare, when chosing the distortive policy
instrument. Intra-regional externalities are thus not considered, and the maximum at-
tainable level of regional welfare is missed.
To summarize: An ITA raises aggregate regional welfare. Hence, in terms of corporate-
tax policy, “some cooperation is better than no cooperation.”
Corollary 7.2a complements the results with respect to aggregate welfare by an analysis
of an ITA´s individual-welfare effects:
Corollary 7.2a: On aggregate, the region gains from partial corporate-tax-policy coop-
eration as compared to a scenario with no cooperation at all. This result carries over
to the individual perspective of the host country: W FDI,ITAi > W
FDI,N
i . The importing
country is at least not worse-off, since it ends up at a welfare level identical to that in
the Nash equilibrium: W imp,ITAj = W
imp,N
j .
Proof: See Appendix C.5. 2
We can infer from Corollary 7.2a that, first, the complete aggregate-welfare gain a
region realizes when concluding an ITA is generated in the host country, and, second,
originates in the direct elimination of corporate-tax-policy competition. Due to this
competition effect, the complete foreign profit (the level of which is not affected by
the ITA, since environmental policy is kept constant) is appropriated by the FDI host,
rather than by the foreign firm.
Differently from the host country, the importing neighbor´s position does not improve,
since environmental taxes remain at a level that disregards intra-regional spillovers.
Because country j does not lose from participating in the ITA neither, such agreement
appears to be a feasible option of international policy-cooperation nevertheless.10
7.3.2 An International Environmental Agreement
An IEA constitutes the second possible regime of “partial cooperation”: Countries deter-
mine environmental policy (i.e. the distortive policy instrument) cooperatively, whereas
lump-sum corporate taxes are still set in a non-cooperative manner. Analogously to
the ITA scenario, the member countries commit to a common emissions-tax rate that
maximizes aggregate regional welfare, and thus corresponds to the socially optimal rate:
τ IEAj = τ
IEA
i = τ
opt
i > τ
N
i .11
10This conclusion holds under the premise that the member countries are committed to the treaty´s
corporate-tax-policy provision.
11This IEA tax rate builds on Proposition 6.2 in Chapter 6, which states for the completely non-
cooperative Nash equilibrium: “If the participation constraint is binding, a country´s environmental-
policy level is independent of its corporate-tax policy.” This argument carries over to the IEA scenario.
Also here, countries lower their profit-tax rate down to a level that reflects their (identical) maximum
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In general, uniform (environmental-) policy levels for all member countries of course
do not constitute the only conceivable design of an international agreement on the dis-
tortive policy instrument (IEA), which is exogenous to the model. The actual policy
pattern countries achieve agreement on during the treaty negotiations obviously de-
pends on many factors, e.g. on the number of, and the political-power distribution
among the member countries, the specific pattern of externalities (environmental prob-
lem) at hand etc. An alternative to the “uniform-policy” solution investigated in the
remainder of this paper, a “differentiated-policy” version of an IEA, is discussed in
Appendix C.10.
The IEA Policy Equilibrium
Lemma 7.4 summarizes the main characteristics of the IEA policy equilibrium:
Lemma 7.4: Suppose, the countries in the region conclude an IEA by choosing the
socially optimal emissions-tax rate as their common policy: τ IEAi = τ
opt
i = −(1 − c) +
t
2
+ 2(δ + µ). In the resulting IEA policy equilibrium, competition for FDI in terms
of corporate taxes persists. The non-cooperative profit-tax rate corresponds to each
country´s maximum WTP for the FDI (its minimum necessary tax rate, respectively).
This tax rate is larger than that corresponding to the “no cooperation” Nash equilibrium:
sIEAi = s
min
i (τ
IEA
i ) > s
N
i .
Proof: See Appendix C.6. 2
Lemma 7.4 implies that the equilibrium profit-tax rate approaches its socially optimal
level, if environmental taxes are fixed to their “international” social optimum. This
finding implies that the introduction of an IEA indirectly weakens harmful FDI com-
petition in corporate taxes.
The intuition behind this finding is straightforward: The intensity of intra-regional
FDI competition is determined by the FDI-option´s relative attractiveness compared
to importing (i.e. by the net FDI surplus). If in an IEA, the environmental-tax rate
is raised above its optimal non-cooperative level, the host country´s welfare surplus
(and thus the incentive to compete for the foreign investment) declines (for a given
value of s):12 On the one hand, its own domestic welfare falls short of the initial max-
imum level associated with an optimal emissions-tax choice in the Nash equilibrium.
WTP for the FDI (see below). Hence, the generalized participation constraint is binding also in the
IEA equilibrium: (1− sIEAi )Πi = (1− sIEAj )Πj(= k). As a consequence, s can be eliminated from the
aggregate-regional-welfare function analogously: W IEAreg = CSi + CSj + netrevi + netrevj +Πi − k︸ ︷︷ ︸
siΠi
.
Maximization with respect to τi yields the same value for τ IEAi as in the case of si = s
opt
i = 1. Hence:
τ IEAi = τ
opt
i (s
opt
i ).
12More specifically, this decline is composed of three potentially counteracting effects. The first is a
decrease in the relative CS-surplus: The tax-induced output detraction causes a decline in CS, which
is more pronounced in the host, than in the importing country (this is due to a larger initial CS-level in
the host, as compared to the importing country). The second effect is a change in net environmental-
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On the other hand, the importing country´s welfare rises, since the IEA emissions-
tax rate internalizes both intra-regional external effects (pollution- and CS-spillovers).
The host country reacts to the decline in net FDI surplus by reducing the corporate-tax
investment incentive offered to the MNE, and raises s.
Welfare Effects
How does aggregate regional welfare in an IEA regime compare to welfare in a sce-
nario without any cooperation? In other words: Does such an environmental-policy
agreement, like the corporate-tax agreement, mitigate the adverse welfare effects of
international policy competition? If so, how does the associated regional-welfare level
compare to that associated with the social optimum? Proposition 7.3 provides the
answer to these questions:
Proposition 7.3: Aggregate regional welfare in the IEA equilibrium exceeds that in
the Nash equilibrium with no cooperation, but falls short of the socially optimal level:
WNreg < W
IEA
reg < W
opt
reg .
Proof: See Appendix C.7. 2
An environmental-tax agreement, like international cooperation on corporate-tax pol-
icy, induces positive aggregate-welfare effects for the involved countries: Not only are
environmental taxes raised to their socially optimal level, and thus intra-regional ex-
ternalities internalized (internalization effect). In addition, “harmful” corporate-tax
competition for FDI is indirectly weakened, as the equilibrium profit-tax rate rises
compared to its non-cooperative level (competition effect). As a (unintended, but ben-
eficial) consequence, a larger share of foreign profit is preserved for the region and adds
to aggregate welfare. Accordingly, if cooperation on both policy instruments is not a
feasible policy option, partial cooperation in terms of an IEA constitutes an appropriate
step in direction of approaching the social optimum.
To summarize: An IEA “kills two birds with one stone” and raises aggregate regional
welfare. Hence, also in terms of environmental policy, “some cooperation is better than
no cooperation.”
tax-revenue surplus, the direction of which is ambiguous: Whereas a higher tax rate c.p. raises gross
environmental-tax revenue and reduces environmental damage (both implying a positive impact on net
FDI surplus), the output detraction c.p. lowers the emissions-tax base (implying a negative impact
on net FDI surplus). Third, foreign profit shrinks. As in the Nash equilibrium the profit-tax rate is
negative, absolute subsidy-payments to the MNE decline. Regarded isolatedly, this effect implies a
positive impact on net FDI surplus.
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What about the individual-welfare effects of an IEA? Corollary 7.3a summarizes:
Corollary 7.3a: Not only the region as a whole, but also both individual member
countries gain from concluding an IEA: W FDI,IEAi > W
FDI,N
i ∧W imp,IEAj > W imp,Nj .
Proof: See Appendix C.8. 2
Both countries gain from partial cooperation in environmental policy. This finding
is intuitive from the importing country´ s perspective, since environmental- and CS-
spillovers from its neighbor are now considered in the distortive policy-instrument. This
internalization of externalities (expressed by a rise in the emissions-tax rate), however,
is per se disadvantageous for the host country. On aggregate, however, its welfare loss
due to “excessive” output taxation13 is overcompensated by the welfare gain induced by
the lower intensity of corporate-tax competition.
Consequently, as both countries are made better-off in terms of their individual welfare,
also an IEA constitutes a feasible option of partial international policy-cooperation.14
7.3.3 Comparative Analysis of ITA and IEA
According to the preceding discussion, both international one-policy agreements are,
in what concerns the aim of mitigating the adverse welfare effects of “harmful” FDI
competition, appropriate instruments of intra-regional cooperation. What remains to
be determined, is their relative performance in raising aggregate social welfare. In
other words: Given the competitive and environmental conditions characterizing the
region, which pattern of policy cooperation should the neighboring countries prefer: an
environmental- or a corporate-tax agreement? In particular, the question is, whether
an ITA or an IEA induces larger aggregate-welfare gains as compared to the completely
non-cooperative Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 7.4 provides the answer:
Proposition 7.4: For “moderate” levels of intra-regional pollution spillovers, aggregate
regional welfare in the ITA equilibrium exceeds that in the IEA equilibrium:
W ITAreg > W
IEA
reg .
Proof: See Appendix C.9. 2
What is the intuition behind Proposition 7.4? The ITA’s superiority to the IEA in
aggregate-regional-welfare terms hinges on the environmental-externality parameter ly-
ing in an “intermediate”, intuitively plausible range. This range is determined by the
two crucial assumptions underlying the whole paper:
13The term “excessive” is here interpreted from the host country´s perspective, in the sense that the
tax exceeds its individual welfare-maximizing rate of τNi .
14Like the ITA, also the IEA must be binding for this conclusion to hold.
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First, intra-regional pollution spillovers (represented by the level of µ) have to be suf-
ficiently large to ensure that the socially optimal emissions-tax rate exceeds the non-
cooperative Nash-equilibrium rate (i.e. τ opti > τNi ).15 Accordingly, transboundary pol-
lution has to be so severe that the negative environmental externality’s impact on the
importing country exceeds the positive CS externality’s impact associated with the
FDI. Consequently, their internalization implies the cooperative tax rate to exceed the
non-cooperative rate.
Second, intra-regional pollution spillovers have to be sufficiently small to ensure a
non-prohibitive level of the socially optimal emissions-tax rate (i.e. τ opti < τ
prohib
i ).16
According to this condition, for the region as a whole, hosting the MNE must be more
attractive than any other option: Despite the pollution associated with the foreign
firm´s production, the region must benefit from the investment.17
Why is the relative performance of the alternative agreements driven by these assump-
tions? To answer this question, let´s recapitulate the mechanisms that determine their
respective aggregate-welfare impacts.
As explained in Section 7.3.1, the ITA-induced welfare gain solely originates in the
competition effect, i.e. in the direct elimination of intra-regional FDI competition, and,
consequently, the region´s newly gained ability to appropriate the complete net FDI
surplus.
The IEA-induced welfare gain, meanwhile, has two sources (see Section 7.3.2): The in-
ternalization of intra-regional externalities by means of a socially optimal emissions-tax
rate on the one hand, and the induced indirect weakening of FDI competition, which in
turn improves on the region´s ability to appropriate foreign profit, on the other hand.
Hence, both an internalization- and a competition effect are at work.
If environmental spillovers are “too large”, the benefits of the internalization effect in an
environmental agreement become so strong that they outweigh the competition effect
the corporate-tax agreement´s benefit builds on. Hence, in such scenario, the welfare
gains attained by an IEA exceed those attained by an ITA.
If, on the contrary, environmental spillovers are “too small”, the net FDI surplus for
the host country is relatively small, and FDI competition relatively weak. The benefit
15This assumption was introduced and motivated in Section 7.2.2.
16This assumption was introduced and motivated in Section 7.2.1.
17In line with the previously discussed general interpretation of this paper´s conclusions, also these
two assumptions can be interpreted in a more general sense:
Assumption (1) implies the externality, which is crucial for the respective research question a model
is applied to (here: the environmental externality) to be the most relevant. Additional intra-regional
spillovers (here: the CS externality) may arise, but are dominated by that crucial intra-regional
external effect. For FDI/MNE decision variables causing positive externalities (recapitulate the above-
mentioned example of R&D-expenditures), assumption (1) would imply the socially optimal tax rate
to be smaller than the respective non-cooperative rate.
Assumption (2) generally excludes parameter constellations that imply the region to prefer the for-
eign firm not to locate within its markets (NIMBY; see above). This assumption is not binding in
model frameworks with positive externalities, and sensible in all frameworks dealing with negative
externalities, if issues of FDI competition are analyzed.
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from the competition effect of an ITA is thus of relatively minor relevance. Therefore,
also in a scenario with weak environmental spillovers, an IEA can prove to be superior
to an ITA in aggregate-welfare terms, a result that might appear surprising at first sight.
Hence, only in a scenario with intermediate (and intuitively plausible) pollution-spillover
levels the ITA-induced welfare gain from the competition effect exceeds the respective
IEA-induced gain from a combination of competition- and internalization effect.
To summarize: Under plausible assumptions on the patterns of the environmental ex-
ternality that characterize a region, countries should prefer an ITA to an IEA, if they
intend to raise their aggregate social welfare by concluding a partial one-policy agree-
ment.
This conclusion, however, is based on the premise that the region´s aim is to raise social
welfare on aggregate. This premise ignores that welfare generally consists of different
elements, each of which might constitute a target of policy-making in itself. If gov-
ernments specifically wish to focus on international pollution problems, of course the
environmental, and not the corporate-tax agreement would be the suitable pattern of
cooperation.
In a more general interpretation, the above conclusion reads as follows: If countries
in a region intend to negotiate a partial one-policy agreement in order to improve on
their aggregate welfare, they should concentrate on the non-distortive rather than the
distortive policy instrument. Such cooperation pattern is superior due to the fact that
the benefits from the direct elimination of FDI competition (which is initially exerted
in terms of the lump-sum instrument only) exceed those attainable from the combi-
nation of an internalization benefit (via cooperating on the distortive instrument) and
the indirect weakening of FDI competition: If the agreement targets the distortive in-
strument, FDI competition in the lump-sum instrument persists (though less severely).
As a consequence, the complete net FDI surplus continues to be channeled to the for-
eign firm, instead of adding to regional social welfare. Consequently, the potential
aggregate-welfare gain, though positive, falls short of the respective gain an agreement
on the lump-sum instrument may generate.
7.4 Conclusions
In following a normative approach, this chapter complements the preceding positive
analysis of the effects strategic FDI competition has on environmental-policy levels: If
two countries simultaneously decide on two policy instruments in a non-cooperative
manner, they will engage in downward tax competition in a non-distortive corporate
tax, whereas a distortive environmental tax is left at its optimal non-strategic reference
value.
The current chapter investigates the welfare implications of such international policy
competition for FDI by comparing welfare in the resulting non-cooperative equilibrium
to the maximum attainable level associated with the social optimum. As such com-
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pletely cooperative outcome does not appear to constitute a feasible policy option in
the “real world”, two alternative, and apparently more realistic, approaches to miti-
gate the adverse welfare effects of FDI competition are assessed: partial cooperation
in corporate-tax- versus in environmental policy. In particular, the focus is on the
question, how such agreements perform in improving on aggregate regional welfare.
The main results are: As compared to the social optimum, where countries coopera-
tively decide on both policy instruments with the aim of maximizing aggregate regional
welfare, FDI competition in emissions- and corporate taxes induces a waste of regional
resources and a decline in aggregate welfare. The introduction of an ITA (partial
cooperation in corporate-tax policy) has no environmental consequences: Neither equi-
librium policy choices, nor environmental quality are affected. The direct elimination
of corporate-tax competition for FDI raises aggregate regional welfare compared to the
completely non-cooperative setting. The socially optimal welfare level, however, is not
attained. The introduction of an IEA (partial cooperation in environmental policy),
by indirectly weakening “harmful” corporate-tax competition in addition to committing
the member countries to socially optimal emissions-tax rates, also improves on regional
welfare. Hence, for both patterns of partial policy-cooperation, this paper suggests that
“some cooperation is better than no cooperation”. A comparison of both alternative
agreements reveals that an ITA outperforms an IEA in aggregate-welfare terms.
This conclusion can also be read in a more general way: The positive welfare impact
of an international agreement on the lump-sum policy instrument, which is initially
applied in intra-regional FDI competition, exceeds the positive impact of a respective
agreement on the distortive instrument, as the latter is not subject to policy competition
in the initial non-cooperative situation anyway.
What can we conclude from these findings? Above all, comparing the welfare effects of
the two alternative patterns of partial cooperation highlights the importance of taking
interdependencies between different policy instruments into account in the process of
policy making. If policy-makers anticipate the repercussions of a change in one policy
instrument on another, they can consider (and possibly take advantage of) additional,
indirect welfare effects of their policy choice. In particular, governments have to rec-
ognize the possibility that the international coordination of one policy instrument will
affect their partner countries´ incentive patterns also in other policy areas.
Beyond the scope of this paper and relating to the analysis carried out in Part II of
this dissertation, one could think of implications for an investigation of the countries´
national perspective: Governments face different political interests within their coun-
try when determining policies. If, for instance, policy-makers are aware of an IEA´s
“double dividend”, and communicate this to interest groups which are originally op-
posed to the agreement, the domestic implementation of the IEA could be facilitated
by much. Likewise, the awareness of the fact that environmental policy is not affected
by international cooperation on corporate taxes, and, thus, no ITA-induced adverse
environmental impacts have to be feared, could facilitate the implementation of such
agreement by much.
Part IV
Conclusions
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What are the common conclusions of the preceding analysis in Part II and III of this
dissertation and which implications with respect to the issues of public debate illustrated
in Part I do they yield? In particular, are the related concerns about the presumed
adverse impacts of globalization justified?
The answer is “yes and no”. Part II comes to the conclusion that the introduction of
stricter environmental regulations does not worsen (but even improve on) the interna-
tional competitiveness of a domestic polluting sector, if the incumbent government aims
at being re-elected and for that purpose takes into account different lobby groups’ inter-
ests when choosing environmental- and industrial policies. Hence, this paper’s findings
suggest that the “international-competitiveness” concern is not justified.
The positive analysis in Part III, Chapter 6 yields an analogous conclusion with re-
spect to the “environmental-RtB” concern: Neither international FDI competition in
corporate- and environmental taxes nor continuing trade liberalization induce an ero-
sion of environmental-policy levels.
The findings of the normative analysis in Chapter 7 are slightly less optimistic: They
suggest that concerns on adverse aggregate-welfare effects of FDI competition are in-
deed justified. However, the paper also shows up appropriate and politically feasible
ways to overcome the suboptimal non-cooperative policy regime: international cooper-
ation in environmental- or corporate-tax policy-making. In particular, the finding that
an international agreement on corporate taxes is suitable to raise the countries’ aggre-
gate welfare provides theoretical validation to the G7 countries´ urgency to coordinate
their tax policies referred to in the introduction.
Though the models applied in this dissertation focus on specific environmental- and
industrial-policy instruments, the results are more general and carry over to numerous
alternative policy scenarios.
In generalized terms, the main conclusion of Part II reads as follows: Interest groups
that oppose the introduction of some policy measure because of its presumed adverse
impact on their utility level should be aware that they can expect politicians to com-
pensate them by adjusting another policy instrument. This compensation may even
yield them a net benefit, if the government trades off the gains and losses of different
interest groups in order to sustain maximum overall political support and so ensure its
own re-election.
Very broadly speaking, the generalized conclusions of Part III are the following: Coun-
tries that face some domestic externality engage in international FDI competition in
terms of a lump-sum policy instrument, while leaving a distortive policy instrument at
its optimal “no-competition” level. Nevertheless, overall welfare in the non-cooperative
policy regime is suboptimally low. However, even if the social optimum associated
with international cooperation in both policy instruments is not feasible, countries may
overcome such Prisoners´ Dilemma situation by concluding partial one-policy agree-
ments. The associated positive welfare effects are larger if the agreement targets the
non-distortive rather than the distortive policy instrument, i.e. the instrument which
is subject to the initial FDI competition.
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In summary, both parts of the dissertation yield a common general conclusion: When-
ever interest groups, politicians or economists assess the consequences of economic devel-
opments (like e.g. globalization or trade integration) or newly implemented policy mea-
sures (like e.g. emissions restrictions), they should be aware of the political-economic
system’s complexity. A careful consideration of the various inherent interrelations, the
repercussions of one policy measure on another and the associated indirect effects helps
avoid drawing premature conclusions. This is particularly important, as those link-
ages may even induce outcomes (for instance in terms of policy choice or welfare) that
oppose public expectations and economic-theory predictions neglecting the associated
repercussions and indirect effects.
In analogy to these common general conclusions, also the policy implications derived
from both parts of this dissertation relate to one another: Politicians intending to im-
plement some policy measure like e.g. an international environmental agreement should
not only take the above-mentioned policy interdependencies and their effects into ac-
count, but also communicate them to the public and to the diverse affected interest
groups. Both papers have shown that the prevailing public expectations on, and per-
ceptions of, the apparent consequences some policy measure or economic phenomenon
might have are too pessimistic and thus provoke widespread (and unjustified) oppo-
sition. Hence, policy-making in general, and the introduction of actually beneficial
measures in particular, could be facilitated by much, if decision-makers succeeded in
explaining these repercussions and indirect effects not immediately obvious to their
country’s population and to the relevant interest groups.
Let me finish this discussion with one final remark concerning the theoretical modeling
of economic issues in general. The purpose of my analysis has been to incorporate
additional aspects, most importantly the interdependencies between different policy
instruments, into the applied model frameworks and so improve on capturing “real-
world” patterns of policy-making. Nevertheless, the introduced models remain highly
simplified pictures of the “real” political-economic system. Policy interdependencies,
political incentives and economic relations in the “real world” are much too complex to
be completely reflected by one analytical model. The aim has thus been to focus on
the most relevant features with respect to the research issue and neglect other aspects
in order to keep the models tractable and to allow for deriving analytical results. As a
consequence, those results have of course to be interpreted cautiously, keeping in mind
the underlying simplifications.
To conclude, there remains much scope for future research. As already mentioned in
the respective papers´ conclusions, the current models neglect aspects like terms-of-
trade effects, country asymmetry or firm heterogeneity. In order to take those clearly
important characteristics of “real-world” policy-making conditions into account, one
could either focus on each of them alternatively, or even try to introduce them in
addition to aspects already considered in the current models.
Appendix A
Appendix to Part II
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A.1 Auctioning of Emissions Permits
Percentage of emissions permits allocated via auctioning
Country 2005-07 2008-12
Austria 0 1.3
Belgium-Brussels 0 0
Belgium-Flanders 0 0
Belgium-Wallonia 0 0
Bulgaria 0 0
Czech Republic 0 0
Denmark 5 0
Estonia 0 0
Finland 0 0
France 0 0
Germany 0 9
Greece 0 0
Hungary 2.5 2
Ireland 0.75 0.5
Italy 0 0
Latvia 0 0
Lithuania 1.5 2.7
Luxembourg 0 0
Netherlands 0 3,7
Poland 0 0
Portugal 0 0
Romania 0 0
Slovakia 0 0
Slovenia 0 0
Spain 0 0
Sweden 0 0
UK 0 7
Source: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/auctioning_en.htm
(latest access July, 2010)
The numbers are data provided by the member states themselves.
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A.2 Proof of Lemma 3.1
• Sector I: The subsidy obviously benefits the polluting industry, since s raises the
remuneration of labor in that sector (L, according to eq. (2.5), is paid its marginal
product). Labor is thus attracted to the subsidized sector (LIs > 0) and production
of good I rises. In addition, due to the small-country assumption, the producer
price rises by exactly the amount of the subsidy increase: pps = pws +1 = 1. Hence,
the return to the specific factor unambiguously rises:
ΠIs = p
p
s︸︷︷︸
=1
g(E) (F I − F ILLI)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
− ppg(E)F ILLLIsLI︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
> 0. (A.1)
• Sector II: As total labor supply is fixed, the increase in LI is accompanied by a
proportional decrease in LII . Production of the numeraire good declines and so
does the return to its specific factor:
ΠIIs = −F IILLLIIs LII < 0 with LIIs = −LIs < 0. (A.2)
• Workers: On the one hand, workers benefit from a positive “wage effect”: As the
marginal product of labor increases, also the wage rate w will rise, though, due
to the diminishing marginal product of labor, to a lower extent:1
ws = F
II
LLL
II
s > 0. (A.3)
On the other hand, the amount each worker has to pay to finance the subsidy,
sxI
L
, increases. The overall change in income is given by:
Is = ws︸︷︷︸
“wage effect”>0
−x
I
L︸︷︷︸
“subsidy effect”<0
− s
L
xIs︸ ︷︷ ︸
“scale effect”<0
< 0. (A.4)
Hence, there are two negative income effects opposing the positive wage effect:
The “subsidy effect” arises because the subsidy level per unit of output is increased.
The “scale effect” is owed to the rising production scale: For each additional unit
of output an additional unit of the subsidy s has to be paid. Economic-plausibility
considerations suggest that the two negative effects outweigh the positive wage
effect: The opposite case would imply that workers were able to increase their
total income by increasing their tax payments. Consequently, they would prefer
1This result also holds for the real wage: Due to the small-country assumption, the consumer price
of the import good, pw, is constant as well as the numeraire-price of one.
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infinite taxation– an economically implausible scenario. Furthermore, industrial
policy must yield a decrease in total income of the economy as a whole, as it
causes welfare-reducing distortions (here, a distortion in production patterns).
If Is were positive, the decline in sector-II profits caused by an increase in the
subsidy would have to outweigh the rise in both sector-I profits and workers´
income in order to be consistent with a decline in total income. As the respective
equations show, this is not plausible. Rather, |ΠIs| > |ΠIIs | holds (see also the
calculations in Appendix A.4). Hence: Is < 0.
• Environmental IG: The utility of the environmental IG is solely determined
by total emissions E. Those do not depend on output. When the subsidy is
increased, the dirty industry raises output given a certain level of environmental
use: Ds = 0. That is, output expansions are attained by solely increasing labor
employment without affecting the level of pollution (within this model framework,
this feature may be thought of as pollution depending on the operating time of a
factory in hours per day: If more labor is employed, output per hour rises whereas
operating time and thus pollution remain at their initial levels. Apart from the
current model framework, output increases at constant emissions levels can also
be attained e.g. by R&D, or by using more advanced and cleaner technology). To
summarize, changes in the subsidy do neither affect emissions, nor environmental
damage or the environmental IG´s utility.2
A.3 Proof of Lemma 3.2
• Sector I: Industry I obviously loses from environmental regulations. When total
emissions are restricted, contrary to the case of an increase in s, production in
sector I becomes less efficient. The lower wage rate detracts labor and production
shrinks. Unlike in the industrial-policy case, however, the producer price is not
affected by changes in E: ppE = p
w
E = 0. Hence, although the volume of permitted
emissions E and the subsidy rate s impact on industry-I profits in the same
direction, the quantitative effects of equivalent changes in both policy instruments
may differ. Overall, the return to the specific factor in sector I unambiguously
2One might annotate that an environmental lobby´s utility should nevertheless depend negatively
on the subsidy rate: Although industrial policy does not influence environmental damage, it constitutes
a means of support for the polluting industry, which environmentalists should generally be opposed
to. In addition, it is questionable whether they anticipate the independence of environmental damage
from the subsidy. However, including s into the environmentalists´ utility function does not alter the
qualitative results of the analysis as long as the utility impact of industrial policy is not stronger than
that of environmental policy. This condition is plausible to be fulfilled in the current model, since
industrial policy has actually no impact on environmental damage.
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declines when emissions are restricted:
ΠIE = ( p
p
E︸︷︷︸
=0
g(E) + ppgE)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(F I − F ILLI)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
− ppg(E)F ILLLIELI︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
> 0. (A.5)
• Sector II: Sector II benefits from the introduction of E:
ΠIIE = −F IILLLIIE LII < 0. (A.6)
• Workers: A decline in the total emissions allowance has the opposite effect on
the wage rate than a rise in the subsidy:
wE = F
II
LLL
II
E > 0. (A.7)
Analogously to a change in s, there is a positive “scale effect” in addition to this
negative “wage effect”, since a decline in E lowers the polluting sector’s output
that has to be subsidized. Unlike in the industrial-policy case, however, there is
no “subsidy effect”, because the level of s is unchanged:
IE = wE︸︷︷︸
“wage effect”>0
− s
L
xIE︸ ︷︷ ︸
“scale effect”<0
< 0. (A.8)
Analogously to the industrial-policy scenario (see Appendix A.2), the subsequent
analysis focuses on the case IE < 0. This is straightforward because it implies
that, as for the two specific factors, both policy instruments affect also a worker’s
total income in the same direction.3
• Environmental IG: Environmental restrictions obviously reduce environmental
damage: DE > 0. Hence, the environmental IG’s utility unambiguously rises.
A.4 The Specific Case of a Cobb-Douglas Production
Function
The following calculations apply the general expressions derived in this paper to a
specific Cobb-Douglas production function and a simple specification of a political-
support-function.
3However, both a positive and a negative sign of IE may be consistent with economy-wide income
to decline due to the inefficiencies associated with the policy intervention. For IE > 0, the analytical
results concerning the direction of the industrial-policy adjustment (see Section 3.1) are unaffected.
Results concerning the “completeness” of industry compensation (see Section 3.2) then depend on
the relative size of marginal environmental damage as compared to the marginal income-effects of
environmental- and industrial policy.
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The production function in each sector is given by:
F (Ki, Li) = (Ki)α(Li)1−α with α =
1
2
, i = I, II. (A.9)
A political support function with the properties discussed in Section 2.4 is given by:
G(ΠI ,ΠII , I,D) = γ1(Π
I)
1
2 + γ2(Π
II)
1
2 + γ3(I)
1
2 − γ4(D) 32 , (A.10)
where γi, i = 1, ..., 4 are the different interest groups´ political weights.
• Specific expressions for sector I:
Profits in the polluting industry are:
ΠI =
(pp)2g(E)2
4w
KI . (A.11)
In analogy to the general expressions derived in Appendices A.2 and A.3, deriva-
tives of the specific profit function with respect to s and E are unambiguously
positive:
ΠIs =
ppg(E)2
2w
KI > 0. (A.12)
ΠIE =
(pp)2g(E)
2w
gEK
I > 0. (A.13)
The second derivative with respect to s is ambiguous in general:
ΠIss = −2g(E)F ILLLIsLI − ppg(E)(LIs)2(F ILLLLI + F ILL)− ppg(E)F ILLLIssLI >< 0
(A.14)
For our specific production function, this expression indicates rising marginal
profits:
ΠIss =
g(E)2
2w
KI > 0. (A.15)
The same holds for the second derivative with respect to E:
ΠIsE = gE
(
F I − F ILLI
)− g(E)F ILLLIELI
−ppgEF ILLLIsLI − ppg(E)LIELIs(F ILLLLI + F ILL)
−ppg(E)F ILLLIsLIE >< 0. (A.16)
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For our example, this expression becomes:
ΠIsE =
ppg(E)
w
gEK
I > 0. (A.17)
In consistence with the general analysis in Section 2.4, marginal political support
from industry I is positive and decreasing:
GΠI =
1
2
γ1(Π
I)−
1
2 > 0; GΠIΠI = −
1
4
γ1(Π
I)−
3
2 < 0. (A.18)
• Specific expressions for sector II:
Profits in the clean industry are:
ΠII =
1
4w
KII . (A.19)
In analogy to the general expressions derived in Appendices A.2 and A.3, deriva-
tives of the specific profit function with respect to s and E are unambiguously
negative:
ΠIIs = −
ppg(E)2
4w
KI < 0. (A.20)
ΠIIE = −
(pp)2g(E)
4w
gEK
I < 0. (A.21)
The second derivative with respect to s is, similar to sector-I profits, ambiguous
in general:
ΠIIss = −[(LIIs )2(F IILLLLII + F IILL) + F IILLLIIssLII ] >< 0 (A.22)
Contrary to sector I, this expression is negative for our specific production func-
tion:
ΠIIss = −
g(E)2
4w
KI < 0. (A.23)
The same holds for the second derivative with respect to E:
ΠIIsE = −
[
LIIs L
II
E
(
F IILLLL
II + F IILL
)
+ F IILLL
II
sEL
II
] >
< 0. (A.24)
For our example, this expression becomes:
ΠIIsE = −
ppg(E)
2w
gEK
I < 0. (A.25)
As for sector I, political support from sector II is increasing in profit at decreasing
rates:
GΠII =
1
2
γ2(Π
II)−
1
2 > 0; GΠIIΠII = −
1
4
γ2(Π
II)−
3
2 < 0. (A.26)
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• Specific expressions for workers:
A worker’s total income equals wage minus subsidy payments:
I = w − sp
pg(E)2
2w
KI
L
. (A.27)
The three effects determining the derivative with respect to s are subsumed in
the following term:
Is = p
pg(E)2w
KI
KII
− p
wg(E)2
2w
KI
L
. (A.28)
The two effects determining the derivative with respect to E are subsumed in the
following term:
IE = (p
p)2g(E)wgE
KI
KII
− sp
pg(E)
w
gE
KI
L
. (A.29)
The second derivative with respect to s is ambiguous in general as well as for our
specific function:
Iss = wss − 2
L
xIs −
s
L
xIss = g(E)
2w
KI
KII
− g(E)
2
w
KI
L
>
< 0. (A.30)
Iss < 0 holds for w <
√
KII√
L
.
Also the second derivative with respect to E has an ambiguous sign in general as
well as for the specific production function:
IsE = wsE − x
I
E
L
− s
L
xIsE = 2p
pg(E)gEw
KI
KII
− p
wg(E)
w
gE
KI
L
>
< 0. (A.31)
IsE < 0 requires 2p
pw2
pw
<
√
KII√
L
.
Political-support patterns are characterized by:
GI =
1
2
γ3I
− 1
2 > 0; GII = −1
4
γ4I
− 3
2 < 0. (A.32)
• Policy outcomes for the specific functional forms:
What do the preceding calculations imply for the general results derived in Section
3.1 with respect to the direction of an industrial-policy adjustment to stricter
environmental regulations? More specifically, what are the signs of Gss (eq. (3.3))
and GsE (eq. (3.4))?
Concerning Gss, terms 1, 3 and 5 are always negative due to the properties of the
political support function (see the discussion in Section 3.1).
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Term 2 remains ambiguous even if our specific functional forms are used:
GIIss < 0 for w <
√
KII√
L
.
Term 4 turned out to be positive for our specific function: GΠIΠIss > 0.
Term 6 is negative here: GΠIIΠIIss < 0.
Comparing the two elements of Gss that represent industry I (terms 3 and 4)
shows that they are equal in absolute values. Hence, the only unambiguously
positive term in Gss completely cancels out. What remains, are three definitively
negative terms and one which is negative under a certain condition. This addi-
tional assumption of w and L being sufficiently small relative to KII , however, is
not necessary for the whole expression Gss to be negative.
These conclusions carry over to GsE: Also there, terms 3 and 4 cancel out. w
and L being sufficiently small relative to KII is a sufficient but not necessary
condition also for GsE < 0 to be ensured.
To conclude, the calculations in this Appendix have demonstrated that standard func-
tional forms of the production- and political-support function are consistent with the
general results derived in the paper.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 3.2
GsE < 0 implies that marginal political support Gs increases when E is introduced (i.e.
E reduced). Due to the support function’s concavity, increased marginal support in turn
implies a decrease in absolute support: dE < 0⇒ dGs > 0↔ dG < 0. Thus, restrictive
environmental policies E lead to an overall decline in political support, aggregated over
all groups: Losses in support from sector I exceed the sum of gains in support from
sector II, workers and the environmental IG:
GE = GIIE︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+GΠIΠ
I
E︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+GΠIIΠ
II
E︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+GDDE︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
< 0
⇒ |GΠIΠIE| > |GIIE +GΠIIΠIIE +GDDE|. (A.33)
After an increase inGs, however, the first-order condition for maximum political support
(Gs = 0) is violated. In order to re-establish the initial level of maximum political
support, the government reacts by increasing s. Due to Gss < 0, this induces a decline
in Gs, or, equivalently, a rise in G: ds > 0⇒ dGs < 0↔ dG > 0. Specifically, increased
subsidization of industry I causes support from sector I to rise and support from sector
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II and workers to decline, whereas support from the environmental group is unaffected:
Gs = GIIs︸︷︷︸
<0
+GΠIΠ
I
s︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+GΠIIΠ
II
s︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+GDDs︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
> 0
⇒ |GΠIΠIs| > |GIIs +GΠIIΠIIs + 0|. (A.34)
Comparing the respective equations shows that for the industrial-policy case, the in-
crease in political support from sector I (inducing the intended reduction in Gs) has
to compensate for only two countervailing effects (i.e. decreased support from sector
II and workers inducing “undesirable” increases in Gs) for eq. (A.34) to hold. When
environmental policy is applied (eq. (A.33)), three countervailing effects have to be
outweighed because the environmental interest and its political support are affected in
addition. Hence, the difference between the LHS and the RHS will be larger for the
lower part of eq. (A.34) than for eq. (A.33) for proportional policy changes.
Consequently, in order to attain a rise in political support G (respectively, a decline
in marginal support Gs), which exactly cancels out the initial decline in G (rise in
Gs) and hence retain the optimum Gs = 0, the subsidy has to be raised more than
proportionally to the initial decrease in E, that is, by more than necessary to retain
the initial income-distribution.
This result is attributable to the properties of the political-support function: In order
to “close the gap” between the LHS-/RHS-differentials of eqs. (A.34) and (A.33) which
arises due to the missing environmental-IG effect in eq. (A.34), the LHS of eq. (A.34)
has to “decline” relative to its RHS. Industry I gains from the increased subsidy and
thus raises support, but at a declining rate. Hence, the term |GΠIΠIs| is the smaller,
the larger the increase in s. On the other hand, industry II and workers lose from the
increased subsidy and thus raise their opposition, but at an increasing rate, so that the
term |GIIs +GΠIIΠIIs | is the larger, the higher the increase in s. Taken together, both
effects imply that only an adjustment of s which is more than proportional can retrieve
the initial level of political support.4
A.6 The Slope of the Iso-Distribution Curve
The iso-distribution curve’s slope is characterized by two equations: It is, on the one
hand, given by ds
dE
| dw
dE
=0. That is, equal income distribution is given where wages and
thus labor allocation and profits are constant. When E is decreased from E0 to E,
4Note that the increase in the subsidy cannot be arbitrarily large as it has to be financed by workers.
At some threshold value of s, their labor income will be completely “eaten up” by the lump-sum subsidy
they have to pay for, yielding a total income of zero. From this point on, further subsidy increases are
no longer feasible. The analysis in this paper thus implicitly assumes s to be sufficiently small for not
reaching its upper bound.
Environmental Policy in Open Economies 98
labor productivity and wages decline. In order to retain the initial level of w, s has to
be raised from s0 to s1 in turn.
This “direct” productivity effect is weakened by an opposing “indirect” one. This is due
to the fact that the decrease in productivity detracts labor from the affected sector,
thus making the remaining labor more productive. In order to keep w constant, s has
to be decreased (according to this isolated indirect effect).
Formally:
ds
dE
= −(p
w + s)gE
g(E)︸ ︷︷ ︸
direct effect <0
−(p
w + s)F ILLL
I
E
F IL︸ ︷︷ ︸
indirect effect >0
< 0. (A.35)
On the other hand, dI
dE
| dw
dE
=0 = 0 has to hold in order to maintain an equal income-
distribution, since workers not only receive wage income but also have to finance the
subsidy (I = w− sxI
L
). On the iso-distribution locus, the introduction of E reduces the
output of the polluting good for constant labor allocation. This leads to a decline in
total subsidy payments S. An appropriate increase in the subsidy rate s then serves to
exactly offset the initial rise in total income:
dI
dE
!
= 0
⇒ dw
dE︸︷︷︸
=0
−x
I
L
ds
dE
= − s
L
dxI
dE︸︷︷︸
=gEF I(LI ,KI)
⇒ ds
dE
= −gEF I(LI , KI) s
xI
⇒ ds
dE
= − gEs
g(E)
< 0. (A.36)
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A.7 Proof of Proposition 3.3
The following line of argument is based on the proof of Proposition 3.2 in Appendix
A.5.
• The impact of environmental factors on the extent of industry com-
pensation:
According to the reasoning in Appendix A.5, marginal environmental damage DE
is an important determinant of industry-I compensation, since it is responsible for
the environmental IG’s change in political support GDDE. This in turn is crucial
for the difference in the levels of the “countervailing effects” the change in support
from sector I has to outweigh to fulfill eq. (A.34) compared to eq. (A.33). As
argued in Appendix A.5, the extent of excess compensation is positively related
to this differential (the “gap”). Hence, the larger is DE, the more environmental
damage is reduced by the introduction of E, the more the environmental IG raises
its political support, and the larger is the industrial-policy adjustment necessary
to re-establish the political optimum.
This line of argument carries over to the political weight of the environmental
interest, as this, via GD, constitutes the second determinant of the environmental
IG’s change in political support GDDE.
• The impact of industry II and workers:
Both the increase in support (or, equivalently, decrease in marginal support) from
industry II and workers after the introduction of E and the respective decrease in
support (or increase in marginal support) after the increase in s will be stronger
for higher political weights of these groups (see eqs. (A.33) and (A.34)). However,
the reinforcement of the industrial-policy effect outweighs the preceding reinforce-
ment of the environmental-policy effect (and does so by more, the larger these
groups´ political weights are) for two reasons following from the properties of the
political support function: First, environmental-policy effects are weaker than the
respective industrial-policy effects because they originate from a higher level of
overall political support (corresponding to a lower level of marginal support). Sec-
ond, also due to concavity, declines in support outweigh rises in support. Hence,
the necessity of increasing s more than proportionally in order to induce a net re-
duction of political support from the income-receiving groups and so re-establish
the political optimum weakens as the political weights of the clean industry and
workers increase.
• The impact of the polluting industry’s own political weight:
Results are not as clear-cut for the political weight of the environmental-policy
loser, respectively the industrial-policy winner (industry I): If this group is at-
tached a higher weight, also both environmental- and industrial-policy effects
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become stronger- the former effect inducing a more pronounced rise in marginal
political support, the latter a more pronounced decrease in marginal support.
Following the line of argument applied for industry II and workers, it is ambigu-
ous here, which effect is stronger, as environmental policy induces a decline, and
industrial policy a rise in support. Hence, the influence of the polluting sector’s
own political weight on the extent of compensation depends on which effect dom-
inates. This rather paradoxical result can be explained by the fact that both the
negative impact of environmental policy on total political support (c.p. weaken-
ing the necessity of increasing s) and the respective positive impact of a subsidy
(c.p. strengthening the necessity of increasing s) increase in the political weight
of the affected group.
Appendix B
Appendix to Part III, Chapter 6
B.1 Proof of Proposition 6.3
The proof proceeds in a stepwise manner, as the results stated in Proposition 6.3 build
on the premise of a binding participation constraint in the non-cooperative equilibrium.
A first step thus shows this condition to be fulfilled.
(1) As in the non-cooperative policy equilibrium, both countries offer a profit-tax rate
smini which corresponds to their maximum WTP for the FDI to the MNE, the
participation constraint is binding in both countries. To prove this by contradic-
tion involves to consider the two alternative outcomes, in which the participation
constraint would not be fulfilled with equality:
Suppose sNj = sminj = smini , k = (1− sNj )Πj and
(i) (1− si)Πi > k. Such an outcome would imply country i´s profit-tax rate to
fall short of its maximum-WTP equivalent smini . FDI would be attracted,
but yield a negative net FDI surplus for country i, since, by definition, smini
corresponds to a net surplus of zero. On the other hand, the MNE´s net
profit exceeds its outside option. Hence, there is a potential to raise the tax
rate until the participation constraint is exactly met at si = smini = sNj , so
that net FDI surplus becomes non-negative for country i and the investment
is just sustained.
(ii) (1−si)Πi < k. Such an outcome in turn implies country i´s tax rate to exceed
its minimum necessary value and, in addition, yield a potential positive net
FDI surplus. The MNE, however, would locate in the neighboring country
j. Hence, there is an incentive for i to lower its tax rate at least until
the participation constraint is exactly met at si = smini = sNj and the FDI
attracted to the domestic market.
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Consequently, the only stable equilibrium yields profit-tax rates corresponding to
both countries´ maximum WTP for the FDI. Due to the countries´ symmetry,
those tax rates are identical: sNj = sNi = smini . The same holds for the MNE´s
gross profit: Πi = Πj.
Hence: (1 − sNi )Πi = (1 − sNj )Πj, i.e. the generalized participation constraint is
fulfilled with equality (binding).
According to Proposition 6.2, this first part of the proof implies, that in the non-
cooperative equilibrium, environmental-policy levels are independent of corporate-tax
policies (and thus independent of the FDI competition´s intensity). This result allows
to use the environmental-tax rate’s non-strategic value τ ∗i in the second step of this
proof concerning the equilibrium corporate-tax-rate levels.
(2) For a given value of τ ∗i , the corresponding optimal profit-tax rate sNi (τ ∗i ) can be
easily calculated by equating welfare levels of the FDI host- and the importing
country and solving for s:
WFDIi (τ∗i , si)
!= W impj (τ
∗
i , si)
⇒ (1− c− τ
∗
i )
2
8
+ (τ∗i − δ)(1− c− τ∗i −
t
2
) + si
(1− c− τ∗i )2 + (1− c− τ∗i − t)2
4
=
(1− c− τ∗i − t)2
8
− µ(1− c− τ∗i −
t
2
)
⇒ sNi (τ∗i ) =− (1− c− τ∗i )2 − (1− c− τ∗i − t)28︸ ︷︷ ︸
surplus in CS
− (τ∗i − δ + µ)(1− c− τ∗i −
t
2
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
surplus/loss in net rev
 4(1− c− τ∗i )2 + (1− c− τ∗i − t)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Π−1i
⇒ sNi (τ∗i ) =
16(1− c− δ − 38 t)(1− c− δ − 34 t− 3µ)
(32c2 + 12ct+ 9t2) + 32(1− δ)(1− c− δ − 34 t)
. (B.1)
Rather than analyzing the specific and rather complex value of sNi (=smini ) as given
by eq. (B.1), the remaining steps of this proof will focus on deriving the general
characteristics of the optimal tax rate:
(3) An equilibrium profit-tax rate below unity sNi = smini < 1 implies a country’s
welfare with FDI and complete foreign-profit extraction (i.e. si = 1) to exceed
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the importing country´s welfare (a regime that corresponds to the no-competition
benchmark scenario):
WFDIi (τ∗i , si = 1) > W
imp
j (τ
∗
i , si = 1) (B.2)
⇒ (1− c− τ
∗
i )
2
8
+ (τ∗i − δ)(1− c− τ∗i −
t
2
) +
(1− c− τ∗i )2 + (1− c− τ∗i − t)2
4
>
(1− c− τ∗i − t)2
8
− µ(1− c− τ∗i −
t
2
).
Plugging in τ ∗i = −13(1 − c) + 43δ shows that the inequality (B.2) holds for τ ∗i
non-prohibitive.
(4) The threshold value for µ at which the optimal profit-tax rate turns from a “real”
tax into a subsidy, implying that the net FDI surplus for the host country in the
absence of any profit-tax revenue equals zero, can be calculated by setting eq.
(B.1) equal to zero and solving for µ:1
sNi
!
= 0
⇒ (1− c− τ
∗
i − t)2 − (1− c− τ ∗i )2
8
= (τ ∗i − δ + µ)(1− c− τ ∗i −
t
2
). (B.3)
Plugging in τ ∗i = −13(1− c)+ 43δ and re-arranging yields: µ˜ = 13(1− c− δ− 3t4 ). 2
B.2 Proof of Proposition 6.4
• An increase in δ raises country i´s optimal non-strategic emissions-tax rate τ ∗i – a
reaction, which aims at correcting for the (aggravated) pollution distortion caused
by the MNE´s investment: ∂τ
∗
i
∂δ
= 4
3
> 0. As a consequence, the MNE´s profit
attainable in country i will decrease:
∂Πi
∂τ ∗i
= −(1− c− τ
∗
i )
2
− (1− c− τ
∗
i − t)
2
< 0. (B.4)
Given country j´s Nash-equilibrium policy (τ ∗j ; sNj ), this detraction in gross profit
induces a situation, in which the participation constraint is no longer fulfilled in
country i: (1− sNi )Πi < (1− sNj )Πj. In order to sustain the investment, country i
1The following reasoning uses the fact that Π−1i > 0.
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must therefore lower its profit-tax rate to a level s′i < sNi , which just ensures the
participation constraint to hold with equality again. Hence: ∂s
N
i
∂δ
< 0.2
• The result that in the no-pollution scenario, the equilibrium profit-tax rate is un-
ambiguously positive (i.e. sNi (τ ∗i , δ = µ = 0) > 0), becomes obvious by plugging
in δ = µ = 0 in eq. (B.1):
s∗i (τ
∗
i , δ = µ = 0) =
16(1− c− 3
8
t)(1− c− 3
4
t)
(32c2 + 12ct+ 9t2) + 32(1− c− 3
4
t)
> 0. (B.5)
• A no-pollution equilibrium profit-tax rate below unity sNi (τ ∗i , δ = µ = 0) < 1
implies welfare with FDI and complete foreign-profit extraction (i.e. si = 1) to
exceed the importing country´s welfare:
WFDIi (τ∗i , si = 1) > W
imp
j (τ
∗
i , si = 1) (B.6)
⇒ (1− c− τ
∗
i )
2
8
+ τ∗i (1− c− τ∗i −
t
2
) +
(1− c− τ∗i )2
4
+
(1− c− τ∗i − t)2
4
>
(1− c− t− τ∗i )2
8
.
Plugging in τ ∗i (δ = 0) = −13(1− c) shows that the inequality (B.6) holds for any
value of t. Hence, sNi (τ ∗i , δ = µ = 0) < 1. 2
B.3 Proof of Proposition 6.5
• The optimal profit-tax rate sNi is given by eq. (B.1). Differentiation with respect
to µ yields: ∂s
N
i
∂µ
= −(1− c− τ ∗i − t2) < 0. This follows from the term in brackets
representing total MNE output, which is positive under the assumption of non-
prohibitive τ ∗i -values.
• For the local-pollution scenario, a positive equilibrium profit-tax rate
sNi (τ
∗
i , 0 = µ ≤ δ) > 0 immediately follows from Proposition 6.3:
0 = µ < µ˜ = 1
3
(1− c− δ − 3t
4
)⇔ sNi > 0.3
• In analogy to the proof of Proposition 6.3 for the general pollution-scenario, also
a local-pollution equilibrium profit-tax rate below unity sNi (τ ∗i , 0 = µ ≤ δ) < 1
2The negative relationship between sNi and δ can also be mathematically established unambiguously.
The specific term of the derivative is ∂s
N
i
∂δ = − 6(−9t
3+256(−1+c+δ)2µ+32t(−1+c+δ)(−1+c+δ+6µ))
(32c2+9t2+24t(−1+δ)+32(−1+δ)2+8c(−8+3t+8δ))2 < 0.
3Alternatively, plugging in µ = 0 in eq. (B.1) yields a term which, under
the non-prohibitiveness assumption with respect to τ∗i , is unambiguously positive:
sNi (τ∗i , 0 = µ < δ) =
16(1−c−δ− 38 t)(1−c−δ− 34 t)
(32c2+12ct+9t2)+32(1−δ)(1−c−δ− 34 t)
> 0.
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implies welfare with FDI and complete foreign-profit extraction (i.e. si = 1) to
exceed the importing country´s welfare:
WFDIi (τ∗i , si = 1, 0 = µ ≤ δ) > W impj (τ∗i , si = 1, 0 = µ ≤ δ) (B.7)
⇒ (1− c− τ
∗
i )
2
8
+ (τ∗i − δ)(1− c− τ∗i −
t
2
) +
(1− c− τ∗i )2 + (1− c− τ∗i − t)2
4
>
(1−c−τ∗i −t)2
8 .
Plugging in τ ∗i = −13(1 − c) + 43δ shows that the inequality (B.7) holds for τ ∗i
non-prohibitive. Hence, sNi (τ ∗i , 0 = µ ≤ δ) < 1. 2
B.4 Proof of Proposition 6.6
• A decline in intra-regional trade costs t raises the MNE´s gross profit in the host
country i by making exports to the neighboring country j more profitable:
∂Πi
∂t
= −(1− c− τ
∗
i − t)
2
< 0. (B.8)
Given the importing country j´s equilibrium policy pair (τ ∗j ; sNj ), the MNE´s
participation constraint is no longer fulfilled: (1− sNi )Πi > (1− sNj )Πj. Country
i´s best response to country j´s policy therefore is to increase its profit-tax rate
to a level of s′i > sNi , which just ensures the participation constraint to hold with
equality again. Hence: ∂s
N
i
∂t
< 0.4
• The specific value of the profit-tax rate under free trade is
sNi (τ
∗
i , t = 0) =
1
2
+ 3µ
2(−1+c+δ)
>
< 0. According to Proposition 6.3, the condition
the environmental-spillover parameter has to fulfill in order to yield a negative
equilibrium-value is: sNi (τ ∗i , t = 0) < 0⇔ µ > 13(1− c− δ).
The respective tax rate’s specific value in autarky is:
sNi (τ
∗
i , t = 1− c) = (−5+5c+8δ)(−1+c+4δ+12µ)34(−1+c)2+80(−1+c)δ+64δ2
>
< 0. Here, the condition for a negative
equilibrium-value becomes: sNi (τ ∗i , t = 1− c) < 0⇔ µ > 13(14(1− c)− δ).
4The negative relationship between sNi and t can also be mathematically established unambiguously
for t = 0 and t = 1− c: The specific term of the general derivative is
∂sNi
∂t =
(6(32c2−9t2+64c(−1+δ)+32(−1+δ)2)(−1+c+δ)−18(32c2+9t2+48t(−1+δ)+32(−1+δ)2+16c(−4+3t+4δ))µ)
(32c2+9t2+24t(−1+δ)+32(−1+δ)2+8c(−8+3t+8δ))2 . For
t = 0, this expression becomes ∂s
N
i
∂t |t=0= 3(−1+c+δ−3µ)16(−1+c+δ)2 < 0. For t = 1− c, we get
∂sNi
∂t |t=1−c= (6(−23+23c
3+32δ3+21µ−96δ2(1+µ)+3c2(−23+29δ+7µ)+δ(87+48µ)+3c(23+32δ2−14µ−2δ(29+8µ))))
(17+17c2−40δ+32δ2+c(−34+40δ))2 < 0.
The rather intuitive line of argument in this proof, however, is not restricted to those special cases. We
can thus consider the negative relationship to be a general one, holding for the whole range of values
t(0, 1− c).
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A comparison of both conditions reveals that the threshold value the parameter
µ must exceed to induce a negative tax rate on foreign profit is lower (and thus
“easier to fulfill”) in the autarky scenario. Accordingly, a subsidy on foreign profit
is c.p. more likely, if trade costs are prohibitively high. 2
Appendix C
Appendix to Part III, Chapter 7
C.1 Proof of Proposition 7.1
• According to eq. (7.2), aggregate regional welfare in the social optimum is given
by: W optreg = W
FDI,opt
i + W
imp,opt
j . Simple computation shows that
W FDI,opti > W
imp,opt
j holds under the assumption of a non-prohibitive socially
optimal emissions-tax rate, respectively for aggregate environmental damage not
too severe (i.e. for τ opti < 1− c− t⇒ δ + µ < 1− c− 34t).
• In the Nash equilibrium, welfare in both countries equals the importing country´s
level: W FDI,Ni = W
imp,N
j . Aggregate regional welfare is thus given by: WNreg =
2W imp,Nj .
• In order to show that WNreg < W optreg , the impact of changes in the emissions-tax
rate on the importing country´s welfare has to be investigated in detail. This is
due to the following line of argument:
Because of the relation W FDI,opti > W
imp,opt
j , a sufficient (though not necessary)
condition for W optreg = W
FDI,opt
i +W
imp,opt
j > 2W
imp,opt
j > 2W
imp,N
j = W
N
reg to hold
is given by W imp,optj > W
imp,N
j .
• In what concerns the two policy instruments, the importing country´s welfare is
solely determined by the level of τi, since the host country´s profit-tax rate si is
non-distortive with respect to output (and export volume) and thus not affecting
CS- or emissions spillovers to the neighboring country. The preceding analysis
(see Section 7.2.2) has established τNi < τ
opt
i . This implies: W
imp,opt
j > W
imp,N
j ⇔
∂W impj
∂τi
|τopti > 0.
• Differentiating the importing country´s welfare as given by eq. (7.2) with re-
spect to τi yields:
∂W impj
∂τi
= − (1−c−τi−t)2
4
+ µ. This derivative is positive for
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τi > 1 − c − t − 4µ. Plugging in τ opti = −(1 − c) + t2 + 2(δ + µ) yields:
τ opti > 1 − c − t − 4µ ⇔ µ > 13(1 − c − δ − 34t). This condition holds due to
the assumption τNi < τ
opt
i (see Section 7.2.2). Accordingly, the sufficient condi-
tion for W imp,optj > W
imp,N
j and thus W optreg > WNreg is fulfilled. 2
C.2 Proof of Corollary 7.1a
• For the importing country, the relationship W imp,optj > W imp,Nj is readily estab-
lished in the proof of Proposition 7.1 in Appendix C.1.
• For the host country, we can deduce from the same proof:
W FDI,opti > W
imp,opt
j > W
imp,N
j = W
FDI,N
i . 2
C.3 Proof of Lemma 7.3
This proof refers to the analysis in Section 6.4: If in an ITA, the profit-tax rate in both
countries is fixed to a level of s = 1, the MNE´s participation constraint is binding
in the ITA equilibrium: (1 − si)Πi = (1 − sj)Πj = 0. Hence, the host country´s
optimal emissions-tax choice is independent of s (see Proposition 6.2 and the respective
proof), and thus corresponds to its competitive level, which in turn coincides with the
non-strategic value: τ ITAi = τNi = τ ∗i . 2
C.4 Proof of Proposition 7.2
• The first part of Proposition 7.2 (W ITAreg > WNreg) first follows from the fact that
in the ITA equilibrium, the FDI host country attains a higher level of individual
welfare than its importing neighbor: W FDI,ITAi (sITAi = 1, τNi ) > W
imp,ITA
j (τ
N
i ).
This condition coincides with the condition for profit-tax rates in the Nash equi-
librium to be lower than one (sNi < 1). This condition is established in Appendix
B.2.
Second, the importing country attains identical individual-welfare levels in both
regimes: W imp,ITAj (τNi ) = W
imp,N
j (τ
N
i ). As the formula indicates, this equality
is owed to the fact that country j´s welfare is solely determined by country i´s
emissions-tax rate (i.e. independent of s; see Appendix C.1). This tax rate is
identical in both regimes (τ ITAi = τNi ).
Hence: W ITAreg = W
FDI,ITA
i +W
imp,ITA
j > 2W
imp,ITA
j = 2W
imp,N
j = W
N
reg.
• The second part of Proposition 7.2 (W ITAreg < W optreg ) is straightforward, and follows
from the general definition of a social optimum:
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In both regimes, ITA and social optimum, the lump-sum profit-tax rate equals
one. The only policy difference consists in the environmental tax: Whereas the
distortive emissions-tax rate in the social optimum (τ opti ) amounts to a level that
maximizes aggregate regional welfare, the respective tax in an ITA regime falls
short of the optimal rate: τ ITAi < τ
opt
i . By definition, any tax rate different from
the socially optimal one (i.e. each τi 6= τ opti ) must induce suboptimal regional-
welfare levels.
Hence: W ITAreg (s = 1, τ ITAi ) < W optreg (s = 1, τ
opt
i ). 2
C.5 Proof of Corollary 7.2a
• For the importing country, the relationship W imp,ITAj = W imp,Nj is readily estab-
lished in the proof of Proposition 7.2 in Appendix C.4.
• For the host country, the proof is intuitive: In both regimes N and ITA, country i
maximizes its individual welfare by an optimal choice of the distortive emissions-
tax rate: τ ITAi = τNi . The domestic-welfare differential is thus driven by the
other, lump-sum policy instrument: Given τi, a corporate-tax rate of si = 1
allows to redirect the maximum possible share of foreign profit to the domestic
market. Hence, any value of si < 1 must induce a sub-optimal amount of profit-
tax revenue. Country i´s welfare in the Nash equilibrium with sNi < 1 must thus
fall short of welfare in the ITA equilibrium, where sITAi = 1. 2
C.6 Proof of Lemma 7.4
• The level of smini , which reflects the intensity of FDI competition, is determined
by the net FDI surplus, i.e. the welfare differential between the host- and the
importing country given by W FDIi (τi, si)−W impj (τi).1
• For the Nash equilibrium, i.e. the initial policy pattern countries face when con-
cluding an IEA, the optimal profit-tax choice is based on the welfare differential
W FDIi (τ
N
i , si)−W impj (τNi ). (C.1)
Remember that the Nash equilibrium emissions-tax rate corresponds to the host
country´s optimal non-strategic tax rate: τNi = τ ∗i (see the analysis in Chapter 6).
1Accordingly, Appendix B.1 derived the countries’ optimal profit-tax rate in the Nash equilib-
rium by setting this welfare differential equal to zero. Given the IEA equilibrium emissions-tax rate
τ IEAi = τ
opt
i = −(1 − c) + t2 + 2(δ + µ), the specific value of the profit-tax rate corresponding to the
IEA equilibrium becomes: sIEAi = smini (τ
opt
i ) =
2(2c+t+2(−1+δ+µ))(4c+3t+4(−1+δ+3µ))
16c2+5t2+16t(−1+δ+µ)+16(−1+δ+µ)2+16c(t+2(−1+δ+µ)) .
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• For the IEA scenario, the relevant welfare differential is given by:
W FDIi (τ
IEA
i = τ
opt
i > τ
N
i , si)−W impj (τ IEAi = τ opti > τNi ). (C.2)
• It is straightforward to show that the welfare differential inducing the Nash equi-
librium profit-tax rate sNi in eq. (C.1), given sNi , exceeds the respective differential
in eq. (C.2) yielding the IEA-induced optimal profit-tax rate sIEAi :
– When, starting from the Nash equilibrium, the emissions-tax rate is ex-
ogenously raised to a level of τ IEAi > τNi = τ ∗i , the host country´s do-
mestic welfare will decline, as the IEA detains it from charging its optimal
environmental-tax rate. By definition of an an optimal policy-choice, any
value of τi with τi 6= τ ∗i induces sub-optimal individual-welfare levels.
Hence: W FDIi (τ IEAi , sNi ) < W FDIi (τNi , sNi ).
– The importing country, on the contrary, gains from the rise in τi, as, differ-
ently from the non-cooperative tax, the IEA emissions-tax rate considers all
externalities from the neighboring FDI host.
Hence: W impj (τ IEAi ) > W
imp
j (τ
N
i ).2
– Taken together, the preceding steps show:
W FDIi (τ
IEA
i , si)−W impj (τ IEAi ) < W FDIi (τNi , si)−W impj (τNi ).
Hence, the introduction of an IEA reduces the welfare differential between
the host- and the importing country, corresponding to the net FDI surplus.
• To conclude, the introduction of an IEA, by exogenously raising the emissions-
tax rate above its initial domestic-welfare maximizing level, reduces the relative
attractiveness of hosting the FDI and thus the countries´ maximum WTP for the
investment. As a consequence, the minimum necessary tax rate ensuring a net
FDI surplus of at least zero, corresponding to the profit-tax rate offered to the
MNE in the IEA equilibrium, will exceed that in the initial Nash equilibrium:
sIEAi = s
min
i (τ
IEA
i ) > s
min
i (τ
N
i ) = s
N
i . 2
C.7 Proof of Proposition 7.3
• The first part of Proposition 7.3 (W IEAreg > WNreg) is proved by the following line
of argument:
– In both scenarios (IEA- and Nash equilibrium), countries compete for FDI
in corporate-tax policy until their maximum WTP for the FDI, conditional
on the respective equilibrium-level of τi, is reached: sIEAi = smini (τ
opt
i ),
sNi = s
min
i (τ
N
i ). As a consequence, both IEA members attain the same
level of individual welfare: W FDI,IEAi = W
imp,IEA
j .
2For further details see the welfare analysis in Section 7.3.2 and Appendices C.7 and C.8.
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– Hence: W IEAreg = 2W
imp,IEA
j > 2W
imp,N
j = W
N
reg ⇔
∂W impj
∂τ
|τNi > 0, i.e. an IEA
raises aggregate regional welfare (relative to the completely non-cooperative
scenario), if the relation between the importing country´s welfare and the
emissions-tax rate is positive.
– As argued in Section 7.2.3, the importing country´s welfare is solely deter-
mined by the level of τi. Furthermore, the preceding analysis has established
that τ IEAi > τNi , and
∂W impj
∂τi
> 0⇔ τi > 1− c− t− 4µ.
The value of the non-cooperative emissions-tax rate τNi = −13(1 − c) + 43δ
meets this condition for environmental-spillover parameters sufficiently large,
i.e. for µ > 1
3
(1 − c − δ − 3
4
t). The latter condition in turn is fulfilled by
assumption (a feature that has already been used in the proof of Proposition
7.1 in Appendix C.1).
– Hence, starting from the Nash-equilibrium level of τNi , increases in the
emissions-tax rate raise the importing country´s welfare: ∂W
imp
j
∂τ
|τNi > 0.
This implies: W imp,IEAj > W
imp,N
j ⇔ W IEAreg > WNreg.
• The second part of Proposition 7.3 (W IEAreg < W optreg ) is proved by a similar line of
argument as followed in the proof of Proposition 7.1, supplemented by a consid-
eration of the welfare effects for the host country:
– Due to τ IEAi = τ
opt
i ⇒ W imp,IEAj = W imp,optj , the following relationship is
easily established:
W optreg = W
FDI,opt
i + W
imp,opt
j > 2W
imp,opt
j = 2W
imp,IEA
j = W
IEA
reg
⇔ W FDI,opti > W imp,optj .
– The latter relationship has been established in Section 7.2.3. Hence:
W optreg > W
IEA
reg .2
C.8 Proof of Corollary 7.3a
• For the importing country, the relationship W imp,IEAj > W imp,Nj is readily estab-
lished in the proof of Proposition 7.3 in Appendix C.7.
• For the host country, the proof combines elements of the preceding proofs as
follows:
– The first part of the proof of Proposition 7.3 shows: W FDI,IEAi = W
imp,IEA
j .
– The proof of Proposition 7.3 has also established: W imp,IEAj > W
imp,N
j .
– The proof of Proposition 7.1 shows: W imp,Nj = W
FDI,N
i .
– Combining those three findings yields: W FDI,IEAi = W
imp,IEA
j > W
imp,N
j =
W FDI,Ni . 2
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C.9 Proof of Proposition 7.4
As the resultW ITAreg > W IEAreg does not hold in general, the following proof will show this
to be the case under the two crucial assumptions the complete analysis in this paper is
based on. To repeat, those assumptions are:
(1) τ opti > τNi ⇔ µ > 13(1− c− δ − 34t).
(2) τ opti < τ
prohib
i ⇔ µ < 1− c− δ − 34t.
In addition, the proof uses the following definition: ∆W (µ) .= W ITAreg −W IEAreg . This
proof thus establishes the relation ∆W (µ) > 0.
• In general, whether ∆W (µ) >< 0, depends on the level of µ, since τ opti depends on
µ:
∆W (µ) = W FDI,ITAi (si = 1, τ
N
i ) +W
imp,ITA
j (τ
N
i )− 2W imp,IEAj (τ opti ).
Plugging in the values of τNi and τ
opt
i yields the following expression:
∆W (µ) = 1
144
(−16c2−27t2−48t(−2+2δ+9µ)−32c(−1+3t+δ+21µ)−16((−1+
δ)2 + 42(−1 + δ)µ+ 45µ2)) >< 0.
• This expression has two roots: ∆W (µ) != 0⇒
µ˜1 =
1
60
(28− 28c− 18t− 28δ −
√
704− 1408c+ 704c2 − 528t+ 528ct+ 189t2 − 1408δ + 1408cδ + 528tδ + 704δ2);
µ˜2 =
1
60
(28− 28c− 18t− 28δ +
√
704− 1408c+ 704c2 − 528t+ 528ct+ 189t2 − 1408δ + 1408cδ + 528tδ + 704δ2).
• The next step is to determine the size of a value for µ satisfying assumptions (1)
and (2), i.e. 1
3
(1− c− δ − 3
4
t) < µ < 1− c− δ − 3
4
t, in relation to those roots:
– In what concerns the first root, calculations reveal that µ˜1 ≤ 13(1−c−δ− 34t).
Hence, µ˜1 violates assumption (1). Evidently, assumption (2) is met:
µ˜1 < 1− c− δ− 34t. Hence, an environmental-spillover parameter consistent
with this paper’s assumptions must exceed µ˜1: µ > µ˜1.
– In what concerns the second root, analogous calculations reveal that
µ˜2
>
< 1 − c − δ − 3
4
t. It is thus possible that µ˜2 violates assumption (2),
whereas it can be shown to meet assumption (1): µ˜2 > 13(1 − c − δ − 34t).
Hence, an environmental-spillover parameter consistent with this paper’s as-
sumptions must be smaller than or equal to µ˜2: µ ≤ µ˜2.
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In summary, the findings of the preceding root analysis yield: µ˜1 < µ ≤ µ˜2. A
value of µ which is consistent with this paper´s assumptions thus lies in-between
the two roots of the function ∆W (µ).
• What remains to be determined, is, whether µ˜1 and µ˜2 enclose a minimum or
a maximum of ∆W (µ) (and, thus, whether this function takes on positive or
negative values for relevant levels of µ):
Setting the derivative of ∆W (µ) with respect to µ equal to zero and solving for
µ, yields the following extremum: ∂∆W (µ)
∂µ
= 1
3
(14− 14c− 9t− 14δ − 30µ) != 0⇒
µ˜0 =
1
30
(14− 14c− 9t− 14δ).
This value constitutes a maximum, since the second derivative is negative:
∂2∆W (µ)
∂µ2
= −10.
• Hence: µ˜1 < µ ≤ µ˜2 ⇔ ∆W (µ) > 0. Figure C.1 illustrates this conclusion:
Figure C.1: ITA-IEA Welfare Differential
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The figure shows: Values of µ that satisfy the assumptions underlying this paper´s
analysis lie in-between the two roots of the function ∆W (µ). Since those roots
enclose a maximum, ∆W (µ)must be positive for relevant values of µ: ∆W (µ) > 0
for µ˜1 < µ ≤ µ˜2. Hence: W ITAreg > W IEAreg . 2
C.10 An IEA with Differentiated Environmental Taxes
This Appendix introduces an alternative pattern of how countries may cooperate in
environmental-policy making and draws comparisons to the IEA version in the main
text.3 The IEA there is referred to as “uniform-policy” agreement (regime U), the
alternative version here as “differentiated-policy” agreement (regime D).4
The differentiated-policy IEA discussed below constitutes the most efficient form of
international environmental-policy cooperation, since in the associated policy equilib-
rium, aggregate regional welfare amounts to the maximum level associated with the
social optimum.
The IEA member countries commit to the following environmental-policy patterns:5
• In analogy to regime U, country i charges the socially optimal emissions-tax rate
derived in Section 7.2.2: τ IEA,Di = τ
opt
i = −(1− c) + t2 + 2(δ + µ).
• In contrast to regime U, the neighboring country j sets its tax rate at a pro-
hibitively high level: τ IEA,Dj = τ
prohib
j = 1− c− t. As a consequence, the MNE´s
gross-profit option in country j equals zero, and investment is definitely deterred
from there (whereas in regime U, the MNE is indifferent between the two locations
within the region).
What is the rationale behind the differentiated-IEA policy-pattern?
• As shown in Section 7.2.2, for a given profit-tax rate, charging the socially optimal
emissions-tax rate in the FDI host country implies internalizing all prevalent intra-
regional externalities and thus yields the maximum welfare level for the region as
a whole.
• Due to the prohibitively high emissions-tax rate in country j, it is certain that
the FDI goes to country i, where the MNE´s gross-profit option is positive (by
assumption: τ opti = τ
IEA,D
i < τ
IEA,D
j = τ
prohib
j ).
3Though all policy patterns described here are tailored to this paper´s model framework, they are
analogously applicable to a broad range of alternative settings. Hence, as repeatedly discussed in the
text, also the findings and conclusions in this Appendix are interpretable in a much more general way.
4The general idea for regime D goes back to Davies/Ellis (2007).
5In this Appendix, the superscripts D and U identify variables referring to regime D and U, respec-
tively.
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• Hence, under such environmental-policy patterns, country j can choose any (arbi-
trarily low) profit-tax rate sj[−∞, 1] without inducing the foreign firm to invest
in its domestic market. Such a situation is equivalent to a scenario in which
country j does not have any incentive to engage in FDI competition. As a conse-
quence, country i need not compete for the FDI neither. It can thus appropriate
the complete foreign profit by charging the MNE with a maximum profit-tax rate
of one. This equilibrium tax rate also corresponds to the socially optimal one
derived in Section 7.2.2: sIEA,Di = 1 = s
opt
i .
• To summarize, the IEA equilibrium in regime D yields the following policy pat-
terns:
{τ IEA,Di = τ opti ; τ IEA,Dj = τ prohibj ; sIEA,Di = sopti ; sIEA,Dj [−∞, 1]}.
What are the welfare effects of an IEA with differentiated policies?
• From a regional-welfare perspective, the surplus from FDI, which is completely
realized by country i (and thus benefits the region), corresponds to the maximum
amount in the social optimum. Such IEA therefore raises aggregate regional
welfare above its level in the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium to the maximum
possible extent.
Furthermore, the IEA-induced regional-welfare gain exceeds the respective gain
from a uniform-policy IEA (see the proof of Proposition 7.3 in Appendix C.7):
W optreg = W
IEA,D
reg > W
IEA,U
reg > W
N
reg.
• Both individual countries gain from environmental-policy cooperation, since their
welfare in the social optimum exceeds the level attainable in the Nash equilibrium
(see the proof of Corollary 7.1a in Appendix C.2):
W opti = W
IEA,D
i > W
N
i ∧W optj = W IEA,Dj > WNj .
• A comparison of the alternative IEA versions shows that the FDI host country
i benefits by more in regime D than in regime U: W IEA,Di > W
IEA,U
i > W
N
i .
This result is attributable to the fact that regime D completely eliminates FDI
competition in profit taxes and thus enables country i to extract the complete
foreign profit. This is different in regime U, which also mitigates corporate-tax-
policy competition to a certain extent, but does not completely eliminate it. In
the associated policy equilibrium, the countries offer the complete net FDI surplus
to the foreign firm as investment incentive in terms of a low profit-tax burden (see
Section 7.3.2).
• For the importing country j, on the contrary, it makes no difference, which IEA
regime it faces: W IEA,Dj = W
IEA,U
j > W
N
j . This equality is due to the fact that
country j´s individual-welfare level is solely determined by the host country´s
emissions-tax rate (see the proof of Proposition 7.1 in Appendix C.1), which is
the same in both IEA scenarios.
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• Finally, an inter-country comparison of individual-welfare levels in both IEA sce-
narios yields interesting insights: It is straightforward to show that in the regime-
D policy equilibrium, the FDI host country is better off than the importing coun-
try: W IEA,Di > W
IEA,D
j . This is due to the complete elimination of profit-tax
competition, which enables country i to realize the complete net FDI surplus,
since this need not be “competed away” to the foreign firm. Its welfare will thus
exceed the level attainable in the importing country by exactly this amount. In
regime U, on the contrary, FDI competition persists, leaving both countries with
identical welfare levels: W IEA,Ui = W
IEA,U
j (see Section 7.3.2).
This finding has general implications concerning the political feasibility of such
an IEA in the “real world”: The individual-welfare differential between the FDI
host and its neighbor casts some doubt on the assumption that countries succeed
in concluding an IEA with differentiated policy levels, though such agreement
is superior to the uniform alternative in welfare-terms. When thinking of this
issue, one has to consider that an IEA is not imposed by some federal author-
ity with the aim of maximizing aggregate welfare (as supposed in Davies/Ellis
(2007)). Rather, an IEA involves negotiations between sovereign national states,
each focussing on its individual domestic-welfare maximization (though to a cer-
tain extent recognizing the need to cooperate internationally). Since countries in
the model framework applied here are symmetric, there is no political justification
for differentiated policy levels: Which of the two countries would voluntarily com-
mit to setting prohibitively high taxes and so deter the investment, if its neighbor
is enabled to definitely become the FDI host?
These plausibility considerations suggest to introduce the IEA, in the given model
framework, as a uniform, rather than a differentiated-policy agreement. Conse-
quently, this chapter treats the latter IEA version, just like the social optimum,
as an ideal, rather hypothetical version of international policy-cooperation.
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